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Abstract 
 
Do genes or environments have more of a role to play in the development of 
psychological traits? The nature versus nurture debate takes many forms and recent 
developmental systems arguments consider the roles of developmental resources to 
be inextricably linked. In this thesis I show that some elements of human culture, 
specifically technologies, play a privileged role in psychological development. 
Moreover, as we invent new technologies, we change the developmental 
environment for the present and subsequent generations, thereby causing evolution 
of the mind. I begin by outlining evidence, which shows that culture, and technology 
in particular, cause novel psychological traits to develop. Then I explain the 
evolutionary dynamics by which novel technologies and traits co-elaborate each 
other. The brain has evolved adaptations for plasticity and responds to environmental 
challenges in novel ways during development. I also show that brains often integrate 
with the material world, incorporating symbols, technologies and other artefacts as 
part of distributed information processing systems. Having demonstrated that 
technology has a causal role to play in cognitive development and function, I then 
move on to explain how we can distinguish among causal roles and thereby favour 
some causes over others in explanations of the development of traits. Beginning with 
Woodward’s analysis of three dimensions of biological causation, I build a concept 
space and incorporate a fourth dimension of causation. This modified four-
dimensional concept space of causal roles allows us to categorize and distinguish the 
causal role of genetic and non-genetic developmental resources. It turns out that, 
with respect to some questions or effects we are interested in, genes are important, 
and with respect to many other effects or developmental outcomes, cultural 
technologies are more privileged causes. I illustrate the use of this causal analysis tool 
by explaining the development of critical thinking skills. I conclude by arguing that the 
privileged role of technology in psychological development may help to explain two 
problems in human prehistory. First, it helps to explain why there was a lag between 
Homo sapiens becoming anatomically modern and only later becoming behaviourally 
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modern, and second, it helps to explain the mysterious extinction of the 
Neanderthals.  
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INTRODUCTION – The Moghul Emperor Akbar and the Nuclear 
Apocalypse 
 
 
Evolution has been transferred from the organism to the environment… in the 
products of art, and the recorded examples of noble lives, we have an environment 
which is at the same time the product of mental evolution, and affords the condition 
of the development of each individual mind to-day. (Morgan 1896) 
 
Imagine that there is a nuclear apocalypse. All adult humans are killed and all 
technology as we know it is destroyed. This includes computers, the Internet, books, 
all representational media, all social technologies such as education systems and 
syllabi too. Somehow a few young children manage to survive the effects of the 
radiation alongside rats, cockroaches and the odd genetically modified crop. The rats 
and cockroaches go about their daily business pretty much as before the disaster. 
They scurry about, eat food, breed, perhaps solve the odd maze or two. But what 
about the human children, how do they behave? Or more particularly, how do they 
think?  
 
Unfortunately for humanity, a hideous undertaking suggests an answer: the Moghul 
emperor Akbar (1542-1605) conducted a similar experiment (Catrou 1826; Ridley, 
2003, p. 169). Akbar, who conceived of his monstrous experiment as progressive 
science, was motivated from a weariness of religious warfare and decided to 
determine whether humans were innately Hindu, Christian or Muslim. Several 
children were raised in silence and isolation, in a fortified castle, tended to only by 
deaf mutes1. Brought before the court at the age of twelve: 
 
…these children appeared before the emperor, to the surprise of every one, they 
were found incapable of expressing themselves in any language, or even of uttering 
any articulate sounds. They used only certain gestures to express their thoughts, and 
these were all the means which they possessed of conveying their ideas, or a sense of 
their wants. They were, indeed, so extremely shy, and, at the same time, of an aspect 
                                                             
1
 Harlow & Soumi (1971) have conducted similar experiments with monkeys and report similar results.  
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and manners so uncouth and uncultivated, that it required great labour and 
perseverance to bring them under any discipline, and to enable them to acquire the 
proper use of their tongues, of which they had previously almost entirely denied 
themselves the exercise. (Catrou 1826, p. 117) 
 
One final (fictional) scenario appears in Jean Auel’s ‘Clan of the Cave Bear’. Here the 
Homo sapiens child Ayla is raised by Neanderthals. As she grows up her human 
cunning and intelligence enable her to succeed in the Neanderthal clan. Though an 
entertaining and sweeping epic, this book’s premise is gravely misconceived. Ayla in 
all probability would have grown up thinking and acting just like her Neanderthal 
caregivers. As I will demonstrate later in chapter eight, in all likelihood if the premise 
had been reversed and a Neanderthal child was raised by humans then the child 
would have grown up expressing human competence with symbols and a degree of 
abstract thought probably not achieved by ‘wild-type’ Neanderthals.  
 
Obviously, neither Hinduism, nor Christianity, nor Islam is innate. But I will argue that 
virtually nothing is ‘innate’ in our common conception of the term. This conception 
being some approximation of invariantness and having an evolved history (see 
chapters two and seven for discussion). Furthermore, our usage of the concept 
‘innate’ is confused. Brains develop in a rich context. A highly flexible system of 
neurons is causally structured by the environment. Indeed, as we will see in chapter 
three, the environment in many ways is a part of the mind, or at least the supportive 
crutch that allows the mind to function as it does.  
 
In what follows I will be particularly focusing on human constructed environments. I 
will demonstrate how the worlds we build in turn build our minds. Processes of niche 
construction, technological innovation, the structuring of education systems and the 
ongoing integration of brains with the world have driven human psychological 
evolution, particularly over the last 40,000 years. With a particular focus on 
technology, I aim to show that not only does technology and educational structure 
explain the unparalleled success of Homo sapiens, but the environments we are 
creating right now, are having real-time effects on how our children think. Not only 
do Akbar’s deprivation experiments (and a host of animal data) show that 
impoverished environments alter psychological phenotypes, but enrichment data 
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(from animals and humans) show that brains are highly adaptive and plastic, 
responding in novel ways to novel environments. The constraints on development are 
not as stringent as some nativists have argued and a wide range of cognitive 
phenotypes can be built by structuring in the environment. I note, however, that the 
argument has certain important caveats. Sometimes simple restructuring of the brain 
can have extreme consequences for development and subsequent cognitive ability.  
 
I am interested in what humans have done, can do, or might be able to do. Human 
action is driven by psychology. I will be taking a broad approach to what counts as a 
psychological trait. All skills, knowledge, or processes, mediated (in part, but not 
necessarily exclusively) by the neural system, in particular those that are the subject 
matter of cognitive science or educational psychology, and which help to determine 
human action, will be of interest. This will include thought processes, algorithms for 
solving problems, databases of factual knowledge, and variations in perception, 
language, attention, memory, intelligence, emotion, and so on. All such things will 
count as psychological traits for the purposes of the present argument.  
 
The sociocultural perspective on psychological development championed by Vygotsky 
(1978) claims that children develop cognitive structures in response to the use of 
cultural tools and language. The developmental cultural environment accordingly 
influences what cognitive devices the child acquires. I plan on assessing the evidence 
for this approach to cognitive development. I will try to establish in which domains, if 
any, culture determines psychology; and if particular cultural objects or technologies 
are the difference makers in the formation of some cognitive device rather than 
another. There is, furthermore, a debate over whether any causes of development 
carry information about, or represent, the outcomes of development. For example, 
do genes ever ‘code’ for traits? In chapter four I will outline these arguments, and 
deny that genes can be considered semantic information bearers or developmental 
codes. I will explain what it would take for anything to be a bona fide developmental 
code, and in chapter seven I suggest that almost nothing can satisfy these criteria. 
Cultural objects and technologies are unlikely to code for their causal effects in 
development.  
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All this throws up a further important question, which will become the focus of 
several later chapters. This is the main question my thesis addresses. If there are 
multiple, necessary, interacting causes of development, how are we to apportion 
causal responsibility in explanations of development? If technology is a cause of 
psychological development, and culture in general has a role to play, and other 
environmental features have their own influences, and genes obviously feature in 
these causal explanations, how do we explain which causes are important, and why? I 
argue that it is possible to understand complex development without committing to 
simple single factor determinist theories of causation on one hand, or being drawn 
into intractable systems approaches on the other.  
 
To clarify, I am only interested in human psychological traits. Though some of the 
arguments may generalize to non-psychological traits, or to non-human traits, others 
will not. This is partly because of the special sort of organ of plasticity that the brain 
is. Once we see in chapter two what sort of thing we are dealing with when we 
examine the brain we will understand why my arguments may sometimes not apply 
to hearts, hair colour, or hormone levels. 
 
ARGUMENT PRECIS 
Part One – Cultural Technology and Psychological Traits 
 
The argument is that human psychological development is influenced by 
developmental environments. Sometimes these developmental environments are 
partly constituted by human technologies. As technology changes over time, 
developmental environments change. This results in different psychological traits in 
different places and at different times. A key claim of my argument is that we can 
distinguish among causes in development and that sometimes human technologies 
are important or privileged causes of cognitive development. They, therefore, ought 
to feature prominently in developmental and evolutionary explanations.  
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The argument proceeds as follows: In chapter one I catalogue correlations between 
various cultural technologies and a range of psychological traits. In many instances 
the relationship is causal. This will show that culture can modulate, affect, attention, 
and some of the constituents of IQ, such as numerical cognition. Overall, I show that 
cultural technology is a cause of psychological traits.  
 
In chapter two I outline an explanation of these effects. Culture causes psychological 
traits through experience-dependent neural plasticity. I discuss the 
neuroconstructivist approach to psychological development. Even taken in 
conjunction with nativist approaches, neuroconstructivist data suggests that it 
unlikely that anything is ‘innate’ in the common sense of the word, and that the 
construction of minds always depends on context. Rather than claiming 
environmental determinism, I am attempting to explain the mechanism behind the 
phenomena I illustrated in the first chapter.  
 
Chapter three shifts attention from development to context and examines how 
constructivist brains integrate with, and depend upon, external media for their 
development and function. I discuss the notion that our brains integrate with and 
depend upon our bodies and external supports for thinking. Furthermore, sometimes 
these external supports constitute proper parts of our cognitive systems. This will 
demonstrate that it is not only developmentally that we are shaped by external 
factors, but that operationally minds require the integration of brains, bodies and the 
technological world.  
 
To this point I will have outlined the observable effects of cultural technology on 
psychology, and three relationships between cultural technology and minds. The first 
effect is a causal developmental relation. I will show that technology has measurable 
effects on the outcome of development, causing some traits rather than others to 
emerge. Second, I demonstrate a functional dependence relation. In these cases 
technology plays an essential role in the operation of some human psychological 
capabilities. Finally, I argue for a constitutive cognitive relation. If this argument 
works for any given technology, the technology is to be properly seen as a component 
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of the agent’s cognitive system. These arguments will lead into part two of the thesis 
where I examine kinds of causal roles in development in general and build a tool to 
catalogue the kinds of roles that cultural technologies (as compared to other factors) 
play in psychological development.  
 
Part Two – Untangling Causation in Development 
 
In chapter four I introduce and explain a concept-space tool that we can use to 
distinguish among causal kinds in developmental systems. First, I introduce 
developmental systems theory. One of the key arguments that systems theorists have 
made is to reduce the role of genes to no more important than any other element in 
the developmental matrix. In response some argue that the informational content of 
genes is reason to privilege them in explanations about development. I argue that this 
is wrong. I then discuss the idea that genes are privileged, sometimes, in some 
contexts, and with respect to some questions. But they are privileged for the same 
reasons that any other aspect of the developmental matrix (including cultural 
technologies) may be privileged. Developmental causal privilege is a function of kind 
of causal role, not of information. By taking a causal analysis approach we can bring 
structure to developmental systems theory and to nature-nurture debates. The tool I 
introduce for analysing and representing causes does just this.  
 
In chapter five I apply the tool generated in chapter four to several causal factors in 
development. I demonstrate that genes are neither a universally privileged cause, 
neither do they play a homogenous role in development. They are sometimes 
important, but so are some cultural technological causes of psychological traits. I 
emphasize that not all causes are equal, and that the tool introduced in chapter four 
can help us analyze whether causes are privileged, and why.  
 
Chapter six details a case study that uses the tool to analyze the causes of one 
psychological trait, the ability to think critically. I explain why many of its causes are 
not relevant to causal models of this trait’s development. I then construct a toy 
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example of a causal explanatory model for this trait and emphasize the importance of 
cultural technologies in its development. This move sheds light on the importance of 
the role of cultural technologies in causing the psychological traits we encountered 
back in chapter one.  
 
The concept space introduced in chapter four can be used to understand some 
concepts in biology. I show in chapter seven that regions of the space and the causes 
therein help us understand the concept of innateness, and what it takes to be a code 
for development. This chapter summarizes the theoretical implications of the causal 
analysis tool. 
 
Part Three – Evolution and the Sapient Paradox 
 
Finally, in chapter eight, I turn from development and causes to evolution. If 
psychological development in part depends on cultural technological environments, 
then psychological evolution will occur when such developmental environments 
change. Understanding this helps explain the ‘sapient paradox’ (Renfrew 2008). This 
is the question of why there is such a long temporal gap between the ‘modern’ 
human genome being established and the significant behavioural and cognitive take-
off of the Holocene (the last ten thousand years). A related question is why the 
comparatively similar species Homo sapiens and Homo neanderthalensis took such 
radically different evolutionary trajectories leading up to the Holocene. The fates of 
these species could not have been more different. Neanderthal became extinct and 
Homo sapiens went on to dominate the planet. In this final chapter I explain how 
parts one and two of this thesis contribute to resolving these questions.  
 
To reitirate, the overall thesis argument is that as we build our worlds, by inventing 
and propagating technological innovations, we are also shaping our minds through 
developmental processes influenced by technological innovation. This is paradigmatic 
of, and exemplifies, the theory of cognitive niche construction. Psychological 
development is a complex process, but we can demonstrate on principled grounds, 
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that technological culture plays an important, privileged, role in the emergence of 
some traits. 
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Cultural Technology and Psychological Traits 
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CHAPTER ONE – Technology is a Cause of Psychological Traits 
 
Introduction 
 
In this opening chapter I will show that cultures, and in particular technologies, have 
causal influence over psychological traits in humans. After a brief discussion of what I 
take technology to be, I will catalogue several different domains of human psychology 
that are open to modulation by cultural context. I will describe variability in 
intelligence, mathematical cognition, affect and attention. I show that all of these are 
partly or largely constructed according to cultural technological context. My general 
strategy will be to provide evidence that there is variation for each domain across or 
between populations (this may be temporal variation across relatively short 
timescales), and then to follow this with examples of which technologies are 
implicated in producing some of the variation. 
 
The reason for describing these phenomena is so that I can highlight the wide range 
of potentially important components of the developmental matrix with respect to 
human psychology. Once we understand the sorts of contexts that produce a range of 
cognitive phenotypes we can start to identify particular sorts of causes of human 
psychological traits. This will help us eventually to bring structure to the complexities 
of development and to answer questions about prehistoric human minds by 
correlating variation in cognitive phenotype with variation in environments. 
 
There are many cultural influences on psychological development. For example, poor 
maternal nutrition causes low birth weight. This has been shown to lead to low 
cognitive scores and poor problem solving ability (Walker et al. 2007). These 
researchers also found that caregiver sensitivity, responsiveness to the child, and 
caregiver affect, all led to differences in cognitive outcomes. As did ‘cognitive 
stimulation’, which sometimes resulted from teaching mothers to develop children’s 
skills. In this thesis however I am interested in technology. What role is technology 
playing in the development of psychological traits? What role has human constructed 
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technology played in modulating psychological development over historical and 
evolutionary time? 
 
By cultural technology I mean anything that is invented and made by humans, that is 
open to innovation, and has a public dimension, in that the entity can be shared 
between individuals as well as modified, formalized and potentially documented by 
them using external media. I want to rule out things that are purely behaviours, 
unless those behaviours depend upon tools. Tools might be anything from lists on 
clay tablets, to stone-tipped spears, to personal computers, or a syllabus in formal 
physics education. If behaviour depends in part on tools then it is technological. I 
count words because these are open to innovation, invention, can exist as public 
representations and be shared among individuals. Clearly there can be paradigm and 
more marginal cases of technologies. Words are perhaps a marginal case, whereas an 
iphone is paradigm case.  
 
Nickerson (2005) conceives of technology as the building of artifacts or procedures 
(tools) to help people accomplish their goals. I am happy to accept that procedures 
are technologies. Behaviours on their own are not, but if the behaviour depends on a 
procedure that can be invented, modified, shared, formalized, documented and so 
forth, then it is technological. Techniques will be technological if they are procedures 
or if they depend on tools.  
 
Intelligence and the Flynn Effect 
 
The intelligence quotient (IQ) measures the age-adjusted ability of individuals to 
perform certain mental tasks. It is established that the average population IQ has 
been rising over the one hundred years since the tests were invented (Flynn 1987, 
1999). This phenomenon is known as the ‘Flynn Effect’ and is well explicated in Flynn 
(2007). There is much debate surrounding what it is that IQ tests actually measure 
(see e.g. Steen 2009) but for my purposes it is sufficient that IQ measures something 
consistent. The fact that IQ has demonstrably and uncontroversially changed shows 
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that there has been a cognitive change. This cannot be genetic as the effects can be 
measured in a single generation. 
 
In industrialised nations the rises have measured 1.33 standard deviations in one 
generation. In rural Kenya the rises between 1984 and 1998 were even more 
dramatic (Daley et al. 2003). Various hypotheses have been put forward as possible 
explanations. These include: improved nutrition and health care, changes to family 
structure, improved schooling and increases in environmental complexity. Possible 
specific explanations for this ‘Flynn effect’ abound, but models that appeal to 
improved diet, genetic changes, or experience practicing the tests have been largely 
ruled out (Flynn, 2007; Johnson, 2005). For example, data from the Daley study 
suggests that health in Kenyan children was worse in 19982. Also these researchers 
have controlled for methodological issues unlike several of the western studies. For 
example, the IQ tests given in 1984 and 1998 are unlike the Kenyan children’s normal 
schooling. The same cannot be claimed in the west. The main remaining explanations 
are improved schooling and ‘environmental complexity’.  
 
We can measure different aspects of intelligence. These are classed as crystallized 
intelligence and fluid intelligence. Crystallized intelligence refers to the set of factual 
knowledge that an individual learns and includes such things such as vocabulary and 
times-tables. A person’s education and experience determines what they learn and 
how they are able to apply this knowledge. Crystallized intelligence also increases 
with age (Toga & Thompson 2005). Fluid intelligence refers to more analytic 
reasoning and memory capacities and the processing speed of cognition. This declines 
with age. 
 
Interestingly the observed IQ rises are not uniform across all IQ sub-tests. The rises 
occur largely in the Raven’s Matrices and Similarities sub-tests (see figure 2). Changes 
in these tests have been shown to be up to two standard deviations in 50 years. 
These sub-tests assess abstract thought and fluid intelligence. The similarities sub-test 
                                                             
2
 These researchers don’t draw this conclusion from their data, though it is clear that the incidence of 
significant anaemia increased over the study period. Anaemia in Africa is almost certainly due to 
hookworm and treatment-resistant malaria. 
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asks questions like, ‘in what way are dogs and rabbits alike?’ Figure 1 shows an 
example of Raven’s Matrices. 
 
 
 
So, fluid intelligence has increased. Overall I am less interested in whether high IQ is a 
useful trait to possess. I am merely interested in the fact that there have been 
population-wide changes in psychological traits over brief periods of time. Let’s now 
look in more detail at two of the proposed causes of these IQ gains. First ‘improved 
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schooling’, and second ‘environmental complexity’ (of which improved schooling may 
actually be an instance).  
 
One explanatory model appeals to changes in formal education technologies 
(including syllabi and techniques for presenting material) over the twentieth century. 
This is the neurodevelopmental schooling hypothesis (Blair et al. 2005). This theory 
notes that in the first half of the twentieth century the wider availability of formal 
math education caused a population-wide IQ rise. And once math education was 
universally available, an increasing focus after the 1950s on providing fluid-
intelligence-demanding problems to younger students continued the trend. For 
example, geometry, once the realm of university mathematics education, was taught 
to elementary students. Also, children taught arithmetic using traditional rote and 
algorithmic methods tend to use more rigid and less effective techniques to solve 
problems than those who learned socially and constructively, figuring out the 
properties of the decimal system through emphasis on concepts and manipulative 
materials. So it is proposed that this twentieth century increase in IQ was a two-phase 
process. Importantly, the skills required for these math tasks crossover with Raven’s 
matrices and the Similarities IQ sub-tests. Not only do twentieth century school math 
text books include question items similar to Raven’s Matrices (Blair et al. 2005), but 
the Raven’s items test the ability to induce abstract relations and manage a large set 
of problem solving goals in working memory (Carpenter et al. 1990). All this suggests 
that changes to math education practices, especially when more and more abstract 
concepts are being taught to younger students, will drive IQ gains. The reason why 
literacy and numeracy scores have remained relatively static is because reading and 
arithmetic have been part of ordinary human society for a long time, whereas more 
abstract categorization of the world is a relatively new phenomenon and is associated 
with the more recent scientific worldview.  
 
Science education is, therefore, likely to be another contributing factor. Just as 
experience with mathematical symbols can open up new conceptual possibilities, so 
experience with scientific concepts can open up new categories of thought and 
therefore new possibilities for action in the world. Flynn (2007) describes some 
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questions posed in the similarities sub-test. When asked about the relationship 
between a rabbit and a dog, students not educated with a scientific worldview state 
things like, ‘a dog chases a rabbit.’ The thought is concrete. But those scientifically 
educated may suggest that both animals are mammals. New possibilities for 
describing the world emerge. The important point, and a theme of this thesis, is that 
changes to pedagogical procedures, content, and method, change psychological traits 
in the developing generation.  
 
Another proposed contributing cause of the Flynn effect is ‘environmental 
complexity’. As with laboratory animal cognition (e.g. Lewis 2004, also chapter 2 of 
the present work), ‘environmental complexity’, loosely construed, has been 
suggested as a factor in the rising IQ scores seen globally.  Johnson (2005) suggests 
that popular media has had a dramatic effect. He compares the cognitive demands of 
contemporary media with those of a few decades ago. For example, ‘Dragnet,’ a 
1970s detective show, tended to follow a linear plot, always from the detectives’ 
point of view. ‘The Sopranos,’ a more recent mafia series, has multiple plot strands, 
running through many episodes, with point of view changing from scene to scene. 
Similarly, the social network of 1980s show ‘Dallas’ involved only a handful of key 
characters, whereas the more recent show ‘24’ requires the viewer to track the 
relationships of a few dozen. Johnson also argues that videogames have become 
fiendishly complex and maddeningly hard. Furthermore, by encouraging players to 
probe, hypothesize and re-probe, they are encouraging scientific thought. Johnson 
argues that hypertext and the Internet have changed the way we think, and have 
encouraged us to manipulate information, to act upon it rather than just let it wash 
over us.  
 
It may be difficult to test relative overall complexity because as some things get more 
complex others become simplified. For example, there is no doubt that the visual 
symbolic complexity of our environment has increased during the twentieth century, 
however, the general trend in many parts of the world to a smaller family size has 
reduced the social complexity of particular aspects of people’s lives (and conversely 
increased social complexity in other aspects). So we may see a variety of cognitive 
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effects, enhancements to visual symbolic processing, and possible decreases in 
cognitive aspects such as empathy (see the section titled ‘The Affect Effect’ below).  
 
The argument is that it is our children’s mental diet that has changed from 1900 to 
2000, not their edible diet. In 1900 children might help with household chores, play 
stickball, read books or even undertake manual work. In 2000 they are creatively 
using text in instant messaging, following masses of baseball stats, entering virtual 
worlds where physical laws are broken, and following intricate plots on television 
series. As we will see in chapter two, the human brain is malleable and responds to 
what it experiences. Today we feed a more and more complex diet to our brains. 
Hence, argues Johnson, popular culture in part drives the Flynn Effect.  
 
We see stepped stimuli throughout the twentieth century; the complexity of media, 
games, communication, and school syllabi has progressively increased. Of course 
higher IQs also thirst for more complex puzzles, so a pop culture ratchet begins. If this 
is true, we should see marked inter-cultural effects, and rural-urban effects too, 
because socio-cultural factors are not uniform in their effects on populations. 
Alexopoulos (1997) compared rural and urban IQs in Greece in 1979 and in 1997. He 
found a difference of 12 IQ points favouring urban Greeks in 1979. This had reduced 
to 4 points by 1997. The suggestion is that increased media penetration, 
transportation, and an overall rise in ‘cultural level’ in rural areas has driven this. This 
is entirely consistent with the drivers of the Flynn Effect that I have already described. 
Sternberg & Preiss (2005) quotes similar effects in the USA. 
 
The Flynn Effect is not lost on those who monitor popular culture as critics either. In 
an essay about the 2010 film ‘Inception’ (which subsequently won four Oscars at the 
2011 Academy Awards), Patrick Goldstein of the Los Angeles Times writes: 
 
‘Some critics have raved about the film’s originality while others have mocked its 
excesses. If you were a young moviegoer, you loved the visually arresting puzzle-box 
thriller. But the older you got, the more likely you were to detest the film’s run ‘n’ 
gun, dream-within-a-dream complexity.’ 
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The idea is that the younger generation who have grown up on a diet of computer 
games, with their range of worlds and levels, more easily track the narrative density 
and clues of ‘Inception’ (Goldstein 2010). There is no doubt that a switch to visually 
based cognitive development in the late twentieth century is influencing cognition.  
 
It is argued that intelligence is strongly heritable (e.g. Toga & Thompson, 2005). 
Therefore there is a paradox in postulating large environmentally-dependent changes 
in IQ over a couple of generations. But Dickens & Flynn (2001) resolve this paradox. A 
key part of the explanation follows Lewontin’s (1995) arguments about gene-
environment interactions. Lewontin notes that plant height might be largely 
genetically determined, but we could take a sack of corn and divide it in half. Plant 
half and fertilize it, and plant half and not fertilize it. The (significant) difference in 
mean height between the two populations would be the result solely of environment. 
So the question is this: is there an ‘IQ nitrate’ that has been in action in human 
environments in the last century? This would be one possible explanation.  
 
Dickens & Flynn (2001) resolve this paradox further by explaining a model in which 
people’s IQs are determined by genes and their environment, but in which 
environment is matched to their IQs. Basically this is the idea that people with slightly 
higher IQs may be rewarded for good test scores, or find intellectual pursuits more 
enjoyable, so they seek out environments like libraries and practice math problems in 
their spare time. This would lead to further intelligence gains and so on. The idea is 
perhaps simply elucidated by imagining two genetic variants, x and y, and a range of 
environments A through E. We can plot a table of the hypothetical IQ scores of 
individuals with each genotype in each environment (figure 3): 
 
Environment A B C D E 
Genotype X / Y X / Y X / Y X / Y X / Y 
IQ 90 / 100 90 / 105 90 / 105 95 / 110 100 / 130 
 
Figure 3. Hypothetical Gene-Environment Mappings 
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But importantly, possessing genotype Y tends to cause people to select environment 
E. It is hard to see how IQ could be described as ‘innate’ given these interactions.  
 
Mathematical Cognition 
 
Having suggested some pedagogic and technological influences on IQ, I will now 
explore mathematical cognition. Language has an effect on human cognitive 
development. It enables us to do things with our minds. Speakers of Piraha (which 
lacks consistent number words entirely) although able to match quantities and 
therefore have an appreciation of the concept of exact quantity, are unable to 
remember and compare cardinalities across space and time and therefore lack basic 
arithmetic skill. It also seems that Piraha speakers do not represent exact cardinality 
mentally (Frank et al. 2008, Pica et al. 2004, Everett 2005). This phenomenon can be 
explained once we understand a little about the mathematical competences of the 
primates.  
 
Numerical cognition in primates and humans exhibits some similarities but many 
striking differences. It appears that there are at least three systems involved in 
number concepts. A low-numerical-value exact system enabling comparison of 
numbers up to about three or four, which primates clearly possess as they can make 
selections preferring two to one, and three to two food items (Hauser et al. 2000). 
There is a large number approximate system, which permits comparison between 
larger numerical concepts. But the resolution of this system is limited and the larger 
number of objects must be approximately 1.5 times the size of the smaller (more for 
infants, less for adult humans). This is the Weber limit on performance. Human adults 
possess a Weber limit at a ratio of about 1.15 to 1 (Lipton & Spelke 2004). 
Discriminability depends on this ratio. Rhesus monkeys were unable to discriminate 
between 3 and 8 on a choice task. Cotton-top tamarins can represent number cross-
modally but not precisely (Hauser et al. 2003). So it appears that primates possess but 
lack significant skills with this device. The third system is the large number exact 
system. This is necessary for exact arithmetic operations with large numbers, for 
example calculating the discrete sum of 12+19. It appears that this system is not only 
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language-dependent but also depends on the language learned. As noted above, 
speakers of Piraha (Gordon 2004) and Munduruku (Pica et al. 2004), which lack 
number words, have no real skills with large numerical manipulation. Here we see an 
example of rich language, or ‘environmental complexity’ in the more general Flynn 
Effect terminology, enabling a psychological trait, number sense. There is no large-
number exact system without environmental support.  
 
Speech, and more particularly, the specific language spoken can play an essential role 
in the organization of higher functions. Language, as I have noted already, is a 
technology, albeit a less paradigm case. We can craft it and employ it as a tool. 
Dennett (2000) is explicit about the nature of language as a tool. He uses the phrase 
‘tools for thinking’ when referring to words.  
 
Let’s move on from language to symbols, particularly representation using the 
number line. When asked to perform mathematical manipulations that involve 
employing negative numbers children perform very badly and respond with 
statements such as, ‘you can’t do it’. Their conceptual appreciation of negative 
quantities depends on either exploring the physical number line, investigating the 
minus sign, or perhaps both. Without encountering the number line as a model, 
negative quantities are unimaginable. The problem, ‘what are four apples minus ten 
apples’ has no solution (Vlassis 2008).  
 
If asked, ‘can you write “no cats”?’ a pre-reading child says, ‘you can’t write that 
cause there are no cats’ (Olson 2005, p. 63). Concepts that relate to existing real-
world objects such as ‘cat’ can develop without the symbol or word for ‘cat’, but the 
concept ‘negative three’ can’t exist without the number line, minus symbol, or both. 
Saying, ‘the opposite of three’, or ‘not three’, fails to capture the concept, as the 
solution here intuitively seems to be ‘zero’, or at least ‘nothing’. In normal human 
ontogeny, the acquisition of the concept of negative numbers requires public 
symbols. The concept of debt is not enough to scaffold the development of concepts 
of negative quantities because a debt itself is always a positive sum. 
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Symbols that don’t relate directly to the material world can permit entirely new 
relations or concepts to be understood. Indeed, symbol-trained primates can learn to 
manipulate second order relations of sameness and difference through symbol 
identification (Thompson, Oden, Boysen, 1997) whereas wild primates never do. 
Chimps can be trained to recognize relations of sameness and difference and tag pairs 
such as cup/cup or cup/shoe with the appropriate arbitrary symbol. Important is the 
next step of the experiment where tag-trained chimps, and only tag-trained chimps, 
could then repeat the task with higher-order sameness and difference relations using 
pairs such as cup-cup/cup-shoe. The idea is that the tag training allowed the chimps 
to reduce the higher-order problem to a descriptively less complex scene by mentally 
substituting each pair with a sameness or difference symbol. They could then take 
this new pair of just two objects and repeat the process. Humans of course make 
many such substitutions every day. Something as simple as putting all my lollies in 
one bag and all yours into another bag reduces the descriptive complexity of a task. 
Labelling the world with tags, containers or categories increases our computational 
opportunities. By learning to label the world a host of previously imperceptible 
relations become apparent and useful to us.  
 
The notation system learned influences the difficulty of mathematical operations. 
Imagine trying to do long division with Roman Numerals. It is not impossible, but is 
considerably more difficult. The Arabic system is more suited to the problem. At one 
grain of analysis the function (coming up with the right answer) is the same. But at 
one grain of analysis the flight of birds and of jet aircraft is the same. Yet there is 
something importantly different and interesting about birds as compared to jet 
aircraft. Marr (1982) distinguishes between the functional and the algorithm level of a 
process. A process may count as ‘doing arithmetic’, in the sense of mapping two 
numbers to one sum. This does not depend on the system employed. However, at a 
different level of analysis we are choosing particular representations to input and 
output, and an algorithm by which the process is achieved. This second level specifies 
‘how’ we are performing the calculation. The choice of an algorithm is constrained by 
what it has to do (say, long division) and the hardware upon which it must run (some 
combination of symbols and human brains). The differences in how a cognitive 
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manipulation is performed are real and important differences in many instances. 
Some symbols open up new possibilities for cognitive manipulations that involve 
physically shifting external symbols on external media. The cognitive process of 
calculation then supervenes on this system of brain, pencil and symbols. Once new 
rules or concepts have been created then new cognitive possibilities open up. I will 
discuss these issues further in chapter three.  
 
Language and symbols have important roles to play in mathematical capability. 
Different linguistic and symbolic environments can lead to different mathematical 
capacities. I want to move now away from the general area of intelligence and 
mathematical cognition, to look more closely at a completely different domain of 
human psychology, that being affect and emotion.  
 
The Affect Effect 
 
Affect is a term used in psychology to recognize someone’s emotional state or the 
way they are feeling. It also denotes the outward appearance of such states. I now 
describe research that suggests there has been recent cultural modulation of affect. I 
consider empathy and aggression. 
 
Eisenberg (2002) defines empathy as, ‘an affective response that stems from the 
apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition, and that 
is similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel’ (p. 135). 
Research demonstrates that empathy has changed over recent decades. In a meta-
analysis of 72 studies using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index,3 Konrath et al. (2011) 
show that college students in 2009 score significantly lower than those in 1979 on 
tests of empathic concern and perspective taking. Furthermore, the drop in empathy 
was most marked since 2000. In further analysis the same authors found that 
                                                             
3 The Interpersonal Reactivity Index is a 28-item scale that gauges aspects of interpersonal sensitivity 
including: Empathic concern (feelings of sympathy for others' misfortunes), perspective taking (how 
people imagine others' points of view), fantasy (how people identify with fictional characters in books 
or movies), and personal distress (how people feel when they see the misfortunes of others). 
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perceptions of people’s kindness and helpfulness have changed throughout the same 
time period.  
 
It would be interesting to know if this phenomena exhibits cross-cultural differences. 
Are there particular cultural factors that are driving the effect? Konrath et al. 
comment on the cultural and social composition of the college student population 
over time and conclude that it has not changed markedly in the study period. But 
what about non-college students? And are there rural-urban differences as we saw 
with the case study on IQ shifts? This sort of information would be useful to know. 
Konrath et al. attribute these changes to synchronus social and cultural changes. 
These include an increasing emphasis on the self, a preponderance of violent, 
horrifying media and the growth of online social media.  
 
‘With so much time spent interacting with others online and not in reality, 
interpersonal dynamics like empathy might certainly be altered. For example, 
perhaps it is easier to establish friends and relationships online, but these skills might 
not translate into smooth social relations in real life....’ (Konrath et al. 2011, p. 9).  
 
It may also be that the demands of college life have increased such that students 
don’t have sufficient time to worry about others.  
 
This large study merely shows a broad global effect of cultural context shifts on 
affect, specifically empathy. However, more refined research suggests that particular 
elements of culture may be contributing to the shift in empathy. Technology may play 
a role in this shift over time. It could be that the ease and speed of communication 
technology leads people to become more easily frustrated or bored. Perhaps the 
content of media may desensitize people to the pain of others or increase feelings of 
personal threat (Konrath et al. 2011). Whatever the combination of causes, I will now 
discuss one example. Research shows that violent computer games are causally 
implicated in aggressive behaviour.  
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Computer Games and Affect 
 
Swing and Anderson (2008) review thirty-two independent samples where the effects 
of violent games have been studied. They conclude that there is unequivocal 
evidence that short-term exposure to violent games produces immediate increases in 
aggression and that repeated, long-term exposure increases aggression across the 
lifespan. They further argue that poor methodology has underestimated this effect in 
previous studies. Some studies demonstrate that the correlation is causal. Violent 
responses still take provocation, and violent videogame exposure is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for aggressive responses, but rather is probabilistically causal in the 
same way that smoking causes lung cancer (clearly other factors are part of the causal 
matrix). The effect is supposedly more important than exposure to violence on 
television because the agent can rehearse the whole action sequence from threat 
appraisal to violent act and is intimately identifying with the aggressor, usually from a 
first-person point of view.  
 
Further analysis of videogames by Gee (2008) sheds light on why games are so good 
at teaching participants. Indeed, Gee argues that good videogames (by which he 
means entertaining and popular ones) illuminate how we learn. It is not a trivial feat 
to master something as complex as some contemporary videogames. So the game 
designers have built into the game features like safe practice arenas, just-in-time 
information cues and smart virtual artifacts. Game levels advance in difficulty so as to 
be on the edge of the player’s present capabilities. All these techniques conform to 
what is known about optimizing learning. The most complex yet learnable games 
even shed light on learning strategies not yet used in education. Games are powerful 
educators. They are also popular because of their continuous reward structures. This 
satisfies the brain’s dopaminergic system’s yearning for payoffs.  
 
With violent videogames we have a situation where real world players are in 
command of multiple identities, real and virtual. The identities can influence each 
other. This is indeed the case with many kinds of games, from role-playing with war 
paints and sticks to immersive virtual reality. Technology has both intended and 
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unintended effects (Sproull & Kiesler 1992a, 1992b). The intended effect of violent 
videogames is entertainment. An unintended effect is increasing the player’s 
disposition to aggression. This effect is likely to be one (among many) specific 
contributing factors to the empathy changes noted by Konrath et al. over the last few 
decades. It is important to note that I am not claiming that this is the only cause of 
empathy changes in the last decades. But I am suggesting that effects like this one 
will conspire to produce the effects measured in populations over time. 
 
Attention 
 
Cognitive science has generally concluded that attention has a limited capacity 
(Kahneman 1973). This is the basis behind laws that prohibit cell phone use while 
driving. Whether hand-held or hands-free, studies have shown that brake reaction 
time and object detection are impaired and accident rates rise (Watson & Strayer 
2010). However, given the arguments so far, we should not conclude that this 
capacity for attention is immutable. In fact it may be that different technological 
contexts cause differences in attentional capacity. Individuals from different 
developmental environments may perform differently on split-attention demanding 
tasks. I will present data below regarding computer games and attention that suggest 
that varying use of computer games may have some correlation to attentional 
capacity, but the correlation unfortunately is not conclusively demonstrated to be 
causal. However we will see that the argument for differing attentional capacities as a 
result of differing developmental contexts remains plausible. 
 
Watson & Strayer (2010) demonstrate that multi-tasking attentional differences do 
exist across populations. They found that virtually everyone tested on an 
experimental protocol that simulated cell-phone-while-driving showed decreases in 
performance. However, there was a small population of about 2.5% of subjects who 
showed no impairment at all4. These same 2.5% scored consistently in the top 
                                                             
4
 The 2.5% was 15 fold higher than a 100,000 trial Monte Carlo simulation run on the data.  
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quartile across a range of driving-related and auditory operation span tasks. This runs 
against the prevailing cognitive science wisdom that attention is always degraded in 
multi-tasking activities.  
 
However, there is a general trend in cognitive science to search for similarities rather 
than differences across a population. Often the task of a research program is to 
deduce how a particular cognitive task is effected in human beings (perhaps as 
opposed to, say, chimpanzees). However, arguments in the next chapter defending 
the plasticity of brains ought to cast doubt on this approach to cognitive 
investigation. Neural circuits may operate differently in different individuals. 
Questions perhaps should be framed as, what proportion of individuals express such 
and such a way of cognizing?  
 
Watson & Strayer identify those whose attention does not seem to be degraded 
while briefly multi-tasking. But they also argue that Parasuraman & Greenwood 
(2007) have found evidence for another unusual sub-population. The ‘odd man out’ in 
their experiment was an individual who could sustain attention on a single task 
without exhibiting vigilance fatigue. It may be that super multi-taskers and the odd 
man out are opposite ends of a phenotype spectrum (those good at focusing on many 
things at once, and those good at focusing on a single thing for a long time). The 
interesting question is what is the cause of these trait differences? Many potential 
causes of attention differences across a population exist. I will now suggest that 
computer game use may be one of them. 
Computer Games and Attention 
 
Dye et al. (2009) note that action video game players of all ages have enhanced 
attentional skills. This motivates the question of whether it is the games that cause 
this trait or not. Feng et al. (2007) found that ten hours of playing action games was 
enough to increase participants’ useful field of view on a visual attention task. 
Tahiroglu et al. (2009) found that use of computers increases attention in the short-
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term as measured by the Stroop TBAG test5. However, this was only for those for 
whom the computer game was novel. Participants for whom the computer game was 
a daily habit did not show improved attention. It may be that novel games increase 
frontal and prefrontal activation and executive functions such as attention. Overall, 
computer games seem to have some effect on short-term cognition but exactly what 
is unclear. Tahiroglu’s study also concurs with Chan & Rabinowitz (2006) who found 
that more than one hour per day use is correlated with inattention. Barlett et al. 
(2009) argue that research into computer games and cognitive development suggests 
that games can enhance selective attention, concentration, tracking and useful field 
of view. Considering that seasoned players seem not to show the effects it may be 
the aspect of novelty rather than a particular game or games that is important. Either 
way, using computer games seems to have some effect on attention.  
 
Again, I am not attempting to suggest that computer games are the sole cause of 
attentional variations in contemporary populations. I am merely suggesting that such 
technologies may be one part of a web of causes that are driving recent, rapid, trait 
variation and change across many domains of human psychology. Later, in chapter 
four, I will begin outlining a tool for analysing causal roles, which helps us untangle 
this causal web. 
 
Pedagogical Tools 
 
My final illustration of the effect of technology on psychological trait development for 
this chapter is the case of pedagogical tools. I will outline remedial reading software 
and diagram use for explaining concepts.  
 
Mioduser et al. (2000) explain that reading partly requires the ‘natural development’ 
of a suite of cognitive tools, and partly the ‘formal acquisition’ of a set of abilities. 
These researchers undertook an experimental study to see if features of computer-
                                                             
5
 The Stroop TBAG test has five subtests that sequentially involve reading colour words that are printed 
in black, reading coloured colour words, naming coloured circles, naming the colour of normal words, 
and naming the colour of coloured words where there are incongruities of colour and meaning.  
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based learning materials could enhance the learning of early reading skills in children 
at high-risk of learning disabilities. Improvement on three tests was significantly 
higher in the computer group than control groups.  
 
‘Children seem to benefit from computer-based work not only at the specific skills 
level but also, as a result of their improvement in academic achievement, in terms of 
motivational and self-confidence levels,’ (p. 58).   
 
They attribute this result to the embodiment effects of the computer. The child can 
press the screen, hear the sounds, and see the words. This active, embodied, 
engagement seems to enhance learning. There is immediate feedback and concrete 
manipulation of language. Of course, the acquisition of reading skills is highly 
individualized. Close observation of the child’s performance is followed by mindful 
pedagogic decision-making. But with an algorithm for individuation the computer can 
perform this role. Obviously this depends initially on the programmer’s intention, but 
technology and teacher’s intention can interact positively. The computer software, 
however, is clearly a part of the cause of the child’s reading skills.  
 
Another technology that is causally implicated in attaining cognitive skills is the use of 
diagrams. Overall, using schematics seems to enhance cognitive performance. When 
teaching cell biology, diagrams scaffold what we can learn and understand. Scheiter 
et al. (2009) found that a realistic dynamic visualisation when compared to a 
schematic one was less effective in teaching the concepts of cell replication. Only 
students who watched the realistic visualization twice (and not the schematic one) 
had lower learning outcomes. So schematic representations enhance learning about 
real natural processes.  
 
As the complexity of our visual environment increases due to information and 
communication technology, we can expect our skill with schemas, diagrams and other 
abstract representations to increase along with understanding of the concepts 
represented by these schemas.  
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Summary 
 
In this chapter I have illustrated that some technologies play a causal role in 
psychological development. I also emphasized variation in psychological traits due to 
variation in the technological exposure of individuals across place and time. 
Sometimes there are qualitative and dramatic differences in psychological traits, such 
as when comparing whether number words are present or absent. Sometimes the 
differences are of quantity or efficiency, such as with variations in action computer 
game use. I have shown that these effects cut across many domains of human 
psychology, from intelligence to affect.  
 
These examples underscore the importance of active engagement with the material 
and symbolic world when learning various concepts. It is also clear that technology 
can have unintended as well as intended consequences for cognition. This is 
demonstrated by the unintended increases in aggression derived from violent 
computer game play. Also, cultural change can drive population-wide changes in our 
psychological profiles. The Flynn Effect shows this. And finally, individuals within a 
population can have different developmental experiences and therefore different 
psychological traits.  
 
I also emphasized the interplay between technology and education. Take Mioduser’s 
literacy software for example. The computer is a designed product which requires 
syllabus planning by educators and face-to-face modulation via teachers. Cultural 
technological causes of many cognitive traits are probably often hybrid in this way. 
Education structures themselves, however, are cultural technologies (schools, classes, 
timetables, syllabi, pens, paper, calculators, tests, the internet, written feedback, and 
so on).  
 
Finally, many of the cultural technological influences on cognition (and there are a 
great many more than those I have described so far) are examples of humans 
inventing technologies and then perpetuating those technologies. As we build our 
worlds in this way we are changing not just the operative context of the present 
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generation, but also the developmental context of present and future people. This is 
a key phenomenon that I will return to later when I discuss niche construction and 
evolution in chapter three. Context is something that can be inherited.  
 
Key Claims 
 
The message that I am trying to convey is that there are a variety of causal 
relationships between technology and psychological traits. Technological innovation 
has the potential to lead to rapid shifts in the psychology of populations, and 
sometimes there are important differences in technological exposure between 
individuals. The nature and significance of these causal relationships are varied and 
will need untangling at some point. This is a project that I begin in chapter four. In the 
next chapter, I explore the neural shifts underpinning the psychological effects 
described so far.  
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CHAPTER TWO – The Neural Mechanism and Development 
 
Introduction 
 
I have just surveyed the influence that human technological culture has on our 
psychological development. The fact that technological culture influences our 
psychological phenotypes accords with the interactionist consensus in developmental 
biology (e.g. Sterelny & Griffiths 1999, Pennington et al. 2009, Levy 2004), which 
asserts that both genes and environments are important in developmental processes. 
It is not merely nature or nurture that is responsible for who we are but it is nature 
‘via nurture’ as Ridley puts it (2003). In the case of technological culture it is nature 
via technological culture (and other assorted determinants). But what is our nature 
when it comes to cognition? What mechanisms underpin the culture-psychology 
interactions I have described in chapter one? 
 
Different positions on the relative contribution of genes and environment exist. On 
one hand there is a stongly nativist school of thought. Such Evolutionary Psychologists 
claim that the majority of psychological development is determined by genetic 
influences. They further argue that these genes and gene networks were selected 
deep in the Pleistocene (1.7 million to 10,000 years ago) because they tended to lead 
to the development of domain-specific specialized cognitive modules, which solved 
the adaptive problems of that era. Evolutionary Psychology emphasizes the adapted 
nature of our minds. At the other end of the spectrum are various constructivist 
approaches, which see development as highly contextualised. Traits emerge as a 
flexible, general-purpose brain encounters the world. In this chapter I describe 
examples which indicate that the latter is more likely. Given that this position largely 
denies innateness, I will begin this chapter with a few paragraphs on what innateness 
is supposed to be and end the chapter with some reflection on this concept.  
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The structure of this chapter is as follows: First I make brief comments about the 
notion of innateness. I will then describe the positive case for a constructivist view of 
development. What emerges will be a picture of neural development that explains 
very clearly why we see the sort of culturally mediated psychological trait outcomes 
that I discussed in chapter one. I will not be denying adaptation. I will not be denying 
the central role of genes in development. What I am trying to emphasize is that 
plasticity of trait development is important, that sometimes causes other than genes 
are important. Developmental plasticity must be constrained by the characteristics of 
the developing system, but we will see that there is no reason to believe that there 
are many invariant cognitive structures, or human psychological universals. After 
outlining the case for constructivism I will then raise two important problems for 
Evolutionary Psychology. It may seem obvious but psychological traits will be 
determined in part by evolutionary history, and in part by individual experience.  
 
Over the next two chapters we will encounter three relationships between 
technological culture and minds. First, in this chapter I will explain how technological 
culture can modulate neural development. Different cultural and technological 
environments cause the development of different neural structures in brains. 
Necessarily, much of the evidence supporting this comes from studies of animal 
brains. In the next chapter I will explain scaffolding and extending of minds. 
Sometimes technological culture can act as a support or scaffold, which enables 
minds to function in particular ways. And sometimes technological culture should 
properly be seen as a part of the rich information processing system that spans brain, 
body and world. In these cases cognition can be said to extend beyond the body.  
 
Innateness 
 
There is a folk concept, which tries to capture the ‘nature’ arm of the interactionist 
consensus. This is the concept of innateness. Many important debates have been 
framed by an innate/not-innate distinction. For example the IQ debate that I 
introduced in chapter one is often framed as, ‘how much of intelligence is innate?’ 
The concept of innateness is also a part of folk wisdom. Some traits of an organism 
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are characterised as part of its inborn nature and other traits are not. In the debate 
over cognition, nativists (notably Evolutionary Psychologists), propose that there is a 
core set of innate representations. Proponents of ‘nurture’ or the acquisition of traits 
argue that complex representations are constructed only through experience. It is 
interesting to note that both sides of this debate classify traits by their causes. Innate 
traits have internal causes of a particular kind and acquired behaviours come from 
the external (psychological traits that arise from embodied experience are a bit of a 
grey zone). I will have more to say about this in chapter seven after I have introduced 
a model for cataloguing causal kinds. For now I merely want to massage scepticism 
about the whole idea of innate traits. 
 
The innate/non-innate debate is complex. For example, high IQ can be caused by a 
particular genotype, FADS2, but only in children who are breastfed (Capsi et al. 2007). 
Is this an internal or external cause? Is the high IQ innate? Is phenylketonuria innate 
or acquired, given that it is in a sense 100% genetic (you only get it with a particular 
genetic mutation) and it is 100% environmental (you only get it if there is 
phenylalanine in your diet)? It is far from clear in what sense such traits are supposed 
to be ‘innate’. 
 
It might be argued that some traits are genuinely innate. For example, newborn 
infants smile in response to adult faces in the first couple of months of life. This might 
be considered ‘innate’. But shortly I will give examples where species-typical 
behaviour at birth is easily modified by simple pre-natal interventions. What is it 
about infant smiles or their causes that lead us to consider them innate? I will show 
that our brains are not hard-wired or prescribed ahead of development. If cortex is 
not innate in this sense then how can behaviour be? These considerations cast doubt 
on the whole concept of innateness. After I have described constructivist 
development I will return to this idea of innateness. At least some authors agree that 
the folk concept is confused and perhaps empty. I think we can salvage a related 
concept to the folk concept, however, and I will explain an ‘internal, stable, heritable, 
privileged causes’ notion in chapter seven.  
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Neuroconstructivism 
 
Development is the progressive elaboration of increasingly complex structures. All 
humans undergo development beginning as small and simple organisms and 
becoming larger and more complex across time (Stiles 2009). Neuroconstructivism is 
the view that neural structures elaborate according to contextual influences rather 
than being genetically pre-specified. Here is an example illustrating the development 
of auditory localization in barn owls. Given the conservative nature of evolutionary 
developmental mechanisms, this example is likely to be relevant to humans too.  
 
If juvenile owls are fitted with a visual prism that shifts their field of view they can 
adapt to a twenty-three degree shift in about seven weeks and maintain accurate 
orienting behaviour to sounds (Shultz, Mysore & Quartz 2007). Removal of prisms 
results in a slow return to normal orienting behaviour. Adult owls, however, adapt 
poorly to prisms. But perhaps most interestingly, juveniles returned to normal and 
subsequently given prisms again as adults do show adaptability! This suggests that 
the intervention as juveniles has altered their cognitive architecture. The cognitive 
systems underpinning orienting behaviour are flexible and their development can be 
modified by interaction with external artifacts.  
 
The explanation of this phenomenon lies in the way the auditory localization neural 
networks grow in barn owls. In order to orient accurately there must be a smooth 
mapping between the auditory input and the degree to which the owl turns. In 
normal circumstances there is a map from signals at some angle of degrees to an 
output of orienting the same number of degrees as the input. In this normal case we 
have the situation (seen in figure 4) where the input (i) maps to the output (o) such 
that i1 maps to o1 and i2 maps to o2 and so on. However, once this system has 
developed then prisms are applied to the owls. The prisms cause misalignment of the 
auditory input to orienting output transformation by 23-degrees. To correct for this, 
the owl’s neural network needs to align input (i) with output (o + 23-degrees). Figure 
4 represents this by illustrating a map from i1 to o2, i2 to o3 and so on. The owls can 
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learn to shift this mapping over time. But for this to be successful additional neural 
resources must be committed. This is so that in can map to on+1. By adding units to the 
network the owls introduce the extra degrees of freedom in the input-output 
transformations required for orienting behaviour. When the prism is fitted the 
correct output is no longer the originally corresponding one. By growing the network 
and adding this unit the birds compensate over time. This explains why the juveniles 
returned to normal then given prisms again as adults could cope. When returned to 
normal they shift back to the i1 maps to o1 and i2 maps to o2 correspondence. But the 
unit o6 remains in place, and can be employed in adaptation as adults again. 
 
The novel context caused juveniles to commandeer uncommitted brain tissue and 
add extra units to their standard neural network. The new network is qualitatively 
different from the standard adult one because it can cope with distortion of visual 
input. It now has provision for a range of distortions to visual input and can shift 
between them. The new device is flexible, the standard one is not. It would be 
interesting to know whether juveniles fitted with prisms from birth were able to 
switch back if the prisms were removed as adults. I suspect not because their 
standard network would merely be the same as the original standard network, just 
shifted 23 degrees without provision for flexibility. This case exemplifies genuine 
construction of contextually relevant cognitive tools due to experience.  
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A standard view of learning is that networks learn by modifying connection strengths 
between nodes (e.g. brain cells). In brains this means modifying the thresholds at 
which individual neural junctions (synapses) will activate. This can and does enable 
learning but examples like the barn owl one suggest that we don’t only learn by 
modifying connection strengths. Synaptic weight change may explain short-timescale 
plasticity, but other architectural changes occur on other time-scales. In fact if the 
only learning undertaken is the modification of synaptic thresholds then networks will 
be limited in what they can learn, because changing weightings that are already 
learned has the potential to destroy previous learning. Once these networks attain a 
certain state, then there are things that it will be impossible to learn. On the other 
hand networks with the ability to grow, or commandeer new structure are capable of 
solving any learning problem that can be solved, by any algorithm at all. Such 
constructivist networks are highly flexible and have true computational generality. 
‘The burden of innate knowledge is relaxed’ (Shultz, Mysore & Quartz 2007, p. 71). 
Genes may have been selected that determine the initial mapping, but we cannot 
appeal to genetic adaptationism to explain the novel input-output map, or the 
flexible nature of the mature networks in adults-who-had-prisms-as-juveniles. The 
prism itself, as a novel object in the environment is a cause of the novel networks. 
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The emergence of the novel networks was enabled by inherent flexibility in the 
developing system. I argue that it is right to claim the flexibility is an evolutionary 
adaptation, but not the network itself.  
 
Mine is a constructivist account of development. Developmental psychologists Piaget 
(1955), and Vygotsky (1978), whose theories drove developmental psychology for 
many decades held constructivist views. More recently neuroscientists Quartz and 
Sejnowski (1997) and Mareschal et al. (2007) have pushed similar lines. They call this 
account neuroconstructivism. A constructivist approach does not exclude 
evolutionary explanation of the human mind. In fact it depends on at least some 
tenets of an evolutionary account. A rich understanding of development is going to 
shape the degree to which we find Evolutionary Psychology on one hand, or 
neuroconstructivism on the other hand plausible. I will show how cognition is 
constructed contextually at every level of analysis. I’ll give several examples of 
neuroscientific and cognitive research to support this view. 
 
The neuroconstructivist picture examines development at the level of single neurons, 
brain systems and whole organisms. Neuroconstructivism notes the following. First 
development occurs in a rich context. Genes are active in a context of other genes; 
cells in a context of other cells; neural networks in a context of other networks; 
cognitive devices in a context of other cognitive devices; brains in a context of bodies; 
and bodies in a social, physical and technological environment.  
 
The basic tenet of neuroconstructivism is that ‘development is fundamentally 
constructivist in nature’ (Mareschal et al. 2007, p. 5). There is a progressive increase 
in the complexity of representations. This results from re-wiring neurons and novel 
neural connections. New cognitive abilities form as a foundation of simple ones 
emerges and is modified.  Over developmental time there is creation of genuinely 
new cognitive abilities as well as the better use of pre-existing ones. In the case of 
cognition, the structures are increasingly complex representational forms. Initially 
there exist only simple representations, and over time through mechanisms of 
competition and cooperation between elements, richer representations emerge, 
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which in turn allow proactive exploration of problem space and progressive 
specialization of neural and cognitive devices. The representations that emerge are 
partial and they are distributed across many functional circuits. Neuroconstructivism 
differs from dynamical systems in that there is a focus on representations, and it 
differs from classical connectionism in that the architecture of the system is not 
static, the system continues to build itself. 
 
The emphasis here is on a few relatively simple processes that are repeated across 
different levels of description. Cooperation, competition and progressive change in 
structure over time occur at the level of neurons, neural nets, and cognitive devices. 
Representations do not emerge in isolation. The development of cognition is primed 
to be flexible. This is demonstrably the case as we will see in the examples below. To 
think that the same suite of cognitive devices will emerge across a wide range of 
contexts is a mistake. As environments change the neural system destabilizes and 
responds with construction of new connections in order to better reflect the 
structure of the environment. Technologies, constructed niches (and prisms) have a 
causal role in this destabilization and modification. I’ll move now to some more 
examples.  
 
Illustrative Examples of Constructive Development 
 
Let’s work through a set of examples of constructive processes in the brain. We have 
already seen the plasticity and potential for neural networks to grow (in barn owls), 
next I’ll show that neural resources can be commandeered for completely novel 
purposes (in bird chicks). We’ll see how altered neural inputs alter neural 
development in premature infants and in hand surgery. We’ll look at the idea that 
cognitive devices can be transmitted culturally when circumstances are right, also at 
contextual impacts on mouse and rat brains. Finally, I will describe manipulations of 
human self-representation.  
 
Lorenz (1937) performed imprinting experiments on bird chicks. Ducks and quails will 
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approach a speaker playing the maternal call of their species. At first it was thought 
that this behaviour was hard-wired (or ‘innate’). However, it became clear that the 
behaviour results from prenatal exposure to species-typical calls heard through the 
shell wall (this is demonstrated by Gottleib’s (1971) deprivation experiments). 
Interestingly, Lickliter (1990) then cut holes in shells three days before chicks hatched 
and shone patterns of light inside. The birds, who do not normally experience any 
visual stimulation except for diffuse light before birth, were stimulated with visual 
experience. These chicks did not approach any particular species calls once hatched. 
The prenatal visual experience had disrupted their normal auditory development. It 
was also shown to interfere with later auditory learning as well.  
 
This begs immediately questions about human premature infant development. This is 
because very premature infants are thrust into a stimulating environment that is 
atypical for the stage of their brain development. Indeed, some studies have shown 
that the psychological development of premature babies is highly abnormal 
(Stephens & Vohr 2009, Johnson et al. 2009). Prenatal species-atypical patterns of 
stimulation (inducing developmental plasticity) have been implicated in elements of 
both mental retardation and genius in premature human children. This is not 
surprising given that the prenatal stimulation of Lickliter’s chicks advanced their visual 
development at the expense of normal auditory development. Just as the juvenile 
owls co-opted uncommitted neural tissue to cope with the prisms, Lickliter’s bird 
chicks co-opted ‘auditory cortex’ to cope with the visual patterns stimulating them in 
the shell. Constructive processes begin before birth. However, it is still important to 
note that parental education is still a better correlate of high IQ than birth weight or 
maturity. This suggests strong environmental influences on the development of 
intelligence (Weisglas-Kuperus et al. 2009).  
 
Wilson (2010) notes that there is significant cultural variability in cognition. Culture 
influences the contents of cognition, but culture also influences the structure of 
cognition. Many ‘cognitive tools’ are not genetically wired, but are transmitted 
culturally and become ‘firm-ware’. For example, number concepts are effectively 
transmitted via the inheritance of number words, and the algorithm for doing long-
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
46 
 
division is passed on in similar fashion. Wilson discusses ‘re-tooling’, but this is 
probably misleading as it implies there is something there (innate?) that is already 
tooled. Really she is talking about organization, another term for this is development. 
‘The consequence of this is that cognitive phenotypes will differ across cultures, sub-
cultures, and even more local groupings such as families.’ (Wilson, 2010, p. 1). 
 
Wilson argues that we have a set of cognitive tools which underpin cognition. She 
argues, however, that many of these tools (the structure, not just the content of 
cognition) are culturally caused. Just like the prisms cause novel cognitive tools in 
juvenile owls, culture causes novel tools in humans. She argues: First, that cultural re-
tooling of cognition is ubiquitous, and second, that cultural tools construct neural-
cognitive architecture.  
 
Wilson provides examples of this, such as the cognition of individuals who have 
‘unusual experience with spatial processing’ (2010, p.4). London taxi drivers must 
complete years of memorization of the streets of London and this coupled with on-
the-job experience give them fantastic abilities to navigate the city. Maguire et al. 
(2000, 2006) have demonstrated changes in the grey matter in the hippocampus that 
cannot be explained without reference to their navigation experiences. These taxi 
drivers also show a striking decrease in their ability to acquire new spatial 
information. Again it is interesting to compare this finding to Lickliter’s bird chicks and 
the barn owls. Probably what has occurred is a degree of neural commitment. This is 
exactly what is predicted by the neuroconstructivist picture of cognitive 
development. We often see context-sensitive construction followed by a decrease in 
flexibility. However, a decrease in flexibility is not a necessary consequence of 
context-sensitive construction. Learning to read, for example, leads to an increase in 
plasticity in many domains.  
 
Surgery provides another, fairly controllable, example of contextual modification. The 
somatosensory region of the brain acts as a map of the body surface. Anatomical 
structures such as limbs, hands and digits are represented in proportion to the 
number of nerves they have supplying them. The location of these maps in the cortex 
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is fairly predictable, but accumulating clinical observations have indicated that the 
brain is more plastic than previously thought. If a nerve is cut so that the input to the 
brain is lost then we see neurophysiological reorganization in this somatosensory 
cortex. Further, if sensory experiences change, rather than cease altogether, the 
same phenomena occurs. Surgical procedures on hands are always accompanied by 
synaptic reorganization in the somatosensory cortex (Lundborg 2000). Similarly, 
extensive use of hands (such as violin playing, and probably more recent phenomena 
like texting or typing) result in enlargement of the corresponding projectional areas in 
the brain (Schwenkreis et al. 2007). Many results of surgery, both encouraging and 
disappointing may be explained in this way. This process of reorganization is a 
system-wide phenomenon. Brains and brain regions exist in a context, and when that 
context changes, and the corresponding inputs to the brain or brain regions change, 
then structure changes.  
 
Laboratory animals, mostly mice, raised in more complex environments exhibit 
behavioural, anatomical and molecular changes compared to mice housed in bare 
cages (Lewis 2004, Turner et al. 2003). The complex environments tend to consist of 
more social interactions, increased object density in spaces, and the provision of 
novelty. The outcomes include: increased spatial and non-spatial memory acquisition, 
decreases in voluntary alcohol consumption, decreases in aggressive behaviour, 
limitation of deleterious effects of maternal separation, and decreased stress 
reactivity. Increases in brain weight, cortical thickness and neural connection density 
were noted, as were increases in neural growth in the visual cortex and hippocampus 
and other molecular changes. In one of the best known ‘enriched mice’ studies 
(Cooper & Zubek 1958), rats were bred to be ‘maze-bright’ or ‘maze-dull’.  Enriched 
environments caused maze-dull rats to perform better, but had little effect on maze-
bright rats. Impoverished environments caused poor performances in maze-bright 
rats, but little effect on maze-dull. So these constructive interactions are very 
complex. 
 
If we trim off one side of a rat’s whiskers, then within one to three days cortical 
responses to stimuli from the intact whiskers are strengthened (hence the brain’s 
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plasticity mechanisms are quick). So we see that altering inputs and outputs can 
dramatically alter cortical organization. The existence of the body, of a particular 
body organization, constrains the kind of experiences that are possible. Tool use can 
have similar effects on self-representation. 
 
Operators of robotic devices handling hazardous materials at a distance come to 
‘rapidly and effectively’ feel a shift in point of view, as if the robot arms are actually 
their own (Clark, 2003). The neural correlates underpinning self-representation have 
been shown to be malleable. When monkeys have been given tools such as a rake to 
reach for food, the cells in the visual receptive fields that represent the body become 
elongated along the axis of the tool after practice. Effectively, the tool becomes a part 
of the neural self for functional purposes (Iriki et al. 1996).  
 
In an experiment conducted with humans Cardinali et al. (2009) demonstrate that 
after training with a tool for fifteen minutes, subjects perform poorly on the same 
task using just their hand. But interestingly, after tool use, the subjects localized 
touches on their middle finger and elbow as if they were further apart than they 
were. This suggests that the effects are partly caused by an updated body schema 
(‘morphological updating’) incorporating a longer arm. Given the monkey data just 
described, it is likely that visual receptive field neural modifications underpin this. 
Also, given the barn owls and prisms experiments, one wonders what would have 
happened had the subjects using tools been children, what if the experiements were 
conducted for seven weeks as in the barn owl case?  
 
Mental representations of our own bodies are flexible. Ramachandran (1999) in 
particular has demonstrated this, often with innovative clinical applications. For 
example, stroke patients with paralysis can be coaxed back to voluntary movements 
through the use of mirrors set so that the patient thinks their paralysed hand is 
moving. Also, many illusions are possible. In one example, the subject’s nose can be 
made to feel as if it is a meter long by stroking the nose of someone sitting in front of 
them, whilst their nose is simultaneously stimulated.  
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In the last fifteen years, experience with virtual avatars6 has begun shaping the way 
that some humans experience themselves. The ‘Proteus effect’ is described by Yee & 
Bailenson (2009). In these experiments, people made to interact online using taller 
avatars negotiated more fiercely in online economic games than those using shorter 
avatars. Those with more attractive avatars behaved more pleasantly. Furthermore, 
and most importantly, these effects carried over to real-world interactions after the 
online games had finished. Other studies (Vasalou et al. 2007) show that private self-
awareness is enhanced when avatars are similar to oneself. Again it would be very 
interesting to compare the effects of experiments like these with adult versus child or 
adolescent participants. I would expect more dramatic shifts of behaviour with 
children as was found with the adolescent owls.  
 
It’s not just that the blind man’s stick or the sports star’s racket, or the virtual surgical 
droid’s grasping arm feel like they are a part of us, they literally become a part of us 
according to our neural representations. Clark (2003, p. 62) notes that, ‘human brains 
seem to support highly negotiable body images’. Ramachandran (1999) likewise says, 
‘your body image, despite all its appearance of durability, is an entirely transitory 
internal construction’. Simple experiments can demonstrate this such as using a 
dummy hand to trick you into thinking you have sensations you do not have.  
 
Just as the existence of a changing body (embodiment) constrains the experiences 
that the child can have at different stages of development, so too the technological 
world constrains experience. Children are active and different activity results in 
different experiences and different development.  
 
Neural devices exist among a web of other neural devices. This is embrainment. If 
inputs to one brain device change, then the context of other devices changes and 
therefore the development of the child globally can change. It is essential to take 
constraints (and affordances) provided by brain, body and environment seriously 
when trying to explain cognitive development. Finally, more complex representations 
                                                             
6
 An avatar in this sense is a virtual, digital, movable, representation of oneself. The derivation is from 
the Hindu word meaning ‘the worldly incarnation of a god’.  
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can be learned in higher-level networks based on simpler representations already 
learned lower in the network hierarchy. Societies gradually expose infants to 
problems they need to master. The result is that network-A confronts problem A, 
then it grows and network-AB confronts problem B. What is emerging here is a 
picture of representational construction, over time, that is flexible and employs 
additional cognitive resources as and when needed. However, we are also getting a 
picture of increasing specialization and commitment of neural tissue, which makes 
ongoing representational flexibility difficult. That said, the constructivist models show 
that complex representations (such as the owl’s prism/ordinary vision coping device) 
can emerge without being pre-specified.  
 
What seems to be going on here is that experience and context can alter the way the 
brain represents the agent, and a range of experiences can drive development of the 
brain in different directions. There are three ways that the brain can adapt during 
development.  
1. The brain can construct new cognitive tools. We are seeing this with the 
examples so far, such as the barn owls and Lickliter’s manipulations of bird 
chicks.  
2. Second, the brain could find new ways to integrate existing neural devices.  
3. Finally, the brain could integrate in novel ways with external resources.  
In all three cases synaptic change is inevitable. Sometimes this may be just at the 
periphery of a neural circuit as existing circuits shift their pattern of integration, other 
times neural changes can be more fundamental and new or significantly re-wired 
circuits emerge. I’ve explained examples of (1) already. I’ll look more at (3) in chapter 
three. For now I want to move to examining (2), the novel integration of existing 
neural devices.  
 
Cognitive re-tooling 
 
Another way that cognition can develop in constructivist fashion is if existing devices 
are integrated in innovative ways according to what the context demands. It is 
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trivially true that we possess a suite of cognitive devices which underpin our thought 
and behaviour. Both Barrett (2009) and Dehaene and Cohen (2007) give accounts of 
cognition that explain the orchestration of complex cognitive accomplishments by 
appeal to this suite of more primitive cognitive devices. This is what neuro-
constructivism predicts. Neural nets are built according to experience and then these 
devices can be integrated in many and novel ways to enable a wealth of cognitive 
tasks to be accomplished. Flexibility remains after neural resources have been 
commited to particular devices, but what is possible is constrained by earlier 
developmental outcomes. 
 
Barrett (2009) argues that folk psychological categories map to neuronal firing 
patterns via an intermediate set of ‘psychological primitives’. For example, various 
patterns of neural firing will contribute to a state such as core-affect, which will 
reflect a level of arousal or mood. These patterns need only be similar tokens of a 
type of state and not exactly the same in any given instance. Other types of states 
may be such things as directed attention, or categorization. Then a suite of such 
primitives can combine ‘like a recipe’ to produce myriad complex psychological 
phenomena the likes of which we call emotion, cognition and so on. This is a version 
of the type-token identity theory where folk psychological states, say ‘anger’, map to 
an array of primitives in combination, such as core affect, directed attention, 
categorization, and each of these maps to token brain states, which may be different 
in any given instance. The exact states will vary from person to person and situation 
to situation. Given the temporal nature of cognition, the metaphor probably ought to 
be a symphony of psychological primitives working in concert to produce cognition. 
Once the devices (neural tools) are constructed we can then construct ways of 
combining them to accomplish useful tasks. In other words, once we develop neural 
networks for sustaining primitive states such as affect, attention and so forth, we can 
combine these tools in different ways to construct novel cognitive states according to 
context. 
 
Dehaene and Cohen (2007) have a similar argument. They call theirs the ‘neuronal 
recycling hypothesis’. This is based on the idea that there exist a set of basic neural 
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networks these may be partly the result of evolutionary selection, and partly the 
result of developmental experience. The argument has three postulates, first, that 
human brain organization is subject to strong anatomical, connectional and 
evolutionary constraints. These constraints bias learning. Cultural influences on 
cognition, or ‘acquisitions’ (e.g. reading) must find a set of circuits that will support 
the required function, and are plastic enough to meld to the required form, and 
thirdly, that prior organization is never entirely erased. Obviously this theory is open 
to fine tuning of degrees. What is the degree of plasticity, the degree of prior 
organization, the degree of particular constraints? Basically, existing neural nets are 
recruited (in concert) to perform novel tasks as triggered by cultural experience. I 
take this to be a similar position to Wilson’s, where the development of a suite of 
cognitive devices then permits novel cognitive processes to occur as these devices 
harmonize in various ways. Candidates for such primitives include the first two 
systems sustaining numerical cognition that were introduced in chapter one. 
Dehaene and Cohen (2007) take this further and note that reading, writing and 
arithmetic map onto remarkably invariant brain structures. These ‘cultural maps’ 
arise from transformation of cortical precursor maps present in other non-human 
primates. Culture influences brain development by exapting (through 
neuroconstructivist mechanisms) pre-existing brain systems.  
 
Evidence from brain imaging studies suggests that as children acquire the ability to 
recognize words and perform algebraic calculations, that neural activation moves 
from a more diffuse pattern, involving the prefrontal cortex, to a more localized and 
specific pattern. Changing activation patterns seen with neural imaging suggest 
construction of cognitive devices rather than modular prespecification. As circuits are 
constructed they become more localized, specialized and efficient.  
 
For example, studies suggest that when recognizing words a particular area of the 
brain, the visual word form area is reliably activated. This area responds more 
strongly to words in the reader’s native script and to readable words and 
pseudowords than to random letter combinations. Interestingly, the activation 
response is larger and more bilateral in early readers and more specific and localized 
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in experienced readers. 
 
The same phenomena is seen with numerical cognition where there is a progressive 
and massive transfer of activation from pre-frontal to posterior specialized circuits 
over time (Dehaene & Cohen 2007, also Qin et al. 2004). With mathematics the 
localizations are not as precise as with reading. This is to be expected because the 
inputs in reading are very precise, through particular transducers. The inputs 
constructing mathematical cognition are much more varied. They are cross-modal for 
one, we can hear numbers, and feel quantities as well as seeing them. However, the 
evidence suggests that our understanding of the cultural symbols of numbers is 
grounded (neurally) in links with neurons coding for specific non-symbolic 
numerosities in the intraparietal cortex (these are the primitive numerical systems 
discussed in chapter one, which are common to all primates). Furthermore:  
 
‘Several parallels between monkeys and humans suggest that the monkey 
intraparietal neural code for numerosity may be the evolutionary precursor onto 
which the human invention of arithmetic encroached’ (Dehaene & Cohen 2007, p. 
391).  
 
Of course Dehaene & Cohen mean that the precursor was whatever system our last 
common ancestor with monkeys possessed. This is evidence, however, that for 
whatever reason, we possess some fundamental building blocks of cognition (such as 
number sense) that can be orchestrated in various ways to perform more complex 
cognitive tasks. This is the basis of the re-tooling, re-engineering, and cognitive 
integrationist accounts of cognition. But there is nothing to necessitate that these 
components themselves are innate, rather than the products of constrained 
development.  
 
I read Dehaene and Cohen as having nativist leanings . One of their implicit 
assumptions is that our evolutionary history drives many of the constraints that exist 
in brains. For example they say that: 
 
‘the systematic difficulty that children exhibit in discriminating mirror-image letters 
such as p and q may ultimately be traced back to the native propensity of our visual 
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object recognition system for mirror-image generalization, due to its evolution in a 
world where the left-right distinction is largely irrelevant’ (2007, p. 385, my 
emphasis).  
 
One wonders why development in such a world isn’t enough to cause this confusion. 
Early development is indifferent to mirror-image objects. Developing brains would 
probably treat mirror image representations as equals unless their salience was noted 
by other concurrent causes and effects. The salience of written forms, and hence b,d 
and p,q distinctions, comes later, and requires updating of expectations or a re-
modeling of constructed circuits. We shouldn’t be too quick to apportion the causal 
power driving trait development to evolutionary selection for those psychological 
traits.  
 
In fact some accounts of cortical function make very minimal appeal to evolution. 
Genes have a role in the general set-up of most organs, but these organs are usually 
fairly homogenous in structure. Kidneys have a repeating array of filtering nephron 
units that all function in much the same way. Lungs have a repeating array of alveolar 
sacs that all exchange gases in much the same way, and brains have a repeating array 
of cortical layers folds and columns. It seems likely that this, too, all functions in much 
the same way. And given the flexibility of constructive processes, this is likely to be 
some sort of general purpose learning device, which is open to experience. Not a 
richly pre-specified set of domain-specific tools. I suggest that we are the bearers of a 
cortex that is largely plastic, yet is so constrained by the body, the sensory apparatus, 
and the transducers converting sense data to neural data, that we end up with 
particular cortical architectures like the somatosensory map of the body’s surface. If 
this is the case then both the nativists and the constructivists are right on one thing. 
We do have a common neural ‘map’. However, this is because constructive processes 
are suitably constrained. The neocortex is organised comparatively late in 
development, and so has more degrees of freedom. Any invariantness is due to our 
roughly similar body-types, peripheral nervous systems, sub-cortical structures and 
roughly similar external developmental contexts. Any difference is due to differences 
in these things rather than pre-specified differences in neo-cortex. 
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Compared to other primates we are born very prematurely. In part this allows us to 
add experience to our endowment (Gilbert 2002, in Stotz 2010). In fact, it may be 
more accurate to say that we substitute experience for endowment, or we overwrite 
endowment with experience. It is likely that there are profound tradeoffs between 
what the brain was going to do, in a maturational sense, had we stayed in the womb 
for longer than nine months, and what it does instead after our encounter with rich 
experience. 
 
Whether a cognitive device emerges due to adaptationistic genetic pre-specification, 
or through constructive processes, it is conceivable that such devices work in 
synchrony to accomplish additional cognitive tasks. Most nativists accept that 
environmental (and hence cultural) factors play some role in modulating cognitive 
phenotype. This view may be packaged as ‘re-tooling’ or ‘re-engineering’ the existing, 
species-typical, raw materials of the brain. Dehaene and Cohen’s neuronal recycling 
hypothesis suggests that there exist a set of innate primitives, which are available to 
integrate in functional ways. I agree that there is a set of primitives, but 
neuroconstructivist phenomena suggest that these are likely to be unique 
constructions according to each individual’s experience. I have hinted at one 
unjustified assumption that these author’s have made in support of their nativist 
leanings, but now for completeness I’ll give a summary of Evolutionary Psychology, 
which is representative of nativism, and emphasize two key criticisms that undermine 
it. Having done this, it should be clear that evolution, though probably constraining to 
some degree what can develop, does not determine our cognitive devices in most, or 
perhaps even in many cases. This will make sense of the neuroconstructivist examples 
I have outlined above, and the evidence of technological impact on psychological 
traits that I explained in chapter one. So let’s look now at Evolutionary Psychology, 
the fallacy of adaptationism and the grain problem.  
 
Evolutionary Psychology 
 
Evolutionary Psychology is a research program that emphasizes the evolved nature of 
the human mind and a universal human psychology (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby 
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1992; Buss 1995; Pinker 1997). It should now be obvious why a universal human 
psychology is not a necessary consequence of an evolved human mind. The basic idea 
of Evolutionary Psychology is that the human mind/brain is a massively modular array 
of solutions to adaptive problems faced in the Pleistocene. Cumulative evolution by 
natural selection has driven information coding for these adaptations into the 
genome. The genome codes for psychological traits, though these may require 
developmental experience to emerge in species typical form.  
 
An adaptive beahviour is one that is of use to the agent. An adaptation is a trait that 
was adaptive at some point and has been selected for over evolutionary time. It need 
not remain adaptive in the present environment. Evolutionary Psychology wants to 
avoid the mistake of positing current adaptive behaviours as adaptations, so it 
assumes that human beings have minds adapted to past environments. For humans 
the environment of evolutionary adaptedness was the Pleistocene. So humans have a 
‘stone-age mind’ and consequently there is sometimes a mismatch between cognitive 
mechanisms and current environments. For example, it may be an evolutionary 
phenomenon that leads us to desire fat and salt rich foods. But when these are 
abundant (as today in the first world) this is maladaptive as it leads to illness. By 
modelling past environments, positing adaptive cognitive devices and testing current 
populations for those devices, Evolutionary Psychology claims to be able to work out 
specific cognitive systems and preferences shared across populations.  
 
The evidence I have advanced above should make it clear that there will be no such 
thing as a ‘universal human psychology’ given the diversity of developmental 
contexts. But furthermore, we have seen that developmental environments that fall 
far outside what is species-typical or ‘expected’ by developmental resources can lead 
to dramatically different cognitive traits. Even if there actually were some evolved 
modular adaptations, then there is little reason to think that these would develop as 
expected in contemporary technological environments, given that these fall far 
outside what would have been species-typical during the Pleistocene. I will now 
outline two problems for anyone wanting to take an Evolutionary Psychology 
approach to explanation. These are the fallacy of adaptationism and the grain 
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problem. And then I will argue that even if there are some modular adaptations, that 
we could still see significant contextual variation in psychological traits as a result of 
engagement with technology.  
 
Adaptationism 
 
One significant fallacy that evolutionary psychologists fall foul of is the following. 
Beginning with the premise that the mind can be studied naturalistically, and then 
taking methodological naturalism as the paradigm of investigation, they fuse it with 
our best theory of explaining the natural world, which is evolutionary biology. Up to 
this point I agree wholeheartedly with the move. However, evolutionary 
psychologists then seek to explain every cognitive trait as if it were an evolutionary 
adaptation. This is a mistake. The brain could be evolved and yet no psychological 
trait is an adaptation. The brain could be a general-purpose learning device. This 
adaptation for learning then underlies all other psychological traits, which are merely 
learned in particular contexts and are not adaptations (although they may be 
adaptive). Or one could argue that only some traits are adaptations and the many 
others are biological accidents of one sort or another. At the very least we will need 
to know what the brain is and how it works in order to accept or reject the 
hypotheses of Evolutionary Psychology.  
 
Davies (2009) is representative of the savage attacks on Evolutionary Psychology in its 
most robust form. He charges the research program with failing to meet even 
minimum standards of scientific evidence. To begin with, life did not evolve in the 
way that Evolutionary Psychology claims it did. Many, if not most, biological features 
are not an adaptation argues Davies. There exist competing non-adaptive 
evolutionary hypotheses. Many psychological devices may be spandrels (Gould & 
Lewontin 1979), change resistant entrenchments, the results of drift, and so on. As 
Davies notes, the theses of Evolutionary Psychology are simply too strong, that all or 
nearly all of our psychological traits were directly selected for the performance of 
specific tasks. This in itself does not mean that Evolutionary Psychology is has nothing 
to offer, but it diminishes its explanatory scope. Nativist programs like Evolutionary 
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Psychology are simply not going to be able to account for all, or even most, of our 
psychological devices.  
 
The Grain Problem 
 
There is a serious grain problem with the hypotheses of Evolutionary Psychology. The 
hypotheses of Evolutionary Psychology are lacking in reasonable evidential detail, or 
when there is reasonable evidence the hypotheses are necessarily vague as to be 
uninformative. Think of driving a car or reading a billboard. Many of the processes 
involved suggest the existence of a driving or reading module, a module being some 
version of a domain specific, mandatory, opaque, informationally encapsulated 
device (Fodor 1983, Carruthers 2006). Reading could conceivably be described as 
modular. Activity is automatic, we can’t see glyphs on a sign as anything other than 
words, the knowledge is often encapsulated, and so on. But reading clearly does not 
begin as a module, a reading module, as such there is, develops with experience. So 
the existence of modules does not verify the Evolutionary Psychology picture, no one 
thinks there are driving or reading modules, which evolved in the Pleistocene.  
 
Traits like driving competence are clearly built by experience in a novel environment. 
The adaptations, if indeed there are any, are of a different kind, such as the ability to 
alternate attentional resources, edge or depth perception, and so on. These are more 
general functions, more like the psychological primitives I have discussed under 
cognitive re-tooling above, which may be combined in novel ways to produce 
evolutionarily novel functions such as reading, or driving. Furthermore, it seems like 
such things as the ability to alternate attentional resources itself is built by experience 
in novel environments (see the computer games data in chapter one). Indeed, given 
the rapidly changing nature of the environment that humans have found themselves 
in over time, and using Evolutionary Psychology’s methodology, it seems likely that 
the key selected adaptation would be the ability to rapidly learn new things, and not 
be bound by ancient constraints (there will be exceptions to this rule of course, as 
things like language, and cooperative behaviour will probably be adaptive in all 
imaginable human environments). This is the sort of picture favoured by Sterelny & 
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Griffiths (1999) and Sterelny in many subsequent works (e.g. 2003, 2011). I argue that 
this plasticity is exactly the core feature of the brain and human cognition. Much 
psychology may be transient, it appears in one generation persists for a while and 
then changes as cultural technologies and practices change and the developmental 
environment changes. 
 
The grain problem continues when claiming that if a module is ‘intact’ then that 
subject has ‘species-typical’ cognition. This is simply a false premise as illustrated 
nicely by Karmiloff-Smith (2009) who examines Williams Syndrome, a developmental 
disorder that manifests largely as impairments in reading. Reading acquisition is 
disrupted, while apparently leaving other functions like face-recognition intact. 
However, although functional tests of face-recognition seem to confirm this, neuro-
imaging seems to suggest that face-recognition in subjects with Williams Syndrome is 
highly atypical. At one level we have an ‘intact’ process but this tells us nothing about 
the highly varied instantiation in a particular individual. Standard tests often do not 
show how a process is being performed or if it is impaired in an individual given, say, 
an above average family base-line.  
 
As I indicated in chapter one, Marr (1982) gives a very nice explanation of the 
different levels on which a process is operating. Some process like performing 
addition, making a pie, going shopping, or recognizing faces could be instantiated in 
many ways. There are three levels to understand:  
1. ‘What’ the device is doing and ‘why’ (e.g. when calculating arithmetic, this is a 
mapping of two numbers to one). ‘What’ and ‘why’ don’t depend on the 
specific system employed (e.g. Arabic numerals, Roman numbers, etc). The 
process itself puts constraints on the ‘why’. For example when shopping if you 
buy two things it doesn’t matter what order you present them, and if you buy 
nothing it should add to zero.  
2. The second level involves choosing representations for the entities that the 
process manipulates. First, a representation for the input and output and 
second, an algorithm by which the process is achieved. This second level 
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specifies ‘how’ and is dependent on the specific system employed (e.g. Arabic 
numerals, Roman numbers, etc).  
3. The device in which the process is to be realized physically. Obviously the 
same algorithm can be implemented in different technologies (e.g. an abacus, 
a calculator, a brain).  
 
The choice of an algorithm is constrained by what it has to do and the hardware upon 
which it must run. For example, the number of columns an abacus possesses 
determines the magnitude of numbers that can be manipulated on it. Different 
algorithms tend to fail in radically different ways as they are pushed to their limits or 
deprived of crucial information. The same is probably true of face-recognition in 
Williams Syndrome, even though it appears ‘intact’.  
 
So ‘intact’ performance does not mean ‘typical of species cognition’. There is 
impairment in development with subsequent compensation. Developmental context 
and constraints in Williams Syndrome have led to a functional ‘module’ with bizarre 
organization.  
 
‘Human intelligence is not a state (i.e. not a collection of static, built-in modules 
handed down by evolution and that can be intact or impaired. Rather, human 
intelligence is a process (i.e. the emergent property of dynamic multidirectional 
interactions between genes, brain, cognition, behaviour, and environment).’ 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 2009, p. 61).  
 
This is the neuroconstructivist picture and tends to suggest that there are merely 
different developmental trajectories. Even if there are modules that are adaptations 
this does not mean that they are developing as they previously have given 
contemporary contexts. And even if testing suggests an intact module, the neural 
organization, and perhaps the computational algorithm, may vary across populations. 
Even if Evolutionary Psychology finds a trait that looks genuinely universal, we cannot 
say that the function is implemented or developed in the same way across 
individuals. There may just be developmental convergence rather than an adaptation 
at work. A degree of developmental convergence across populations is likely because 
all children experience many of the same aspects of environment. This includes light, 
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sound, gravity, exposure to language and social interaction (Stiles 2009). Modules, as 
such there are, can develop rather than evolve. This indeed seems to be the case. 
Human universals are fully compatible with both nativist and constructivist accounts. 
But constructivist accounts do a better job of explaining observed variations in traits 
(Levy 2004).  
 
It may be a mistake to absorb the full weight of arguments such as Davies’ and 
Karmiloff-Smith’s, or to deny modules outright, but now we see that there are at least 
five ways in which cultural technologies could conceivably influence cognitive 
development even within a strongly nativist picture. 
1. Novel environmental inputs to a fixed native system could produce novel, or 
sometimes ‘misfiring’ functional outputs (this may be the case with 
pornography and sexual arousal, desires for salt and fat).  
2. Existing coarse modules could be re-coordinated to produce novel traits like 
driving and reading that have no evolved history.  
3. Developmental contexts may disrupt the development of modules, however, 
their functions may arise regardless through new developmental trajectories. 
4. Modules that may once have existed may simply not develop in a novel 
developmental context. 
5. Changing integration of modules with the external world of tools and symbols 
could cause novel functional profiles (see chapter three).  
The point of all this is that, even if one accepted the premises of Evolutionary 
Psychology’s arguments, there are still a great many ways in which technological 
context could drive psychological development. However, I suggest that the positive 
case for constructivism and the two objections to Evolutionary Psychology cast doubt 
on whether we should accept these premises.  
 
The most recent concerted defence of Evolutionary Psychology is illuminating. Confer 
et al. (2010) concede that all evolved mechanisms require some environmental input 
for their activation.  
 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
62 
 
‘It does not make sense to ask whether calluses or mating decisions are “evolved” or 
“learned” or due to “nature” or “nurture”. All evolved mechanisms require some 
environmental input for their activation’ (p. 116).  
 
They note that the key explanatory challenge is to identify the learning adaptations 
that enable humans to change behaviour in useful ways given certain environments. 
But the adaptations must be robust in the face of this developmental novelty or 
something else will develop. In this recent defence Evolutionary Psychology is taking a 
step toward more constructivist approaches to cognition. Approaches that take 
developmental context seriously and are not committed to either a universal or 
deeply ‘innate’ psychology. For the purposes of my argument I am happy to concede 
the existence of some evolved modular adaptations. Perhaps there is a language 
module for example. Although I think these are unlikely, see for example Cowie 
(1998), and Tomasello (2008). Also, Sterelny (2011) argues forcefully against an 
innate moral sense over and above our emotional dispositions. But even if there are 
some evolved modules, it must be agreed that developmental experience plays a 
large role in shaping the final nature of such devices. The brain is built for change and 
adaptive plasticity. That is its biological function. That is the adaptation. Any 
universalist project is misguided, and the notion of innateness is confused. 
 
Innateness Again 
 
Mameli and Bateson (2006) argue that there is no simple correspondence between 
the folk concept of innateness and a scientifically useful definition. A number of 
different scientifically useful concepts partially overlap with the folk concept of 
innateness, but it is not possible to choose in principle among such concepts. Mameli 
and Bateson work through twenty-six possible candidates for a scientific successor to 
the folk conception of ‘innateness’. They argue that none is problem free. 
Furthermore, after removing all candidates that are ‘defective’ versions of other 
candidates, they put forward eight possibilities. ‘Innate’ may mean: 
 
1. Reliably appearing in a particular stage of the life cycle. 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
63 
 
2. Being such that environmental manipulations capable of producing an 
alternative trait are evolutionarily abnormal.  
3. Not produced by a mechanism adapted to map different environmental 
conditions onto different phenotypes and, at the same time, not produced by 
the imapct of evolutionarily abnormal environmental factors.  
4. Generatively entrenched.  
5. Developmentally environmentally canalized. 
6. Post-developmentally environmentally canalized.  
7. Species typical. 
8. Standard Darwinian adaptation.  
  
Mameli & Bateson note that the overlap between the folk concept ‘innate’ and this 
list of criteria is only partial. There is no principled way to decide which concept(s) 
most map to the folk concept and, importantly, the eight proposals are non-
equivalent, they each include and exclude different things as being innate. Rather 
than focusing on outdated determinist accounts of innateness, Mameli & Bateson 
argue that what we need to know is if these eight ‘i-properties’ cluster or not. Is there 
a set of traits that have most of the i-properties and another set that have very few of 
them. In such a case then the i-property-rich traits will be the innate ones. These 
authors are sceptical that such a clustering exists. Further complicating this issue is 
that fact that several of the eight i-properties come in degrees. Traits can be more or 
less generatively entrenched for example.  
 
The folk concept often seems to under-specify the complexity of biological 
mechanisms. What we really need is more emphasis on the idea that it is 
development rather than inheritance that is the central concept in biology. All 
evidence points to the importance of the manner in which inherited and contextual 
elements are combined as giving rise to one phenotype rather than another. Neither 
genes nor environments prescribe outcomes. It is confused to talk of traits being 
innate or non-innate, and evidence suggests that cognition is highly plastic and 
contextually malleable. However, I don’t think all is lost for the ‘innate’ concept even 
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in light of the flexibility of the brain, the neuroconstructivist picture, problems with 
nativist accounts of cognition, and confusion surrounding the term ‘innate’. I think 
there is a related concept, which draws on an analysis of the causes of traits, and the 
features of the privileged causes of any given trait. In chapter seven, after I have 
discussed causation in complex developing systems, I will introduce the idea of traits 
whose privileged causes are internal, stable and heritable. This account of 
‘innateness’ hinges on an analysis of causal and explanatory privilege, which I will 
discuss in chapters four through six.  
 
Some Conclusions 
 
I have argued that unique combinations of psychological traits arise in different 
individuals thanks to the context in which they develop. Context can alter neural 
growth patterns, the integration of different cognitive units, and in the next chapter I 
will show that context can afford different ways for brains to integrate with external 
resources. This context partly consists of human technologies. Technology can shape 
neural development. In the next chapter I will show how technology can support 
cognitive functions, and also sometimes ought to be seen as a proper component of 
extended, hybrid information processing systems. All these processes come together 
to give valuable insights into Human Nature. But Human Nature should not be 
confused with innateness (Stotz 2010).  
 
I have spent two chapters building a positive case for context-dependent construction 
of psychological devices. We’ve seen how human intelligence, affect, and self-
representation can be constructed. We’ve also seen how these processes are 
underpinned by dynamic modifications at the level of neurons and neural networks. 
Often the crucial contextual variables are technological. Artifacts, mathematical 
symbols and ways of interacting with digital virtual worlds contribute to these 
constructive processes. This complex picture will become even more complex in 
chapter three when we look beyond the brain, to its integration with the world. 
Ultimately we will need some principled explanatory method to untangle this web of 
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constructive development in order that we can articulate coherent explanation of the 
emergence of traits. I will address this complexity in chapter four. 
 
Furthermore, even if there is evolutionary specification for a particular sort of 
cognition (thanks to the selective effects of a particular sort of environment) then 
changing the environment (as cultural technologies such as language, symbolism, 
numbers, literacy, digital technologies, simulations, formal education and so on, have 
dramatically done) will change the developmental trajectory. Even if some 
evolutionary specification is in the form of conditionals such as ‘if social cue X then 
decrease androgen production, if social cue Y then increase it’ (see Confer et al. 2010 
for similar examples) it is still obvious that any particular environmental state can fall 
outside of the scope of such conditionals.  
 
There are different ways that novel cognitive phenotypes occur. At the level of 
neurons we see stimuli that cause particular developmental trajectories rather than 
others. Lickliter (1990) demonstrates this with bird chicks. At the level of cognitive 
devices we see re-organization of individual (already developed) devices into a range 
of different functional units. Dehaene & Wilson’s approaches to literacy and 
mathematical cognition are examples of this. Finally, we might also see expansion of 
particular neural networks if the context demanded more specific or a greater range 
of processing in a particular task. The prismed owl’s developmental responses 
demonstrate this. 
 
Whatever the mechanism employed in any particular case, altered environments can 
cause alterations in cognition. The take home message is that the neural processes I 
have described in this chapter explain how the cultural technological causes I outlined 
in chapter one can have the effects that they do on psychological traits.  
 
Psychological traits are built by the interaction of, (a) plastic neural resources, (b) 
constructive developmental processes, (c) re-tooling or reorganization of 
fundamental processing units and, (d) integration across brains, bodies and 
technologies. The evolutionary aspects of psychology become relevant in constraining 
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the exact nature of (a) and perhaps in providing some primitives for (c) to work with. 
Overall we have a flexible and reactive genome and neural system.   
 
Three quotes from Karola Stotz perhaps best sum up to this point. First: (2010, p. 
488):  
 
‘*W+hat is most distinctive about humans is the reaction of extremely 
developmentally plastic brains to a total immersion and involvement into a well 
engineered, cumulatively constructed cognitive-developmental niche (Clark 2008; 
Sterelny 2003)’.   
 
In this Stotz is absolutely right. In this chapter I have pointed to the dynamics of the 
developmental plasticity and in chapter one I have pointed toward the total 
immersion in a cognitive developmental niche. Second, Stotz (2010, p. 498): 
 
‘Human nature must inevitably be a product of its cognitive-developmental niche 
that includes a great deal of cultural and symbolic scaffolding.’  
 
Stotz unfortunately gives virtually no evidence that it actually is a product of this. 
Hopefully to this point (and continued in the next chapter) I have shown some of this. 
Finally: 
 
‘It is possible to wholeheartedly endorse the idea that the mind is a product of 
evolution without accepting the claim that the mind is constrained to develop or to 
reason in certain, limited ways. The key to separating these two claims is to recognise 
that what individuals inherit from their ancestors is not a mind, but the ability to 
develop a mind. The fertilised egg contains neither a “language acquisition device” 
nor a knowledge of the basic tenets of folk psychology. These features come into 
existence as the mind grows’ (Griffiths and Stotz 2000, p. 31).  
 
The brain is an evolutionary buffer system. It protects the body from the world and 
enables adaptive integration of body and world. Buffer systems are striking in that 
the buffer itself can change dramatically while preserving the integrity of the system. 
Such a buffer system is designed to maximize phenotypic plasticity and therefore 
permit adaptive behaviour in novel environments. This evolvability has probably been 
selected for over evolutionary time and is an adaptation. Such an adaptation provides 
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the basis for rapid change of human minds over short time-spans, even, as we have 
seen, within the space of one generation. 
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CHAPTER THREE – Mind: Scaffolded and Extended 
 
To summarize up to this point, in chapter one I described the vast array of examples 
of cultural processes that shape the way we think. In chapter two I outlined the likely 
brain and developmental mechanisms that permit culture to sculpt cognition.  I now 
want to shift focus, away from the developmental causes of brain structure, which we 
might call scaffold-ing of development, towards seeing how the brain relates to 
external objects and incorporates them into functional systems. Such functional 
systems may be scaffold-ed in real time by external props.  
 
Let me be very clear about this distinction. A scaffold is a supporting framework. 
Sometimes this is a temporary framework as in the scaffold used against a building to 
allow it to be constructed. Sometimes the scaffolds are permanent, as with a vine 
that is scaffolded by a trellis. Cognition could be (a) scaffold-ed, when it depends 
causally on external symbols to complete some operation, or could require (b) 
scaffold-ing for its development, after which operation no longer causally depends on 
the scaffold. An abacus could provide both versions of scaffold. When adding large 
quantities an abacus can be employed to scaffold the operation in real time, 
scaffolded cognition, but also skilled abacus users have demonstrated very specific 
cognitive enhancements, such as increased digit span memory to around fifteen digits 
(Lock & Peters 1996). This enhanced span ability requires the scaffolding of the 
abacus for its development.  
 
In this chapter I will outline the theory of niche construction. These are the processes 
whereby organisms modify their environments in ways that have functional, 
developmental, and evolutionary consequences. Some author’s have linked a 
hypothesis of extended cognitive processes to this theory of niche construction (e.g. 
Clark 2008, Stotz 2010, Sterelny 2010). We will see how modifications to humans’ 
environments can lead to scaffolding of cognitive development and scaffolded 
cognition. I will also explore the further claim that external resources constitute 
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proper parts of systems that perform cognition, and in some limiting cases could be 
properly characterised as cognitive.  
 
Not all cases where some environmental factor interacts with the cognitive system 
should be considered a systemic whole. For example, observing and responding to a 
billboard advertisement is a process of using an external representation, but the 
representation is merely taken as an input to the cognitive system. However, it is 
argued that the causal coupling of inner and outer elements sometimes creates a 
‘sufficiently integrated cognitive whole’ (Clark 2008, p. 74), these are the cases of 
extended mind, which I will examine presently. Sometimes understanding the 
cognitive system as actually extending beyond the body and brain helps us to explain 
surprising facts. 
 
A Brief Introduction to Niche Construction 
 
Niche construction (see Odling-Smee, Feldman & Laland 2003; Sterelny 2003) is the 
process whereby organisms modify the environment. Environments may be modified 
in adaptive ways, such as a beaver building a dam, or in maladaptive ways, such as 
humans producing vast quantities of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Niche construction 
can have four important consequences. First, the altered niche can effect 
development. Second, the altered niche can contribute support to function. Third, the 
altered niche can constitute a novel evolutionary selective environment. Fourth, the 
altered niche can drive further change and/or accumulate over time. Putting aside 
the evolutionary selective consequences of niche construction for a moment (I will 
return to evolution at the end of this chapter, and in chapter eight) let’s look at some 
examples of the other general consequences of niche construction.  
 
A nice non-human example of the first consequence of niche construction, and a case 
of the scaffolding of development, is exhibited by meerkats. They ensure their 
offspring can safely learn how to catch scorpions, first by providing dead scorpions to 
play with, then by providing disabled (stingless) scorpions, and then finally fully 
functional scorpions (Thornton & McAuliffe 2006). The parent meerkats are 
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engineering the developmental educational environment of their offspring. Sterelny 
(2011) gives many examples of scaffolding of the development of human hunter-
gatherer skills based on an apprentice model. Humans engineer their environments 
with the result that human children learn stepwise complex behaviours and cognitive 
skills. Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of this process is formal education 
where students are led through a series of demonstrative exercises, often with 
partially worked examples, and learn, piecemeal, complex cognitive manipulations. 
Skills are gained that would likely not have been gained had the developmental niche 
not been engineered in this way. Importantly, it is often the case that had the niche 
been engineered differently, different traits would have developed. 
 
The second consequence is that changes to the niche can be functional. Think of 
doing long division. Without a suite of niche engineering this is impossible for most 
people. The process is supported by pens, pencils, or chalk, or some other marking 
tool. The process also requires paper, or a whiteboard, or some other surface to 
make marks on. Finally, an algorithm is needed. This may be internalized but that is 
not essential, a written algorithm to be followed in real time would suffice. Perhaps, 
as is the case more recently, the process is supported just by a calculator or 
computer. In any case, we have engineered our environment in such ways that we 
have as needed, when needed, access to all these tools and algorithms. The niche we 
have built supports this mathematical cognitive function.  
 
Alterations to the niche can change or accumulate over time. Development doesn’t 
stop. It is a lifelong process and so environmental engineering can scaffold lifelong 
development. Also, scaffolding doesn’t have to be intentional. An example of this 
arises in the context of formal education in mathematical physics. Formal educational 
technologies are some of the most powerful cognitive transformers that we have 
invented. Wimsatt and Griesemer (2007), drawing on Warwick (2003), outline the 
development and effect that the Cambridge University tutorial system in physics has 
had on enhancing physical thought. In 1750 due to a desire for increased objectivity 
in the examination process Cambridge changed its examination system in 
mathematical physics from an oral system to a system employing written exams (a 
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change in the niche). This altered the nature of the material that was assessable from 
philosophical discussions of texts like Newton’s Principia, to written problems 
assessing technical competence, for example, asking students to present proofs. This 
meant that overall ranking of the students became possible, so students were then 
under pressure to perform well. Many students began seeking external tutors to help 
them. The performance of the tutors was judged by how well their students did in the 
exams and so the tutors began to experiment with different techniques. One tutor 
made his class take notes (even though paper was very expensive) in order that they 
may practice writing fast for the examinations. However, as a side effect of this niche 
construction activity, these students, now armed with a permanent record of the 
teachings and problems, mastered the techniques much more easily than other 
students. In fact all of the following advanced teaching methods emerged at this 
time: interactive questioning rather than passive lecturing, guided problem solving, 
regular exams, textbooks, graded exercises giving feedback, and grouping students by 
ability so they could learn from each other. The university began to ask the tutors to 
set more challenging questions as they now had greater mastery of mathematical 
physics than the internal lecturers. Eventually, embarrassed by the competence of 
external freelance tutors Cambridge University internalized the tutorial system. 
Ultimately, a change from studying a set text philosophically, to practicing problems, 
led to solving problems never even contemplated by Newton. All this took place 
within the framework of a formal education system, which changed bit by bit over a 
period of 150 years. In math and science there is often a ‘strong sequential 
dependence of later methods and results on earlier methods and results’ (Wimsatt & 
Griesemer 2007, p. 232). It very much seems to be the case that as we build our 
worlds we build our minds. 
 
Embodied and Embedded Mind: Extending Functionalism 
 
Minds (and therefore psychological traits) are embodied and embedded in an 
environmental context. ‘Minds are not disembodied logical reasoning devices’ (Clark 
1997, p. 1). This simple truism has been overlooked in past philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science. We use our fingers to count with. We preserve culture, history and 
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memory in vast treatises for sharing information with others. Minds are inextricably 
bound up with bodies, cultures and environments. This has genuine implications for 
function.  
 
Functionalism about minds is the claim that mental states are individuated by the 
causal relations they bear to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and other mental 
states (Putnam 1975). A mental state is what it is because it plays the right sort of 
functional role in the cognitive system. Traditional functionalism permits us to 
attribute minds to such things as aliens, super-intelligent robots and the like. This 
move is permitted because functionalism is not committed to the material nature of 
mental states and allows mental states to be multiply realized, in different materials, 
for example silicon, or in different arrangements, such as pulses of green goo. Some 
of these entities may be external objects.  
 
External factors are necessary for cognition as we know it. In fact, external factors of 
the right sort might constitute parts of a functional system that thinks (Wheeler 
2010). Wheeler argues that functionalism about minds is the correct approach and 
that we can have extended functionalism in some cases. This has the potential to give 
us ‘extended minds’ (Clark & Chalmers 1998, Clark 2008, see also Donald 1991). 
 
Taking functionalism as our baseline for characterizing mental states, and accepting 
that there is no a priori reason to exclude external factors, then we see that some 
external props could constitute cognitive states rather than merely being objects that 
cognitive states are causally dependent on. Wheeler points out that there are two 
sorts of external prop.  
 
‘Bare causal dependence of mentality on external factors – even when that causal 
dependence is of the “necessary” kind just highlighted – is simply not enough for 
genuine cognitive extension. What is needed is the constitutive dependence of 
mentality on external factors... for supporters of the merely embodied-embedded 
view of mind, the pen and paper system is to be conceived as a noncognitive 
environmental prop’. (Wheeler, 2010, p. 246) 
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So, we motivate a debate over the bounds of cognition by asking, can we justify the 
transition from merely embodied and embedded approaches to an approach 
extending the mind? To accept that human cognitive systems are embodied and are 
embedded in a world of props, is not necessarily to accept that those props constitute 
parts of our cognitive systems rather than mere inputs or tools. To argue that 
external features are parts of a cognitive system is to argue for the thesis of extended 
cognition. Before we get into that debate, however, I would like to prime the reader 
with a case study detailing the origins of writing, since written symbols are often 
argued to be elements of extended cognitive processes (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998).  
 
Literacy 
 
I will begin by outlining some of the details surrounding the emergence and effects of 
literacy in humans. Writing lies somewhere in between ‘a system of human 
intercommunication by means of conventional visible marks’ (Gelb 1963, p. 12) and, 
‘the graphic counterpart of speech (Diringer 1968, p. 8). Writing systems originated 
approximately 5000 years ago, and depended on pre-existing visual/iconic and 
auditory/symbolic cognitive systems. But necessary, too, were a range of 
technologies, tools, marking materials, surfaces for writing to persist on, and so on. 
The motivation to make durable marks was also necessary. This motivation emerged 
from a social problem space. With agriculture, societies had become spatially and 
temporally extended. There was also intensification of the organisation of the social 
environment. Biological human memory became challenged, property was 
accumulated and there was more to keep track of. Information had become more 
valuable and information in an oral culture was fragile (Lock & Gers 2011). Another 
way to put this is that the bandwidth and fidelity of oral culture was not up to the 
task demanded of keeping records in larger agricultural cultures.  
 
Lock & Gers (2011) further argue that, just as is the case with the emergence of 
tutorials at Cambridge University, no one set out with the intention of writing speech 
down. Contemporary systems of coding speech evolved through a process of natural 
selection once visible marks were initiated to confront the problem domains 
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identified above. Just as marking tallys enhanced human capacities for remembering 
and tracking quantities, such as the lunar month and seasons, and pictographic and 
cunieform symbol systems expanded accounting and trade practices, writing down 
speech massively enhanced what it was possible for humans to do in the world. 
Writing down speech was not the adaptive problem that early notation systems set 
out to solve, but this adaptive space was opened to humans once this process began. 
Simple mathematical problems and tallying seem to have created a mind space for 
literacy. In turn literacy builds a host of other cognitive skills. 
 
Vygotsky argued that language influences the higher psychological processes (1962). 
This is corroborated by Pica et al. (2004) and Everett (2005). If this is so then there 
seems to be ‘an a priori case for assuming that subsequent changes in the means and 
modes of communication would affect cognitive processes in parallel ways’ (Goody 
1987, p. 260). A similar line has been taken by McLuhan (1962) who makes very 
strong claims for the cognitive consequences of literacy, particularly the alphabetic 
system of writing. These claims need to be approached carefully. For example, 
multiplication is much more easily conducted with the Arabic as opposed to the 
Roman system of notating numbers. But easier doesn't mean different: both systems 
enable the same underlying cognitive process – the manipulation of symbols for 
arithmetic purposes. This may be true for simple examples, but the Arabatic 
algorithms are much more open-ended and error-free. Similarly, the fact that it is 
much more difficult to organise a dictionary of Chinese characters than alphabetic 
words does not imply that there are different cognitive processes involved in devising 
an organisational framework. On the other hand, there do appear to be clear biases 
amongst occidental versus oriental cultures in the way they approach perceptual and 
cognitive problems (e.g., Nisbett, 2003). 
 
We need to clarify what is involved here. To what degree are we interested in what 
building a literacy niche lets us do (scaffold-ed), and to what degree in how it 
transforms us (scaffold-ing)? There are three different positions one could take 
regarding the effects of writing on cognition.  
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1. There is a strong claim that the appearance of writing systems, and the 
associated memorial record that is open to public scrutiny, began to shape the 
cognition of those who learned and used them. Goody and Watt (1963) claim 
that there are changes in kind of cognition and critical examination. For 
example, Goody claims that the ability to write statements down allows the 
emergence of syllogistic reasoning. This encourages skepticism as a routine 
mode of thought. The idea is that certain cognitive logics depend upon 
writing. Olson (2005) suggests that this is because literacy allows 
metarepresentation of language. We are able to think about language not just 
with it. 
2. Those who deny that writing has cognitive effects argue that symbols are 
merely tools that brains can use in order to perform tasks that they could do, 
in theory, internally. For example, Masterson (1970) describes twenty-one 
different uses of ‘paradigm’ in Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
and catalogues these. Such a task would be very difficult without literacy, 
indeed it may place impossible pressures upon the functions of biological 
memory, but the mental processes employed are of the same kind in each 
case (Halverson 1992).  
3. A somewhat intermediate claim, which is that writing and written symbols 
form proper parts of distributed cognitive systems and sometimes play 
important constitutive roles in our thought processes. 
 
We find defence of the cognitive differences claim (1) in Goody and Watt (1963). 
Goody recalls that he could not count cowrie shells as well as Ghanaian boys who are 
well practiced at this task, which is routine in their daily lives. But Goody notes that 
he could multiply the numbers of shells faster. The argument is that written times 
tables helped him learn and permitted rapid recall of visually inspected charts as 
needed. If the example is unconvincing, then a more illuminating claim may be that it 
is extremely difficult to form the concept of a negative quantity without having 
previously encountered a physical number line.  
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A further example provided by Goody (1977) is that of lists. Though lists exist in non-
literate cultures, writing encourages the ability to inspect lists and isolate items for 
formal taxonomic or categorical purposes. One could argue that such categorical 
thinking is a new mode of thought. Donald (1991) describes human interaction with 
symbolic media as plugging into, and becoming part of, an external system. He argues 
that grouping of information into clusters, or lists, is a peculiarly visual institution. 
Visual lists differ from oral ones in that visual lists free up working memory. Once 
‘free,’ working memory and attention can be directed to other tasks. This allows lists 
to be used without stressing the resources of working memory. Inspection and 
processing of the lists is possible without sustaining them within the resource 
limitations of working memory. Donald further notes that an alphabetically written 
word may be a phonogram (representing sounds), but it can also be an ideogram 
(representing an idea), but that even a whole paragraph or entire book can be an 
ideogram. We can then manipulate ideograms to produce new content.  
 
‘Each time the brain carries out an operation in concert with the external symbolic 
storage system, it becomes part of a network. Its memory structure is temporarily 
altered; and the locus of cognitive control changes’ (1991, p. 312). 
 
The reading of writing also requires a new suite of visual scanning techniques. 
Ordinarily we don’t scan visual scenes from left to right, top to bottom (as English 
speakers do when reading). Furthermore, we can break information into chapters, 
parts, boxes, tables, sections, relations. We give ourselves new perceptual objects 
with which to interact in the world. Biological memory does not easily lend itself to 
this. Finally, Donald notes that, with writing, iteration and recursion are truly 
unlimited.  
 
Numerically literate people perform calculations in a way that is qualitatively 
different from the multiplications of non-literates. Interestingly, the Arabic numeral 
system has evolved to be more adapted to this task than systems such as Roman 
numerals. This is not to say that one cannot perform complex calculations with 
Roman numerals (as the Romans themselves clearly did) but that there are 
differences in the algorithms employed. One way we perform mental calculations is 
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by internalizing these algorithms and this can lead to differences in the cognitive 
processing of number even when the symbols are not actually written down. This 
latter example is a case of scaffolding of cognition, which results from repeated 
experiences of cognition that is scaffolded by symbols.  
 
Goody (1987, p. 256) further claims: 
 
‘the very nature of formal reasoning as we usually understand it (that is, in terms of 
Aristotelian ‘logical’ procedures) is a highly specific skill, critically dependent upon the 
existence of writing and a written tradition which helps formalize intellectual 
procedures’.  
 
Logic is not impossible without literacy, but in general people struggle to develop 
logical thought without the ability to visually inspect. Indeed, Sperber (2000) argues 
that we have a long-standing, evolved, ‘logical module’ and that this allows us to 
attend to the logical properties of representations. This sort of device perhaps 
evolved because we needed to attend to the indefinitely many possible mental states 
of conspecifics and the inferences that they would likely make from them. It would 
also be essential within the context of a persuasion/counter-persuasion arms race of 
the sort likely to have emerged with language. Such a cognitive device would be 
content neutral, merely attending to logico-semantic relationships such as entailment 
and warrant. However, even Sperber concedes that this would be unlikely to account 
for the full range of our modern capabilities: 
 
‘The type of metapsychological competence that is likely to be an evolved adaptation 
is unlikely to explain the modern human ability to attend to abstract representations, 
and in particular to do formal logic’ (Sperber 2000, p. 12).  
 
This is likely to be true, given the demands on working memory of any moderately 
complex logical reasoning. It seems that written symbols are an essential component 
of serious logical cognition. In such cases as the analysis of ‘paradigm’ in Kuhn’s 
writings, it may be true that the elementary operations are the same as those we 
have been capable of for a long time, but by relaxing the demands on memory and 
attention then new combinations and composites are possible. One could liken this to 
the transition from single-celled to multi-cellular organisms. The fundamental 
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building blocks are the same, but many new, varied and powerful functions become 
possible.  
 
However, others are skeptical and instead support claim (2), symbols are merely 
tools. Halverson (1992) notes that a cumulative intellectual tradition is indeed aided 
immensely by writing, but that a syllogism is just a sequence of statements about 
relations that do not depend on the medium that the statements are presented in. 
‘Written records… may allow us to be more accurate in certain judgments, but 
skeptical attitudes hardly depend on them’ (p. 309). He also argues that although lists 
abounded in ancient literate civilizations for administrative purposes, they do not 
seem to reveal any notable differences in kinds of cognition. 
 
Halverson describes many phenomena that are only possible with literacy. These 
include, crossword puzzles, grammars, dictionaries, reading maps, and shaped verse. 
Literacy significantly opens the door to a whole suite of possibilities. Indeed, 
Nickerson (2005) concludes that, ‘there is no other technological advance whose 
effects on human history rival those of this one’ (p. 25). He catalogues a host of 
cognitive amplification devices ranging from various kinds of slide-rules to computers 
and memory aids, all of which amplify our capabilities. 
 
It may not be possible or productive to distinguish between a major enhancement of 
existing capacities and the establishment of qualitatively new capacities. It is clear 
that literacy powers enhancements, illustrated by the analysis of Kuhn’s text. 
Furthermore, when thinking, we often gesticulate and produce overt or covert 
linguistic utterances. Sometimes we write things down. These actions allow us to 
attend to particular aspects of thoughts, or to create new variety to stimulate further 
reflection. The thinking process is partly constituted by our internal representations 
and external scaffolds that we embed ourselves in. Clark often cites the example of 
physicist Richard Feynman. When told that his extensive notes and scribbling were 
the record of his work Feynman replied, ‘No, it’s not a record, not really. It’s working. 
You have to work on paper and this is the paper, ok?’ (Gleick 1992, p.409). Feynman 
is pointing out that his thoughts are hybrid, partly constituted by internal 
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representations and partly by his external working. An important difference between 
Feynman and prehistoric people is Feynman’s integration with external media, 
mathematical symbols, pencil and paper, and graphic representations of concepts. 
Enhancement seems to shade into qualitatively new capacities.  
 
A problem in presenting this as a debate between those who see literacy driving 
qualitative cognitive change and those who don’t is that the debate focuses too 
sharply on individualistic cognitive processes. The Feynman example can be writ 
large. Literacy, through allowing thoughts to be ‘frozen’ permits new kinds of 
cognitive collaboration across space and time. We see new forms of the division of 
intellectual labour and new forms of teaching. A nice example of this is presented by 
Rambusch et al. (2004). In a study of artifacts in a hospital setting, these authors 
observe the role that the folder of patient notes plays in mediating between the 
cognitive activities of various staff, such as nurses, doctors, allied health 
professionals, and administrators. Each agent interacts with the written notes, 
reading off representations, engaging in activity, altering representations or 
elaborating on them. What emerges is a dynamic record of the patient’s condition, 
treatment, management plan, lists of things to do or observe, a record of the thought 
processes of medical staff, and so on. Human cognition is a cultural and social process 
and work done by individual agents produces and alters this representational artifact. 
The folder accumulates information that no single person could remember and the 
current state of the artifact at any given time causes different individuals to perform 
different cognitive acts. Even the location of the artifact causes certain agents to 
perform certain acts depending on their cognitive role, as doctors, nurses, 
administrators and so on. We see processes of shared memory, of trust and 
coordination across a complex cognitive task, there is rich inter-agent communication 
as well, which hinges on the presence of a reliable, durable and modifiable store of 
represenations. Much of this would not be possible if the agents were not literate.  
 
Someone might object that it is now difficult to individuate cognitive systems. If 
different agents are constantly interfacing with the tool, where does one cognitive 
system begin and another end? It is also difficult to determine which parts of the 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
81 
 
system are cognitive, or are mental states, and which are not. However, this is not 
really important. What is important is to recognize that at any given time there is a 
looping process running from agent to artifact and back again. There is a process that 
involves both external and internal representations, and manipulation of those 
representations. These active processing loops are more than just input-output 
couplings, they are dynamic processes that are causally necessary for and support 
human cognitive action. These distributed systems enable human functions and 
enhance our capabilities in the world. 
 
Even if there are no deep ‘cognitive’ (read internal, neural) differences between 
literates and non-literates, the emergence of writing certainly provided powerful 
strategies enhancing learning, memory and education. The ability to record and 
reflect upon content, to critically deconstruct long and complex texts, and to easily 
categorize the world, providing new objects for our attention in the form of lists, has 
amplified human cognitive prowess in important ways. The effect is that of a 
feedback loop, so that non-literates become progressively left behind. 
 
The important idea is not that literacy causes important large changes in cognition, 
rather that small influences act through processes of accumulation and amplification. 
This led humans to think about things that they would not, without the emergence of 
writing systems, otherwise have thought about, or even been able to conceive. It is 
enhancements to the ease of formal logical thought, the scrutiny encouraged by 
written records, and the complexity of argument permitted, which are the important 
factors. A clear example is that early tallying does not require any abstract concept of 
number, but early tallying was probably necessary in allowing this concept to be 
achieved. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss Clark’s notion of an extended mind. I 
argue that humans have hybrid thoughts, which are partly dependant on internal 
neural processes and partly constituted by external or potentially external things such 
as words and symbols. This introduces us to the idea that minds may not be entirely 
constituted by brains. We do indeed create surrogate contexts for our brains to 
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operate in, and these contexts sometimes constitute proper parts of cognitive 
systems. I will give examples. I then note that such contexts are cultural in nature and 
that even without shaping the development of brains, through niche construction, 
culture can shape the trajectory of the evolution of human minds. This may mean 
that the human mind becomes a rather vague and fluid entity of study, however, we 
can certainly still identify assemblies of physical things, which constitute various 
psychological functions. The study of these assemblies then constitutes cognitive 
science. Minds and psychological traits are not the same thing, though there is some 
relation between them. Perhaps minds are collections of psychological traits. The 
argument here is merely that psychological traits, i.e. what humans can do or think 
about, are not causally dependent exclusively on brains. The sustaining systems are 
hybrid in constitution.  
 
Hybrid Thoughts 
 
I will now spend some time discussing the notion of a hybrid thought. When 
something is hybrid it is partly constituted by one kind of thing, and partly by another. 
A hybrid vehicle is powered partly by petroleum and partly by batteries. A hybrid 
university course is partly delivered as face-to-face classes and partly online. In these 
cases there are (at least) two different kinds of thing, which act in complimentary 
fashion to produce some outcome. Clark argues that the human mind is naturally 
designed so as to ‘co-opt a mounting cascade of extra-neural elements as (quite 
literally) parts of extended and distributed cognitive processes.’ (2006, p. 1). Clark 
calls this our ‘ancient trick’. I hope it is clear from chapter two that this is exactly the 
sort of thing that the processes of neuroconstructivism are geared to do. Once this 
very generalist mechanism is in place, then brains find innovative ways to integrate 
an evolving cultural context with neural systems. 
 
As I have outlined in chapter one, our numerical capabilities depend on three 
systems; a small quantity individuation system and an approximate magnitude 
system (both of which are biologically primitive). We also have the learnt capacity to 
use number words (this is an instance of re-tooling our primitive number systems). 
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This is not biologically basic. We learn that perceptually distinct number words 
correlate to distinct quantities, without having to represent the quantities 
themselves. We can then perform actions like working out long-multiplication on 
paper.  
 
When calculating the product of two large numbers algorithmically, on paper, there is 
an embedded, dynamic, causal coupling between my brain and the symbols. The 
process of arriving at the final answer is constituted by my brain and external 
symbols. But, this is not mere embodiment or embedding of a cognitive process in an 
external environment of tools, because there are representations beyond the limits 
of my body, crucial to the process, that are not internalized in any way. We only 
multiply single digits. When multiplying 382 by 112, I begin by multiplying two times 
two. And yet multiple digit solutions resolve themselves on the page. The product of 
a long multiplication is not represented internally at any stage of the algorithmic 
process. Yet it becomes available to internal processes for representation at the end 
of the working. The final product is represented by the final row of digits in the 
multiplication and is a representation now available to further cognitive processes. I 
am manipulating single digit symbols all the way through, yet the manipulation of 
larger numbers emerges in this process. This is a hybrid process, partly relying on 
internal neural operations and partly relying on external scaffolds and support. The 
argument is that lots of mathematics is emergent and cannot be reduced to brain-
bound, symbolic, or cognitive subsystems.  
 
Once the manipulation of representational vehicles is seen as part of the process of 
thought, then it is hard to delineate external from internal without applying a neural 
chauvinism over what constitutes cognition (Menary 2007). Once people have writing 
systems available to them, cognition seems to bleed into the environment as 
integrated systems of information processing. This is qualitatively different from non-
literate thought, it is hybrid.  
 
One objection to this approach would be to cite instances of humans who can 
calculate such large multiplications in their heads. The savant Daniel Tammet is one 
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example, by visualizing numbers as coloured shapes which merge together he 
calculates products in seconds that would take ordinary people many minutes on 
paper. Other individuals can extract 13th roots from one hundred digit numbers in 
their head. However, there are many ways to perform certain cognitive tasks. This is 
the whole basis of multiple realizability. We could employ a calculator, we could 
physically count out beans, or we could do the sums in our head. Each is a different 
instantiation of the arithmetic process. Some instances are examples of traditional 
internal cognition, some instances are genuinely hybrid. It does not matter for the 
arguments here if some people can perform a task using thoughts that are never 
hybrid, because it is clear from observing the behaviour of a vast majority of others 
that hybridity is a normal and important mode of mathematical reasoning. It is 
unclear how savants manage to perform the feats that they do, what is more clear is 
that ordinary human cognition is often hybrid and dependent on external structures.  
 
Negative quantities are a good case study for hybrid and extended thoughts. For 
example, the Greeks based math on geometry and so had no negative numbers. 
Negative spaces, of course, cannot exist. The Chinese had a red and black rod system 
which represented who owes and who is owed money. It could be argued that this 
was a representation of negative quantity, as too it could be argued, were the Indian 
Brahmagupta’s ‘rules for zero’ which employed concepts of fortune and debt. 
However, true negative values must be decoupled from sums of money and the social 
construction that is debt. Debt is still a positive value, a sum of money owed to 
someone. It wasn’t until Europe between 1500-1900 that mathematicians began to 
use negative numbers for solving quadratic equations and where the roots of 
negative numbers had to be dealt with. The imaginary number i was invented. i 
cannot be translated into an internal representation in the same way as a discrete 
real number. The external symbol i becomes a placeholder, a focus of attention until 
it can be eliminated by manipulation. This is a truly hybrid thought. It could be argued 
that the parabola y=x2 could be modified with a third ‘z’ axis running perpendicular to 
both x and y axes. This could enable a visual representation of an inverted ‘ghost’ 
parabola representing negative roots. However, with this it is still at least the case 
that the media is required for priming the internal representation of i. ‘Since 
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mathematicians can express operations that can never be performed in the mind 
alone… mathematics can convey a range of ideas that are actually opaque,’ (De Cruz 
2008). These are true hybrid thoughts. The claim is that there is (at least) a stepping 
stone in development where a hybrid thought acts as necessary scaffolding for an 
internal concept to form. That hybrid thought is based on a public symbol.  
 
De Cruz (2008), like Clark, is confident that there are hybrid thoughts. ‘External 
symbolic representations of natural numbers are not merely converted into an inner 
code; they remain an important and irreducible part of our numerical cognition.’ (De 
Cruz, 2008, pg 487). Public media certainly play an essential role ontogenetically and 
operationally, for example, by allowing a mathematical thought to proceed without 
having to represent all the content at once. 
 
Many of us have experienced the formulation of an elusive thought as we have begun 
to write about a topic. Often an idea may not be clear until we begin to write it down, 
and only then reflect on the words, their logical form, and notice that the idea lacks 
clarity. This occurs because once we begin to produce public representations we can 
attend to particular concepts and manipulate hybrid thoughts on the page by 
engaging with the material symbols. This idea leads into a second, non-mathematical 
example of hybrid cognitive processes.  
 
When I was writing this chapter, I performed the following procedure. I read a pile of 
articles and books on relevant topics. I then typed up notes and comments pertaining 
to each article or book. I also wrote some chunks of text that consolidated some of 
my thoughts. I ended up with a large word document of some ten or twelve thousand 
words. This was a document that I could not wield all at once, let alone fit on the 
screen. I struggled to work with it in this format. So I printed it out, and took a pair of 
scissors and physically cut all the bits up and arranged them by topic and ordered the 
topics into an argument. I then took each new section and wrote them up on my 
computer again. This was hybrid cognition. By physically manipulating the 
environment and especially manipulating objects that were ‘frozen thoughts’ which I 
could stop thinking about because they were frozen in media, I greatly simplified the 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
86 
 
process. The entire system of my brain, body, scissors, paper, and symbols, all these 
complimentary entities, constituted the process of writing this chapter (see figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5: My hybrid mind while writing this chapter. 
 
I am not arguing that it is impossible to compose such a chapter (or indeed solve 
mathematical problems) without hybrid thought processes. I am arguing that in 
actual fact, through hybridizing, the process is made much more simple, or is 
avaibable to individuals not capable of performing the task entirely in their mind, or 
that much more complex psychological functions can be instantiated.  
 
One important point I would like to highlight here is that irrespective of the 
ontological hybridity of thoughts, there is an important causal dependence of many 
of these sophisticated thoughts on external media, the body, and our integration with 
the world. The notion of hybridity itself is less important than the causal structure of 
the systems that underpin psychological traits. That said, the notion of hybridity helps 
to focus our attention on important and central cultural technological elements of 
cognitive systems that may otherwise have been taken for granted.  
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Let’s take just the example of language. There are at least three ways in which 
language (symbols, tags, physical media) can function in hybrid fashion:  
 
1. Language as a source of additional targets for attention and learning 
(remember the tag trained chimps from chapter one). These may be cueing 
differences, by having two different symbols then agents can learn that there 
is a difference.  
2. Language as a resource for directing and maintaining attention on complex 
conjoined cues, a label.  
3. Language as providing some of the proper parts of hybrid thoughts (as we saw 
in the cases of numerical representation).  
 
So by employing language I can anchor my thoughts. I can produce a linguistic symbol 
describing, for example, my mental state, ‘I am sad’. I can then reflect upon this, my 
thoughts take shape thanks to a process of looping into the world and perceiving 
what I have produced. This is overt in the case of a Facebook webpage, for example, 
where I represent myself externally, perhaps linguistically, perhaps as an avatar in the 
three-dimensional virtual world of Second Life. These external props provide anchors 
for further reflection and contemplation, enhancing self-awareness (Vasalou, Joinson 
and Pitt, 2007). I outlined evidence of this sort of phenomenon in chapter one. 
 
I have given examples of how public language, symbols, gestures and objects can turn 
thoughts into properly hybrid things. But we can take things further than mere hybrid 
thoughts. I will now examine Clark & Chalmers’ (1998) stronger thesis that some 
cognition is essentially and significantly extended into the world outside our bodies.  
 
Extended Mind 
 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduced the concept of an extended mind. This is an 
idea that in some forms goes back at least to Merlin Donald’s Origins of the Modern 
Mind (1991). Extended Mind is also called vehicle externalism. Clark makes an 
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important distinction between the contents of thoughts and the vehicles of thoughts. 
The vehicle is the physical instantiation that permits the thought to exist, such as a 
burst of neural activity. For example, the perceptual content of ‘greenness’ detected 
at some location in visual space will have a pattern of neural firing as its vehicle. None 
of this neural firing is green. So there is a difference between the content and the 
vehicle. The content is the thought itself, e.g. an experience of greenness. Though we 
can localize the vehicle in physical space, we cannot really localize the thought. The 
content of a memory may be {the location of the Museum of Modern Art} but the 
vehicle for this might be some neuronal state in the brain, or the symbols in a 
notebook. Either vehicle can be employed to insert the content into working memory.  
 
Extended mind grants that there are two kinds of cognitive case that extend beyond 
the skull. First, our dispositions to behave partly derive from external support for 
dispositional knowledge. This is a claim about engineering information into our 
environments in order that brains may function more efficiently and accurately. This 
is niche construction. Clark and Chalmers give the example of Otto and his notebook. 
Otto keeps information in his notebook, such as the location of the Museum of 
Modern Art. When asked how to get to the Museum of Modern Art, Otto is disposed 
to produce the right directions because of the external, readily available 
representations in his notebook. A more interesting case is found in Clark (2003). 
Alzheimer’s patients with severe disease are often found managing to cope still living 
alone. This is because they engineer their environments to prompt them. They keep 
utensils in open view, or write post-it notes to themselves. This structured 
environment disposes them to behave in certain ways. When admitted to hospital, 
these patients deteriorate noticeably. It is like they have suffered a sudden further 
bout of brain damage. Which in a very real sense they have. They have lost their 
external cognitive scaffolds. 
 
The second way in which cognition allegedly bleeds into the environment is more 
interesting. This is the claim of active information processing loops. We utilise active 
loops of information processing into the environment (of non-biological media) and 
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this constitutes proper parts of our cognitive systems. These two phenomena work 
together and constitute the extended mind.  
 
For many the concept of the extended mind rests upon a parity principle. This can be 
formulated in several ways but the basic sense is that a process counts as cognitive if 
it is the case that had that process occurred in the brain then one would have no 
hesitation in attributing cognition to it. Importantly, others, such as Sutton et al. 
(2010) and Sterelny (2010), argue more for the complementarity relation I set out for 
hybrid thoughts in the previous section, than for parity. Sutton sets out three options: 
 
(1) There is true extended cognition where cognitive processes are sometimes 
constituted by external processes (perhaps based on parity).  
(2) There is merely embedded cognition where cognition causally interacts with 
external resources but remains intracranial (cognition is never actually hybrid, 
it is merely supported by some external factors).  
(3) Distributed or scaffolded cognition where substantial and surprising 
interactions occur between internal and external resources such that cognitive 
psychology should study these distributed processes.  
 
Sutton’s project is to develop option three, which neither requires a cognitive 
extension thesis (1), nor completely denies that there are such extended systems. 
Rather than parity, Sutton et al. favour the notion of complementarity. Biological 
resources and external resources don’t need to have the same formats or dynamics 
to function in integrated systems that enhance cognitive abilities. Parity or functional 
isomorphism is not required for interesting integrated systems. Clark himself argues 
in a similar vein: 
 
‘The argument for the extended mind thus turns primarily on the way disparate inner 
and outer components may co-operate so as to yield integrated larger systems 
capable of supporting various (often quite advanced) forms of adaptive success’ 
(1998, p. 99).  
 
Complementarity also knits with the approaches of theorists in cognitive 
anthropology such as Merlin Donald’s work discussed above. Finally, 
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complementarity does not require that artifacts or external resources have mental 
states, or memories, or experiences, or are otherwise ‘cognitive’, it is simply that 
artifacts cooperate and coordinate with quite disparate internal and external 
resources to constitute systems that process information. The complementarity 
argument can be seen to subsume the parity argument. All cases of parity are cases 
of complimentary relations between inner and outer resources.  
 
If we compare Otto’s notebook and the hospital notes of some patient, then we find 
some important differences. Otto refers to his notebook expecting the memories he 
has recorded there to remain the same. They are durable and reliable. A doctor may 
refer to the hospital notes to follow sequential blood test results; she expects the 
notes to change, they are dynamic. So we see that some cognitive artifacts are 
personalized for one user, this may involve bookmarks, annotations, or additions to 
enhance the ease of use. Repeat users may come to depend on wear and tear 
patterns of the extended resources they employ. Other cognitive artifacts are 
intended for group use. Sterelny (2010) takes this to explain why some external 
resources may be seen more appropriately as extensions of the (individual) mind, 
whereas other (perhaps many more) artifacts are merely resources in extended 
systems of information processing. Sterelny thinks little actually hinges on the 
distinction between cognitive extension and mere supported or scaffolded extension. 
Hence the extended mind picture is not false, it is merely not the most useful way to 
approach these more disparate phenomena. I reiterate again the two scaffold 
relations. First is the temporary kind of scaffolding (a), which allows something to be 
built, or allows brains to develop a particular way. This kind of scaffolding is not 
always required for later function. Second are scaffolded processes (b), which, like a 
vine growing up a trellis, always require the scaffolds in place in order to function.  
 
It is not entirely clear how (a) and (b) fit into Sutton et al.’s triple framework above. 
They don’t seem to fall under (1), just as the scaffolding is not a constitutive part of 
the building. Also, cognition could (2) ‘remain intracranial’ whilst being scaffolded in 
operation, or requiring scaffolding by external resources for development. And clearly 
real time scaffolded processes (3) ought to be studied by cognitive science. 
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In the context of the present thesis, I hope that it is clear that all three of Sutton et 
al.’s situations are causal of phenotypes, when we consider psychological traits to be 
capabilities, and should be considered important in the development and evolution of 
these traits. For the purposes of the project in this thesis I can be neutral between (1), 
(2), and (3) in Sutton et al.’s schema. Though I favour options (1) and (3) over a strict 
approach denying interestingly extended and distributed systems for reasons that 
should be clear from reading this chapter. It is the causal dependence of 
psychological traits on external technologies that is most of interest to me, not 
whether minds are ontologically extended into the world. However, discussing in 
detail the possibility of ontological extension highlights very clearly this causal 
dependence. 
 
What this debate highlights is that the constitutive elements of processes can 
certainly be heterogeneous in nature and coupled to each other in various and 
interesting ways. There are also processes that are shared, multi-agent processes. 
People can collaborate to perform useful, information gathering and information 
manipulating functions in the world. Such things as conducting a census, or 
processing a patient for surgery fit these categories. Sometimes the multi-agent 
process may perform a function that we would ordinarily label cognitive, such as 
working out the solution to a complex mathematical problem. The process that has 
the function of extracting oil from the ground is constituted by a heterogeneous set 
of causal elements. These include human labourers, industrial drills, static pipes, 
complex mechanical pumps, and so on. A mix of biological and non-biological 
components performs the task. Whether cognitive processes are constituted by 
symbols, pens and paper, hand gestures, or external lists, there is a causal 
dependence of human behaviour on this wealth of external material. It should be 
clear that we could change the external materials and thereby enable or disable a 
host of different individual or social human functional traits. In particular we could 
change external materials and enable or disable individual or social human 
psychological traits. I think that some examples, such as the long multiplication 
example, have the right characteristics to count as cognitive on a sensible account of 
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what is cognitive. Hence some legitimate cases of ‘extended mind’ in the strong sense 
exist. But I concede that a lot of informational engineering of our environments 
doesn’t have an ‘owner’ in the right sort of way to count as cognitive, yet this sort of 
engineering can still be very much causal of psychological traits and capabilities. I also 
claim that many such traits are illuminatingly hybrid. This hybridity seems to mark 
human psychological traits as very often different in quality from non-human 
psychological traits.  
 
Evolution 
 
Remember that niche construction activities can also drive evolution. I now want to 
move from discussions of the development and function of psychological traits to 
some considerations for evolution. If cognition is embedded in technology then it will 
be sensitive to technological change and variation. Descent with modification permits 
the inheritance and accumulation of culture. Writing systems may be learned by 
subsequent generations and then altered or added to, thus we can get 'ratchet 
effects' in culture and rapid accumulation of novel cultural items (Tomasello 1999). 
But writing systems also become a part of the developmental environment of 
subsequent generations. Children born into a world partly constituted by 
accumulating and somewhat diverse writings experience a novel developmental 
context in each generation. It seems likely that the very presence of some primitive 
signs and writings, which arose through variation, inheritance and natural selection, 
also provided the basis for a cognitive developmental ratchet. I discuss this in chapter 
eight.  
 
Such ratchet effects are worth remembering when trying to understand whether the 
origins of writing led to dramatic social, economic and cognitive change, or whether 
writing systems were the result of such change (Barton & Hamilton 1996, p. 808). The 
answer is probably both. Writing systems arising drive changes in the developmental 
context, which then drives further elaboration of writing and social changes, thus 
providing heritable variation for selection to act upon.  
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Psychological traits can change in various ways. They can change because brains 
change or they can change because the ways that brains relate to the body or 
external world change. Change in internal brain architecture is derived from changes 
in development. This could be genetic change, environmental change, or cultural 
contextual change, for example, as I have argued in chapters one through three. From 
an evolutionary point of view any of these changes, such as technological innovation, 
could drive changes in the distributions of psychological traits in populations over 
time. Both Donald (1991) and Clark (2008) appreciate this. 
 
Furthermore, in any actual cases of extended mind, external objects do not just cause 
derived developmental changes, they also constitute parts of cognitive processes. The 
external part would be a cognitive component independently of any developmental 
effect it has. So external objects (technologies) can have developmental effects, can 
support functional activities, or possibly could constitute parts of cognitive systems. 
Cognition results from the interaction of brain and world (see figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognition 
Brain 
Genes 
Membranes 
Organelles 
Etc. 
Objects 
Cultural Technologies 
Symbolic Media 
Niche Construction 
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Figure 6: Constitutive Components of Cognitive Systems (for simplicity I have omitted the 
body, which though important, was less discussed in this chapter). Alterations to any of the 
base causes of brains, or objects, e.g. genes, organelles, technology, etc, could alter 
cognition. 
 
Summary 
 
Chapters one through three have shown us that the development and function of a 
brain is importantly derived from external contexts. We couldn’t do mathematics, or 
write chapters of syllogistic thought without scaffolding and/or extending technology. 
What humans can do has changed dramatically over time. Psychological traits as I 
understand them have changed.  
 
The developmental context of Homo sapiens has been evolving as our culture 
evolves. There will also have been some genetic change constituting changes in brains 
in the last 60,000 years. But importantly, there has been a massive amount of change 
and evolution of our material worlds. This has provided fresh opportunities for brains 
to engage in complimentary fashion with the external environment to support a 
range of complex psychological functions. There has been considerable recent 
evolution of these traits, driven largely by changes in our material context and the 
relations of brains to external objects and symbol systems. From an explanatory point 
of view the causal dependence of function on external supports is sufficient. 
Arguments claiming the constitutive dependence of psychological functions on 
external materials serve to further highlight this importance. 
 
The point that I want to emphasize is that there seems to be no real boundary 
between the neural and the external, the causal chains pass seamlessly from one 
domain to the other and back again. Rather than being fixated on what is a 
psychological trait, or what constitutes the mind, perhaps we ought to be more 
focussed on human capabilities. What can an agent achieve in the world and what 
factors are causally important in that achievement? What constitutes the system that 
allows an agent to perform the tasks that they do?  
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With this background (chapters one through three) in mind, we can enter the main 
argument of this thesis. In chapters four through seven, I will develop and employ 
principled reasons to explain the privileged role that human technology plays in 
psychological development. In chapter eight I will return to the issue of the evolution 
of human capabilities, and will examine two problems of prehistory, the sapient 
paradox and the Neanderthal extinction. The first step of all this is to turn, through 
chapters four and five, to an analysis of what it is to be a causal component of a 
developing system, and to look at how different genetic and non-genetic (including 
technological) elements relate to each other and to their effects. 
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PART TWO: 
Untangling Causation in Development 
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CHAPTER FOUR – Causation in Biology and Development 
 
Introduction 
 
To this point we have seen that there are a range of cultural technologies that have 
causal effects on psychological development. In chapter two I showed that these 
influences are modulated by a highly plastic neural system. Finally, we’ve seen that 
the functioning, and in some cases constitution, of the mind is causally dependent on 
a range of technological objects in a changing matrix external to the body itself. I turn 
now to ask, given that there are a great many influences on this system (genetic, 
environmental, cultural) how do we best understand the causal relations that hold 
between all these disparate elements? If technological culture is a cause of cognition, 
what kind of cause is it? And how does cultural causation compare to, say, genetic 
causation? If we want to see how technology fits into the broader picture of cognitive 
development and cognitive evolution then we will need some principled way of 
determining what elements play what roles in development.  In other words, what is 
important, when, and why? In this chapter I want to introduce a tool for answering 
such questions.  
 
The motivation for such a tool is threefold. First is the need to untangle the complex 
picture of cultural technologies and cognitive development that I have thus far 
explicated. Are all the technological determinants I have described equal, or similar in 
their causal profiles? It would be nice to be able to bring some structure to this 
picture. Second, such structure may help quell lingering adherence to genetic 
determinism, in one form or another, which is still held by some investigators. Genes 
demonstrably do not determine phenotypes, and do not even play a homogenous 
causal role when it comes to development. The model I propose will clearly elucidate 
this fact. Finally, developmental systems theory has appeared as an awkward 
challenge to any attempt to build simple models of developmental causation, or any 
attempt to favour some developmental causes over others. I hope that the model I 
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propose can bridge the gap between overly fuzzy, holistic developmental systems 
approaches and overly simplistic genetic (or cultural) determinist ones. To be clear, 
the project I begin in this chapter is one of explanation. I am not interested in the 
metaphysics of causation, or what it means for A to cause B. I am taking for granted 
that elements of the developmental matrix do cause traits. I am trying to explain the 
emergence of traits with some degree of generality. For psychological traits, some 
part of this explanation will be cultural and technological. Furthermore, although I 
employ mainly examples of biological cause and effect in this chapter, I believe that 
the general strategy I employ ought to work for all cause and effect relations.  
 
In this chapter I will outline the gene-environment interactionist consensus and 
developmental systems theory. I will explain three forms of the ‘parity thesis’ 
advanced by developmental systems theorists7. I will show that only one of these 
need be taken seriously if the project of disentangling developmental causation is to 
work. I will then discuss some reasons why one might be tempted to cling to a form 
of genetic favouritism, but I will dismiss this approach by arguing against the 
informational nature of the genome with respect to developmental processes. Then I 
outline some various approaches to causal analysis and causal modelling. I articulate 
what it is that we want from a causal analysis and suggest that James Woodward’s 
approach gives us a likelihood of success. I will then identify a key lingering problem 
with Woodward’s approach and work out a fix.  
 
The Interactionist Consensus 
 
The interactionist consensus (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999, Pennington et al. 2009) 
describes the universal acceptance that all biological (psychological) traits develop as 
a result of the interaction of genetic and non-genetic factors. This comes as no 
surprise once we understand the arguments in chapter two, which described how 
brains and psychological traits are constructed contextually.  
                                                             
7
 This developmental resources parity thesis is not to be confused with the parity arguments advanced 
in the last chapter, which claim that some external cognitive representational resources are on a par 
with internal neural resources and that hence we have an ‘extended mind’.  
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Neither genes nor environments alone determine the final phenotype of an organism. 
Genes and environments interact to produce phenotypes. We’ve seen this already 
with arguments emphasizing both the heritability and contextual dependence of 
human IQ. Clearly neither genes nor environments alone can produce an organism. 
Indeed, just genes and environments are still insufficient, because we need such 
things as membranes and other cellular resources to be present as well. Such 
resources seem to be a bit of a gray zone, neither genes, nor environments. 
 
Although to this point I have largely focused on plasticity responses to the 
environment, genes have a role to play in development. A host of interesting gene-
environment (G x E) interactions exist and most likely apply to all aspects of cognition. 
These effects are known as resilience, diathesis stress, and bio-ecological effects 
among others. I now give a few examples. For more examples see Pennington et al. 
(2009).  
 
Resilience effects are developmental outcomes that occur despite having a 
favourable or unfavourable environment (or genome) present. For example, it is 
known that the heritability of good reading is higher if the parents’ level of education 
is low. The child tends toward good reading, despite the poor parental education. 
Resilience would be universal if some form of determinism (environmental or genetic) 
were true.  
 
Diathesis stress reactions occur when the agent possesses some risk factor, for 
example a genetic or environmental risk factor. This risk factor is then stressed (by 
either the environment or genes) and the effect, which was at risk of occurring, 
manifests. For example, it is the case with psychopathologies, such as conduct 
disorder and depression, that environmental stress coupled with genetic risk factors 
results in more disordered behaviour than would otherwise be expected by either 
factor alone or in additive combination. Conversely it is the case that someone could 
possess genetic risk factors for major depression, but not ever manifest depression 
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because the genetic risk factors are never coupled with the appropriate 
environmental stress. 
 
Bio-ecological effects are where certain environments will permit underlying genetic 
differences among agents to show themselves. Lewontin’s (1995) example of 
genetically variable seeds demonstrates this. When planted in poor soil all the seeds 
fail to thrive. When planted in rich soil the seeds thrive according to their genetic 
predispositions. Hence, a favourable environment actually exaggerates the genetic 
differences. I have indicated something similar in figure 3 (chapter one) when 
discussing human IQ. As I mentioned, it is reasonable to assume that such effects are 
likely to play a role in the development of all cognitive phenotypes. Note also that 
none of this requires a coding or informational relation between the genes (or 
environments) and the phenotypes. These are merely causal effects that some genes 
have when interacting with some environments.  
 
Developmental Systems Theory 
 
Developmental systems theory (e.g. Oyama, 1985; Oyama, 2000; Oyama, Griffiths & 
Gray, 2001) seizes upon this interactionist framework and argues that there is no a 
priori reason to privilege some developmental causes (notably genes) over others. 
Importantly, developmental systems theorists don’t always deny that there could be 
privileged causes. It is just that it is not obvious what these might be and they don’t 
always think it will be the same kinds of causes in all cases. But most importantly, 
developmental systems theory proponents hold that to look at the interaction 
between genes and environments through the lens of G x E interactions is to hold on 
to a false conceptual dichotomy. In fact, there is a very real sense that the heart of 
developmental systems theory is opposition to nature/nurture, or 
genes/environment dichotomies (Stotz 2010).  
 
Developmental systems theory is also an evolutionary thesis. It is important to realize 
that there are two key processes going on. One is the extra-genetic component of the 
developmental system interacting with the genetic component during ontogeny. The 
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other is the possibility of inheriting these extra-genetic components from generation 
to generation. Developmental systems theory emphasizes the relevance of 
development to evolution and emphasizes the evolutionary potential of extra-genetic 
inheritance. The fundamental replicator therefore is the ‘life-cycle’ generated 
through interaction of a developing organism with its environment (Griffiths & Gray 
2005). All sorts of things are inherited not just genes. 
 
Developmental systems theorists often claim that what changes over evolutionary 
time is a ‘developmental system’ constituted by the organism and some broader 
developmental context. Many aspects of ‘environment’ are taken seriously as 
products of evolution in contemporary biological theory. For examples we can look to 
niche construction, which emphasizes the environment-altering activities of 
organisms (Odling-Smee, Laland, Feldman 2003), dual-inheritance, focusing on 
cultural as well as genetic inheritance (Richerson & Boyd 2005), and parallel 
hereditary systems including genetic, epigenetic, behavioural and symbolic channels  
(Jablonka & Lamb 2005a).  Culture and cultural technologies are obviously a key part 
of this sort of system for humans. Developmental systems theory claims that any 
resource that is reliably present in successive generations is inherited. Genes are not 
special on the basis of inheritance. 
 
So how ought we to approach these developmental systems? Oyama suggests that 
we should entertain ‘parity of reasoning’ with respect to the different developmental 
causes. In addition we must circumscribe the relevant causes in any given case, for 
otherwise analysis or manipulation will become impossible. This is why Godfrey-Smith 
(2001) cautions against insisting that we take every causal factor equally seriously. 
 
The Parity Theses 
 
Difference makers are events that make a difference to some outcome. Had the 
event not occurred, then some effect would not have occurred, or would have 
occurred differently. From chapters 1-3 we can see that cultures can be difference 
makers in cognitive development. But, do any elements of culture exhibit symmetry 
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with the causal role of genes in development? Or do genes have some causal 
primacy? Developmental systems reasoning leads us to the Parity Thesis. No 
distinctions between developmental elements map neatly on to DNA on the one hand 
and all other causal factors on the other, therefore causal privileging of the genome is 
unwarranted.  
 
There are actually at least three parity theses: 
 
(1) Genes and some environmental causes are on a par in development. One could 
argue that given genotype A, only by knowing environmental cause B, could we know 
something about the phenotype. Or given environmental cause B, then we need to 
know phenotype C in order to know about the genotype. In a sense genes and some 
environmental causes would share an explanatory symmetry. This is the sort of thing 
that people who say, ‘Your genes and your upbringing are equally important in how 
you turn out’ probably mean. Here’s a concrete example. In the metabolic disease 
phenylketonuria people with a defective gene and phenylalanine in their diet produce 
urine with a distinctive odor due to a build up of phenylalanine in the body. If we 
know that the subject has the defective gene, then only by knowing if there is 
phenylalanine in their diet could we know whether their urine will have a distinctive 
odor. Or given that we know that there is phenylalanine in the diet, only by also 
knowing the odor of the urine, could we infer anything about the genotype. In this 
particular case the defective gene and the contents of the diet seem to be on a par.  
 
Sometimes a second, stronger, Brute Parity Thesis could be, a little uncharitably, 
reconstructed from some DST writings. I articulate it here in order to fully map out 
the conceptual space of positions on parity.  
 
(2) This is the idea that all elements of the developmental matrix are equally causally 
privileged. Membranes are just as important as the temperature of the womb8, and 
both are just as important as genotypes and social upbringings. This is the strongest 
                                                             
8 The incubation temperature of turtle eggs determines the sex of the offspring, the offspring’s 
chromosomes do not.  
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
105 
 
sense of the developmental systems argument and the most awkward for any hope 
of explanatory traction. In this version of the parity thesis everything that is a 
difference maker is equal. Many factors are necessary and none is sufficient for 
developmental effects.  
 
Finally, a Parity of Reasoning Thesis may be meant.  
 
(3) This is the idea that each and every element of the developmental system must be 
approached as if it might be important in development and we can take things from 
there. This means that everything is a candidate for importance. We cannot on 
general theoretical grounds rule any factor in or out. The tool I explain later in this 
chapter will provide principled grounds for ruling causal factors in and out as 
explanatorily important.  
 
Taking the third parity thesis as our benchmark for analysis we will discover whether 
either of the other theses is warranted, but not vice versa. So this is my preferred 
strategy. In the causal analysis that follows, no causal element will receive treatment 
any different from any other. All developmental causes are candidates for inclusion in 
the causal explanations. However, it will then become apparent that not all 
developmental causes are equal, and we will be able to start selecting those causes 
that must be included in useful explanatory models.  
 
Genes and Causal Privilege 
 
Causal privilege is the idea that in a complex causal system we want to focus our 
attention on the ‘important’ causes. This is particularly so when trying to intervene on 
a system. By showing asymmetries among causes we can favour some causes over 
others according to the questions we are asking. These favoured causes (arguably 
genes in the present case) are the privileged causes. Furthermore, privileged causes 
should tend to explain the variations across systems (e.g. see Russo 2009). 
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In the interactionist view described above genes are, ‘context-sensitive difference 
makers’ in development (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999, p. 99).  Could they be more than 
this, and on what basis? Maynard Smith (2000) argues that genes carry semantic 
information about phenotypes and that this fact makes them specially privileged 
causes.  
 
Sterelny and Godfrey-Smith (2007) identify four possible applications of informational 
concepts in biology. One of these is the description of whole organism phenotypic 
traits as specified or coded for by information contained in the genes. This seems to 
be the sense of information most commonly applied to the genome. We sometimes 
speak of this or that gene being a gene for (semantic content) some phenotypic trait. 
The other important possible application is the treatment of cellular processes as 
executing some sort of program. It is possible that genes, as well as (instead of) 
representing phenotypic outcomes, have instructional information content, that is, 
they may be analogous to commands or imperatives. I will discuss genes as programs 
below.  
 
I now offer three arguments against the informational role of the gene, and therefore 
reject developmental causal privilege of the genome on these grounds. This will 
return us to the parity thesis as our starting point.  
 
Information and the Genome – The Great Disappearing Act 
 
Supporters of developmental systems theory hold that there is no dichotomy to be 
drawn between genes on the one hand and environments on the other. There is no a 
priori reason to privilege genes in any developmental cascade and they must be 
approached on equal merit with all other elements of the system. However, in 
biological science we often talk of genes as ‘coding’, ‘representing’, ‘transmitting’, or 
‘instructing’. Perhaps we can argue that genes are to be privileged due to the 
information content that they hold. I wish to quell such appeals by arguing that it is at 
best highly controversial that there is any relevant information content in genes with 
respect to developmental outcomes. Therefore, we ought to avoid talking about 
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genes in such ways. I will give three arguments against the existence of information 
content in the genome and conclude that, therefore, we ought to stop treating the 
genome as an informational reservoir with respect to development. This does not 
necessarily rule out information content in genes with respect to inheritance (an 
approach favoured by Bergstrom & Rosvall 2009, and Shea 2006). But this is a 
separate issue.  
 
What is Information? 
 
We must be clear about the relevant sense of information with respect to the 
privileging of genomes in development. I will explain four approaches, the 
mathematical sense of information, the natural sign sense of information, the 
transmission sense of information, and the semantic sense of information. Only 
carrying information in the last sense could privilege genes in developmental systems.  
 
Shannon (1948) formalized the mathematical sense of information. According to his 
theory information is transmitted from a source (via coding), to a receiver (which 
decodes), through a channel. The easiest way to conceptualize this is to imagine a 
television transmitter, sending electromagnetic waves through the atmosphere to a 
television set. According to Shannon’s theory the number of different messages that 
could have been sent sets the amount of information that can be conveyed in a 
particular channel. Information theory in this sense defines information as the 
probability of a particular message being selected from the set of all possible 
messages. Shannon’s is a theory of the quantity of information that exists. It says 
nothing about the content of a signal.  
 
If we conceptualize the genome as a source, the extant physiological conditions as 
the channel, and perhaps the cell as a receiver, we could quantify how much 
information could exist in the genome. Shannon demonstrated that because every 
form of information can be encoded in bits, there is an essential unity of every mode 
of communication (telephone, text, radio, pictures). It is possible to conceptualize the 
genome in this way too. However, what this approach misses entirely is the content 
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of the information, the semantics of what is being conveyed (Perez-Montoro 2007). 
This point is emphasized by Jablonka & Lamb (2005b) who note that a DNA sequence 
coding for a fully functioning enzyme contains the same amount of information as a 
nonsense string of DNA, even though the second string is semantically ‘meaningless’. 
It is this semantic notion of information that is usually being employed when we are 
discussing the informational content of genomes. We want to know what the genome 
is saying. Not how much it is saying. 
 
Grice (1957) argues that whenever Y is correlated with X we can say it carries 
information about X. This is the basis of the natural signs account of information. A 
natural sign conveys information that something is the case in the world. For example 
lightning conveys the information that there is a storm, rabbit footprints convey the 
information that a rabbit has passed, smoke conveys information about fire, tree 
rings about the age of a tree, and so on. Natural signs are effects of physical 
processes and they give information about physical states of affairs in the world. This 
is why a natural signs account could also be called a causal account of information. 
But this account of information gives no account of the direction of information flow. 
Smoke is correlated with fire, and fire is correlated with smoke. Mathematically, 
knowing a phenotype gives you the same amount of information about the genotype 
as knowing the genotype gives you about the phenotype (Griffiths and Gray 1994).  
 
All elements of the developmental system are natural signs. Membranes, transfer-
RNAs, the temperature of the environment, all these give us correlational 
information. However, different forms of membranes aren’t natural signs of 
phenotype difference in the way that genes are. Cell membranes correlate with all 
phenotypes, but different genes correlate with different phenotypes to different 
degrees. In this sense genes are correlated (however loosely) with phenotypes and 
hence carry information about them. But then so too do many other elements of the 
developmental matrix, such as an infants diet, or the existence of number words in a 
language. It certainly seems like natural signs carry information about states of 
affairs, but this ‘aboutness’ is not representation it is correlation. This ‘aboutness’ is 
simply due to natural signs being the effects of past causes. Genes may correlate 
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more closely with some phenotypes than membranes or temperatures do, but it is 
not obvious that they correlate more closely to certain cognitive phenotypes than 
number words do. Genes are at best natural signs, but so are many elements of the 
developmental matrix. 
 
Let’s move on to the semantic view of information. When I draw a sketch of a dog on 
a piece of paper there are at least three different informational ways of analyzing 
this: 
1. The number of bits of information, the quantity of information in the picture. 
This is the mathematical sense of information.  
2. As a natural sign that someone drew on the page. This is the causal view of 
information. 
3. As having the semantic content {DOG}, i.e. being about a dog, or representing 
a dog.  
The semantic approach captures the directionality of representational content. The 
sketch represents the dog, but the dog doesn’t represent the sketch. This seems to be 
important when we are looking at the relationship between genes and phenotypes. 
Genes are sometimes argued to represent phenotypes, but phenotypes aren’t usually 
argued to represent genes. Furthermore, those who favour the semantic view of 
genetic information (e.g. Maynard Smith 2000) tend to think that genes represent 
phenotypes, but that other elements of the developmental matrix, such as 
environmental factors, do not. I emphasize though that the semantic approach is still 
susceptible to parity arguments. There could be other kinds of developmental 
resources than genes, which represent phenotypes. So although carrying semantic 
content could be a reason to privilege genes, this may not privilege only genes. But 
we will first see whether or not we are justified in attributing semantic content about 
developmental outcomes to genes. I’ll return to this question shortly. 
 
The final sense of information that it is important to address is Bergstrom & Rosvall’s 
(2009) transmission sense of information. These authors argue in favour of an 
important informational role for genes. But they restrict this role to cross-
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generational transmission of information, not a developmental role for genetic 
information. They note that information theory is a theory about the efficient 
transmission of information. Information is packaged and sent across space or time. 
Genetic transmission is about transmission of a genotype from generation 1 to 
generation 2, not from genotype to phenotype. Their transmission sense of 
information is defined as follows: 
 
‘An object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of its 
sequence properties, uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes X.’ 
(Bergstrom & Rosvall, 2009, p. 6, online version) 
 
Examining the sequence properties of genes we see that they are built for 
transmitting information. When we look cross-generationally parity arguments are 
‘shattered’ (p. 7, online version) because no other elements of the developmental 
matrix seem to be designed (selected) to carry information as efficiently and with 
such a capacity as genes. The very structure of genes suggests that they are for the 
transmission of information across generations. This may be so, but this does not 
mean that there is any semantic, or transmission sense, information available in 
developmental (as opposed to phylogenetic) processes.  
 
Bergstrom and Rosvall’s arguments for a ‘transmission’ sense of information give 
privilege to genes in evolutionary processes. Sterelny (2001) and Sterelny in Sterelny 
& Griffiths (1999) also argue that replicators are to be privileged in such explanations. 
However, these approaches do not explain any developmental causal privilege 
possessed by genes, and these approaches (as Sterelny is well aware) are susceptible 
to parity arguments, which suggest that other extra-genetic factors can fill the same 
role (see Jablonka & Lamb 2005a). The hereditary (vertical) conception of 
informational genes can be seen as a separate issue to the ‘horizontal’ transmission 
of information.  
 
Clearly there is Shannon information in the genome, but there is Shannon 
information everywhere in the developmental system. Just as there is information in 
the electromagnetic signal correlating with the TV picture, there is information in the 
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TV picture correlating with the atmospheric conditions. This universality and 
reciprocity of information is uninteresting in the present context.  Clearly genes are 
also natural signs. Any natural sign is just a necessary result of a physical 
phenomenon. To the right interpreter genes are certainly natural signs that, for 
example, some parental organism with such and such a genome survived to 
reproduce. Genes are also natural signs of phenotypes, but only in broad correlational 
strokes. If we want to attribute some sort of privileged causal responsibility to genes 
we are after more than mere smoke-and-fire relations.  
 
Denial of Genetic Information (1): Syntactic Programs 
 
Perhaps there is a genetic program. That is, perhaps genes are instantiating a set of 
rules, a recipe, or instructions that leads them to produce a certain set of phenotypes 
and somewhere in this system resides information, or, more particularly, information 
about phenotypes. Perhaps on this basis we can privilege genes in developmental 
explanations.  
 
We can see how a physical system can instantiate quite complex logic without 
bearing semantic information. Imagine an empty glass is floating upright in a bath. 
Two other half-full glasses, A and B, can be poured into the first glass. If one is poured 
in the first glass contiues to float, if both are poured in then the first glass sinks. A and 
B and the floating glass constitute a logical AND operation. If and only if A AND B are 
poured will the glass sink. So whether the glass is afloat or not represents the truth of 
the proposition A AND B. But the floating glass is not doing logic, we just have a 
regularity of causal specificity, no more, no less. We can interpret the system as a 
logical AND gate, but the system itself is no such thing. One might argue that the 
same applies with any appeal to the genome as a series of imperative IF-THEN 
statements. The genome is merely a physical system obeying rules of causal 
specificity. However, this is too quick. In the bath case nothing in the system is 
designed to respond to the glass sinking. In the case of an organism, there may be 
some response that is adaptive only if A and B are both true. If there is selection for 
the mechanism that activates if A and B are both true, then over time we may 
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legitimately claim that the mechanism (perhaps some gene) has the function of 
testing whether A and B is true.   
 
However, even if the genome instantiates such a program, then this does not mean 
that it bears informational content in a way required to differentiate it from other 
factors in development. More specifically, it doesn’t mean that the genome bears 
semantic content about phenotypic outcomes. Rosenberg (2006) denies the 
informational content of genes on precisely the grounds that at best the genes are 
instantiating a program. He adapts Searle’s (1980) Chinese Room argument to the 
case of the genetic ‘program’. The Chinese Room argument is a response to the 
research program of strong artificial intelligence (AI). Strong AI claims that if we can 
uncover the program that human thought instantiates in the brain, then we will 
understand the brain. Importantly, human thought is ‘about’ something. It has 
semantic content and is intentional. In the Chinese Room thought experiment, a 
person is manipulating unfamiliar symbols according to the instructions in a book in 
order to produce intelligent utterances. However, the person does not understand 
the symbols as content, they merely have syntactic form. The person in the room is 
instantiating a rule governed program, and producing coherent outputs, but does not 
understand anything that passes through their hands. To the person in the room 
there merely exist contentless symbols. Hence, instantiating a program is not 
sufficient for there to be semantic content. The genome, too, possesses syntax. There 
are right and wrong ways for nucleotides to be aligned, there are rules (a code) 
mapping codons to amino acids to produce outcomes. However, nothing in this 
system of rules understands the ‘content’ of the molecular symbols. But, just because 
instatntiating a program is not sufficient for semantic content does not mean, yet, 
that there is no such content in the genome. The genome could be both instantiating 
a program and possess semantic content.  
 
Rosenberg’s reply is that there is no original intentionality contained in the symbols 
(or by analogy the genome) as they depend on an external observer, who 
understands them, in order to possess meaning. Rosenberg argues that even if there 
is true arbitrariness in the genome, then the genome’s lack of original intentionality 
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(all meaning is derived from us, the observers) rules out any special informational 
status it might be said to have. Rosenberg claims that a useful test of whether a state 
is intentional, or if a state is ‘about’ another thing, or represents another thing, or has 
informational content, is that the truth or falsity of a description of the representing 
state ought to be sensitive to how the content is described. Take the example of a 
mental state. Rosenberg uses the following example. Lois Lane believes that 
Superman was born on the planet Krypton. Let’s assume this is true. However, 
Superman under a different description is Clark Kent. But presumably Lois Lane 
doesn’t believe that Clark Kent was born on Krypton. By making a truth-preserving 
substitution in the description we have changed the truth value of the content of Lois 
Lane’s belief. This, argues Rosenberg, is paradigmatic of intentional content. He then 
argues that this feature is clearly lacking with respect to genes. For example, when we 
say that the triplet sequence CAT represents the amino acid histidine, or is ‘about’ 
histidine, then there ought to be some way that we can describe histidine that makes 
the statement ‘CAT means histidine’ or ‘CAT is about histidine’ false. There is no such 
description. CAT means the only amino acid spelled with an initial ‘h’ in English, CAT’s 
content is about Francis Crick’s favourite molecule, and so on, are all true. Hence, 
argues Rosenberg, genes are not intentional (do not possess semantic content). 
 
One concern about this view of Rosenberg’s is that he might be conflating 
information with intentionality. There being different kinds of information, some of 
which are intentional representations and some of which are not. The real question is 
what sort of information we require of the genome in order to attribute a special 
informational role to it with respect to development? I’ve already argued that the 
quality of being Shannon information or of being a natural sign is insufficient. It seems 
that the relevant kind of information must be semantic and representational. But 
even if genes are instantiating a program, then they need not be informational in the 
right way. 
 
So, it might be thought that the genome could be instantiating a program, but that 
this is not sufficient to grant it semantic content about phenotypes. This is 
Rosenberg’s view. It might be further thought that instantiating a program is 
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insufficient to grant developmental causal privilege because this just means that any 
aspect of the developmental matrix that is instantiating a program should be 
privileged. Perhaps cell-division is instantiation of a program, perhaps the creation of 
antibodies to fight infection is instantiating a program, perhaps mothers teaching 
infants to read is instantiating a program. This is not sufficient to privilege the 
genome over other elements. This is how developmental systems theorists ought to 
reply to Rosenberg-like arguments. However, if the genome bore semantic 
information about phenotypes, or represented the outcomes of development this 
may be a different story. 
 
Denial of Semantic Information (2): Genes do not represent developmental outcomes 
 
A weather report clearly represents the next day’s weather. It bears some 
relationship with the actual weather that has the possibility of being more or less 
accurate, just as a sketch of a dog represents the dog more or less accurately. The 
reason that a weather report (or an architect’s plan for that matter) is a 
representation is that that is its intended purpose. An ant trail in the sand (no matter 
how much it looks like the Virgin Mary) doesn’t represent anything because its 
function is not to represent. The ant trail, of course, carries information about the 
path the ant took. The information in this case is a true proposition. It is sometimes 
argued that genes represent phenotypes (e.g. Sterelny, Smith and Dickison, 1996). 
However, if the ant trail doesn’t represent the Virgin Mary because that is not its 
function, then we must ask how do genes come to possess the function of 
representing? 
 
Millikan (1984) provides theories of biosemantics and teleosemantics to account for 
representation in biology. Representations or semantic content occur in biology 
where there has been selection for the function of representing. For example, some 
bacteria possess a tiny inner magnet which causes the bacteria to head toward the 
magnetic north pole (and hence head down to less oxygen-rich water). Intuitively the 
pull of the magnetosome represents the location of oxygen-free water. This is the 
magnetosome’s function. It has been selected over evolutionary time for this 
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function. The magnetosome does not represent the location of the magnetic north 
pole, because this is not what its consumers require it to represent. The consumers of 
the representation require only that it represents oxygen-free water.  
 
The representing entity need not represent correctly or accurately all the time, for 
example the magnetosome can be disrupted by placing a bar magnet near the 
bacteria. The representing entity need only correspond to the represented content 
often enough to establish a selective history for this function. This approach could 
account for genes misrepresenting phenotypes in different contexts. Millikan 
emphasizes the need for both producers and consumers of representations. It is the 
producers’ function to produce a representation that indicates something, and the 
representation indicates something to a consumer of representations. Consumers 
alter their behaviour according to the information in the representation. The 
producer’s function is to produce correct representations, but if conditions are 
unfavourable then it will fail. Being reliable always depends on external 
circumstances. What counts as ‘too unreliable’ is a function of the costs incurred 
when representations turn out to be false versus the gains made when they are true.  
 
Similarly, Maynard-Smith (2000) argues that there are indeed coders, transmitters, 
receivers, decoders and information channels through which the genome can be seen 
as the bearer of information. He argues that in the developmental matrix only genes 
have this privileged informational role, and that the reason they do is because the 
information got there when the process of natural selection ‘put’ the information 
there. The information is required so that rich adaptive complexity can arise afresh in 
each generation. According to Maynard Smith’s argument rich semantic properties 
exist in biology where there has been the right kind of history of natural selection. 
Genes carry information about phenotypes because that is their function in evolved 
organisms. Although Millikan and Maynard Smith claim to identify interpreters (or 
consumers) in biological systems I am sceptical. I give a defense of my position in the 
section titled ‘no interpreters’ below.  
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However there is a further worry for the ‘selective history builds representational 
content’ approach of Millikan and Maynard Smith. The problem arises when we 
consider that representing phenotypes, and representing developmental outcomes 
are not the same thing. Shea (2006) discusses representation in the genome and 
notes that there are two ways of answering the question of how adaptive complexity 
arises in each new generation, one is ontogenetic, and one is phylogenetic. Shea 
argues that only the second case requires representation. All genes have 
developmental properties [genes-D] but some genes also have correlational or 
predictive properties [genes-P]. The presence of a gene-P correlates with some 
phenotypic property. Individual genes will contribute to many developmental 
outcomes, but individual genes persist from generation to generation because some 
of these outcomes are selected for, hence selecting for the gene. Genes-P properties 
arise when genes are selected because of their tendency to bring about some 
phenotype through their gene-D activities. Gene-P properties are selectional 
properties and give rise to teleofunctions. The teleofunctions of genes do not feature 
in ontogenetic explanation. Put another way, gene-P properties do not figure in 
developmental explanations and cannot be the basis of causal privilege in 
development. Genes-D explain stage by stage causal processes in development. 
Developmental explanations are complete without appealing to gene-P properties. 
Genes-P properties are phylogenetic representational properties. So even if it is true 
that genes represent phenotypes due to selective history, this does not mean that we 
ought to privilege genes in developmental explanations. Furthermore, Shea argues 
that DNA codes for amino acids, by virtue of a robust mapping rule from triplet 
codons to protein chains, but being a code and being a representation are two 
separate issues. A spy could employ a code to map between an encrypted string of 
letters and some decrypted string of letters. This is so whether or not the strings 
actually represent anything. So genes-D properties and the existence of a genetic 
code fully account for genes’ role in development, without positing any 
representation of the outcomes of developmental processes.  
 
One quirk of this approach is that it would make genes for skin pigmentation 
representational (genes-P), as there has been selection for different skin 
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pigmentation according to latitude. But it would make most genes for genetic 
disorders not representational (merely genes-D), because genes for genetic disorders 
are usually not favoured by natural selection. So at best this would only privilege 
some genes on the basis of representation. We do not have a general rule of 
representation privileging genes in general in any explanations.  
 
Importantly, Shea’s analysis applies to any element of the developmental matrix that 
is selected for its correlation with P. Any non-genetic factors that have a similar 
developmental role, and have been selected to play that role, also have semantic 
properties. I emphasize, however, that having a functional role, and being selected to 
play that functional role is no guarantee of semantic properties. It is important to 
note that entities can have functions without having semantic content (or to have 
function without representation as Godfrey-Smith puts it (1999)). Think of the heart, 
it has a function to pump blood, but has no semantic information content. This sort of 
discussion does, however, open the door for anything that does represent 
phenotypes (more or less accurately) to take up a privileged role in development. It is 
possible that some culture, such as a teacher’s intention may, indeed, possess this 
representational quality. Such cultural ‘causal representations’ will be discussed in 
chapter seven.  
 
To summarize this section, genes could acquire representational content as a result of 
selection for their correlation with phenotypes. However, this still would not 
necessarily figure in developmental explanations. Now, I further argue that even if 
there was representational content in the genome that is in some way relevant to 
developmental processes, then there is no interpreter or consumer of this semantic 
content and the content, as such there is content, is inert.  
 
Denial of Genetic Information (3): No Interpreter 
 
No matter how much semantic information or representation there is, it is only 
relevant to explanation if it is used. Information must be interpreted (Jablonka 2002), 
consumed (Millikan 1984) or received (Maynard Smith 2000). If there is no such 
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interpreter of the genome then no amount of genetic information is going to warrant 
developmental privilege on the grounds of representation of phenotypes. It is the 
interpreter’s function to use the information.  
 
In fact Eva Jablonka (2002; Jablonka & Lamb 2005b) takes things further. She appears 
to argue that interpreters are necessary conditions for information to be present at 
all. There is only information ‘in’ some entity if an interpreter can react to the entity 
in a range of ways. Interpreters construct information from signals, as needed, when 
needed. Natural selection acts to hone interpreters in order to create the right sort of 
information. Information is not an intrinsic property of a thing. There is no 
information without an interpreter, and there is no interpreter without intention. 
Jablonka explains, ‘Only living systems make a source into an informational input. The 
more complex the organism, the more information it constructs’ (Jablonka & Lamb 
2005b, p. 588). Information supervenes on some physical systems when an 
interpreter interprets them in a particular way. Information is epiphenomenal to 
physical causation, but may form part of explanatory models for interpreting agents. 
However, we don’t need to take things all the way to the controversial position that 
there is no information without interpreting agents. It will be sufficient to argue that 
there is no such interpreter of the genome.  
 
Shea (2006) puts it like this, ‘to be a consumer system a mechanism must have the 
function of responding to a range of intermediates with a variety of different outputs’ 
(p. 325). The process of interpreting the genome is a process that requires producers, 
consumers (interpreters) and actions, users of information, whose success is 
contingent on correspondence between states of affairs and the signals being 
interpreted.  
 
Think of another informational system, a set of traffic lights. There are many methods 
for stopping traffic, for example, a big pile of rocks in the road will stop traffic. In this 
case it is the causal properties of the rocks, which brings about the outcome. 
However, when the red light is showing, it is not the brute causal properties of the 
photons falling on a driver’s retina that stop the car, it is the information, the 
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imperative ‘stop’. There is a selective history at work here in a sense. Because lights 
at intersections are chosen for their redness, in a sense they become lights-P. But 
there is also an instruction, ‘stop’, which goes beyond the physical properties of the 
light. The driver is an interpreting system that can respond to the information 
provided by the lights with a range of actions. Without the driver to interpret the 
informational properties of the light, the information is impotent.  
 
Rosenberg likens genes to the ink marks on a piece of paper, which spell ‘cat’. The ink 
has intentional content about cats only in virtue of human minds attributing that 
content. The ink marks have intentionality that is derived from human minds. The 
marks get their intentionality from our beliefs. This seems compatible with Jablonka’s 
approach to information, which claims that information exists only owing to an 
interpreting system. So what is supposedly the interpreter of the genome? It cannot 
merely be conscious humans, because surely any informational content of genes is 
not dependent on there being actual humans in existence to interpret them. 
 
The likely candidate for ‘interpreter’ of the genome is the transfer-RNA molecule that 
binds to the triplet codon of the DNA and brings the appropriate amino acid molecule 
into place in the growing protein chain (see figure 7). tRNA doesn’t ‘react’ to the 
genome with a range of actions, it merely bumps into it. It can’t do anything else. If 
there are no different possible actions on the part of tRNA then it is not reacting to a 
signal. There is as much meaning, from the tRNA’s, or even the whole cell’s 
perspective, in the genome, as there is meaning in a computer program from the 
computer’s point of view. We can imagine that there is no genetic ‘code’, no 
information in biology at all, and the physical reaction between tRNA and mRNA will 
be completely unchanged. This is not the case if we imagine there is no such thing as 
a writing system and a human agent is presented with written glyphs on a page. In 
this case the reaction will be utterly changed. This is a crucial asymmetry.  
 
Let’s look closely at what is going on when mRNA allegedly codes for the next amino 
acid to be added to a growing protein chain. First of all, mRNA does not actively seek 
the ribosomes it ultimately binds with. At the scale of biologically active molecules 
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movement is so fast and so chaotic as to be all but random. mRNA when it 
accidentally happens to pass into the vicinity of a ribosome will bind. This is a 
chemical fact about the molecules concerned, just as when rain drops happen to fall 
on salt crystals the crystals dissolve. The binding is predictable of course just because 
of the sheer statistical probability of these two rapidly moving molecules colliding in 
the confined space of the cell.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. The Relationship Between mRNA and the Protein Chain: As the ribosome moves 
along the mRNA, transfer-RNAs (depicted as black crosses) bind to triplets of mRNA. This 
aligns amino acids and permits peptide bonds to form between the amino acids of a growing 
protein chain.  
 
Next the ribosome moves along the mRNA, much like a drop of water moves down an 
icicle predictably towards the tip due to the structure of the molecules and solids 
involved. tRNA binds to the ribosome and, just like the soles of particular shoes tend 
to accumulate some sorts of pebbles or leaves, particular tRNAs carry particular sorts 
of amino acids. Only the tRNA carrying the ‘right’ amino acid can physically bind to 
the matching mRNA codon. Particular physical characteristics of the interaction 
between tRNA, ribosomes and mRNA ensure that the tRNA with the anticodon to the 
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mRNA codon almost always align. Think of another physical system, that operating 
when a snooker ball drops into a pocket. The mechanism is such that if the ball is 
white then due to its internal magnet (or sometimes size difference) then the 
mechanism delivers the white ball to one end of the table and other balls to the other 
end. Both these mechanisms operate perfectly well even if there were no information 
anywhere in the systems concerned.  
 
Unlike the case of the traffic light where it is the informational properties of the light 
that caused the traffic to stop, in the case of tRNA is the physico-chemical properties 
of the nucleotides binding and the juxtaposition of two amino acids, followed by the 
formation of a peptide bond between them, according to physico-chemical laws. 
There is no causal role for information in the genome here, merely a physical role. 
tRNA does not interpret the genome, it only has one possible action. Someone might 
argue that what is important in this interaction is the arbitrariness of the tRNA to 
amino acid relation. Any tRNA (and hence any mRNA codon) could in principle have 
been matched with any amino acid. However, it actually appears that there are good 
physico-chemical reasons why some codons map to some amino acids rather than 
others (Bergstrom & Rosvall 2009) and hence the mapping is not as arbitrary as once 
thought. Furthermore, I accept that there is definitely a systematic mapping from 
codon to amino acid, which can only be called a code. But this code exists only 
between mRNA and the primary structure of proteins. Any developmental privilege 
warranted by the genome on this basis does not even ‘reach’ as far as the three-
dimensional folding of the protein chain, which is context-dependent and not ‘coded’. 
Finally, Rosenberg’s argument against codons representing amino acids (because they 
do not satisfy the usual criteria for intentionality) suggests that this genetic ‘code’ is 
not one bearing semantic information. It is the causal properties of DNA that are 
important in development, not any informational properties. With the cell there are 
individual causal components that explain all the workings and development. Even if 
we could see the whole system as ‘using’ the information we don’t need to posit 
information to do so.  
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We must understand an important point made by Godfrey-Smith (2000, 2006a). In its 
original context the theoretical role of genetic coding was restricted to the idea that 
mRNA specifies the amino acid sequence of de novo proteins to be folded in the cell. 
That was it and that was all. Even the 3-dimensional secondary, tertiary and 
quaternary structures of proteins are dependent on local conditions outside of 
genetic control. And the subsequent involvement of proteins in cellular biochemical 
reactions is contingent of a host of other particulars, to say nothing of high-level 
phenotypes of organisms. Any information in genes could ‘reach’ only as far as the 
primary amino acid sequence of proteins. The construction of this sequence is 
mediated by transfer-RNA molecules (tRNAs). If there is information in the genome it 
is restricted to the gene-mRNA-tRNA-amino acid chain system. Godfrey-Smith draws 
this crucial point out by explaining that when you order the extra-large pizza you are 
not ordering the delivery to be late, even if this is a likely consequence of placing that 
particular order. The likely (or necessary) effects of a signal are not always part of its 
content. So it is with genes and development. 
 
What is interpreting the genome? Is it the tRNA? Is it the whole cell? Is it the 
organism? None of these seems likely, or necessary to explain the action of genes in 
development. All that exists are predictable regularities of physical causation. As 
Kitcher (2001) points out, we need not worry about the language of coding (or 
information) in genetics, nothing would change in biological theory itself.  
 
I’ll draw attention to one last theme pushing through all this talk of information, 
representation and codes. It seems that no matter what the outcome of the analysis 
with respect to DNA, then any attempt to privilege DNA in developmental 
explanation is susceptible to the parity argument. There could in principle be other 
elements of the developmental matrix that bear the same qualities of information, 
representation, coding or selective history. This may be particularly so when looking 
to some elements of culture as I will show in coming chapters. It is parity of reasoning 
that ought to be our starting point for developmental explanation, not information 
content. 
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Summary 
 
Genes definitely possess information according to the mathematical theory, they are 
also natural signs. But everything in the world, and certainly everything in the 
developmental matrix can be described in Shannon or natural sign terms. None of 
this makes genes special. There may be a transmission sense of information in the 
genome, but again this phylogenetic information does no explanatory work when we 
are talking of the ontogeny of traits. Attempts to insert semantic information into the 
genome are hazy at best and there are arguments suggesting that even if this were 
the case then the information is not consumed in development. DNA may play a 
coding role, but this appears to be relevant only insofar as we are interested in the 
codon-amino acid link. There is not a well worked out informational concept of the 
genome that shows why and how it plays a distinctive, privileged role in 
development. It may be that there is a defensible, informational concept of the 
special role of genes in development, but there is every reason to pursue an 
alternative approach to assigning importance to developmental factors. 
 
Perhaps this is all just a terminological dispute over information. Well if that’s all that 
is going on here, then this is even more reason to drop the talk of information in 
genes and to apply the parity of reasoning principle. In the final analysis it is the 
causal properties of genes that are important not the semantic ones. Hopefully I have 
shown that it is questionable whether there are any semantic properties. Just like an 
ant trail doesn’t represent anything without an interpreting agent. Just like a pool ball 
will come out one end if it’s white, or the other if it’s coloured. The ball doesn’t have 
any semantic properties, it just is a part in a complex mechanism which has reliable 
causes and effects. 
 
By stripping away the notions of information and representation, then the 
relationship between genes and development is characterized predominantly by a 
causality relation, which has biological effects, which potentially transfer to the next 
generation, which are based on a clear mechanism and not on information content. 
The informational attack on the parity thesis fails for now.  
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Yet, empirically, DNA is an important cause in development. This is demonstrated by 
the genetic basis of many diseases, and sex determination in humans. The remainder 
of chapter four shows how we can retain the developmental privilege of some genes 
or gene networks with respect to some traits and yet still leave open the possibility of 
parity with other elements of the developmental matrix. This is because we can take 
a causal-role analysis of development. This position will lie midway between the 
genes-are-all and the system-is-everything positions introduced to this point.  
 
Causal Analysis 
 
Let’s return to the project of building a tool for causal analysis that respects the parity 
of reasoning thesis. A significant criticism of developmental systems theory is that it 
fails to provide practicing scientists with anything they can actually use. The 
insistence on taking every causal factor equally seriously is crippling to practical 
research and especially an obstacle to deciding where and how to intervene on a 
system. There is a real sense that if everything is important then nothing is. This is the 
main criticism of developmental systems theory. When deciding how to intervene on 
a system we generally ask what are the causes and effects here? How do we identify 
and characterise causes in the developmental system? 
 
Sometimes we are looking to explain a causal chain of events where A causes B and 
then B causes C and so on. For example, when explaining how a deer died, we might 
say that first the hunter pulled the trigger, this caused the flint to flare, which caused 
the gunpowder to ignite, which caused the bullet to fire, which caused the deer to 
die. However, explanation by causal chain breaks down when more than two 
variables are involved in cause and effect at any given stage of the process. For 
example, Rasputin was poisoned, shot, and thrown in the river. How do we explain 
Rasputin’s death? What caused Rasputin to die? It may have been a single causal 
factor, or two or more in combination. There is not a simple causal chain in situations 
like these. Furthermore, sometimes there are multiple causes all of which are 
necessary for an effect. It may be that Rasputin died because he was thrown in the 
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river, and that his poisoning and shooting had nothing to do with his death. However, 
in the case of the development of IQ in humans, we have already seen that genes, 
membranes, and environmental factors all have some role to play.  
 
We need to first, identify the full set of factors responsible for an effect, and then 
make judgments of causal importance in contexts of multiple, interacting, necessary 
conditions. Not all necessary factors are equally important. 
 
Often what we really want to know is the structure of a web of relationships. This is 
particularly true if we are planning interventions on ‘critical mediating variables’ 
(Russo 2009, p. 157). Critical mediating variables, or privileged causes, are the sort of 
thing that policy makers and health professionals are interested in. In psychological 
development it is not merely the case that A causes B. Or even that A causes B via a 
set of intermediaries c,d,e… But A and C and D all may cause B due to the structure of 
their web of relationships. This is the interactionist consensus and the basis for the 
developmental systems position. We ought to distinguish A from C from D if we can. 
They may play different kinds of causal role. If it can be done, this is a way of 
structuring developmental systems. So the first thing our analysis of causal roles will 
need to do is to handle multiple causal factors. Which factors do we want to include? 
There are two options: 
1. We could include everything (systemics, developmental systems theory). 
2. We could include some things (perhaps a more cognitively tractable 
approach). 
Potochnik (2007) does not think that maximal inclusion is best. Maximal inclusion of 
causal factors makes for highly complex explanations. These are cognitively 
demanding and offer little direction for intervention. However, in the interests of 
making sure we don’t leave out any important causes, I will begin with maximal 
inclusion. The method of causal analysis I propose will then lead us to a tractable set 
of causes that comprise an explanation. I will now demonstrate how causes can be 
catalogued and identified as privileged or not. Once we have identified these causes 
we can build our causal explanatory models. In chapter six I will build one such 
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explanatory model. Then we can refine the models in ongoing hypothetico-deductive 
fashion. But the first thing we need to do is to decide what counts as a cause. When is 
X a cause of Y?  
Woodward and the Minimal Sense of Cause 
I will now outline a minimal sense of something being a cause, and then try to 
elucidate differences between the various factors that might satisfy this minimal 
criterion with respect to some effect. Once we have a tool for differentiating causes 
we can then highlight these differences and see how we ought to intervene in order 
to produce the effects that we desire. 
 
Woodward (2003) proposes an ‘interventionist’ theory of causation. This is a version 
of difference-maker theories of causation under which causes make a difference to 
effects. If we take causal relata to be variables, causation relates changes in one 
variable to changes in another. In its simplest form the interventionist intuition is that 
a change in the value of X due to some intervention, would then lead the value of Y to 
change too. Or, it is at least the case that there is some possible intervention on X 
that would result in Y changing as well. This is necessary in order that X be a cause of 
Y. It is crucial that the changes in X and Y occur because of a hypothetical (or actual) 
intervention on the alleged cause. This is because some relata may be correlated 
rather than causally related. The classic example of this is the barometer and the 
storm. Every time the barometer drops there is a storm. But the barometer does not 
cause the storm, there being a common cause of both effects, which is atmospheric 
pressure. If we were to intervene (actually or hypothetically) on the barometer then 
we would observe that the correlations ceased. So the barometer, by the 
interventionist account, is not a cause of storms. It is a caveat of this theory of causes 
that the intervention on X is idealized such that any change in Y that results comes 
about only through the change in X. All other variables that were previously causally 
relevant to X no longer hold influence over X. 
 
We can consider as a cause any thing C, which if it were to be manipulated in the 
right way, would produce a change in some effect E. The link between causation and 
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manipulation (in such cases as there is a link) can tell us something about the 
causation in question. This approach has been criticized as being anthropocentric 
because it seems at first pass to limit the domain of investigation to just those causes, 
which it is possible for humans to manipulate. However, if we characterize our notion 
of intervention in the right way, usually as some sort of idealized intervention, then 
we overcome this problem.  
 
Woodward and Hitchcock (2003) explore a way of characterizing the notion of an 
intervention which does not make reference to the relationship between the variable 
intervened on and its effects. For Woodward and Hitchcock, in contrast to Pearl 
(2000), an intervention I on a variable X with respect to some effect Y, must meet 
four requirements (M1)–(M4): 
 
(M1) I must be the only cause of X; i.e., as with Pearl, the intervention must 
completely disrupt the causal relationship between X and its previous causes so that 
the value of X is set entirely by I, 
 
(M2) I must not directly cause Y via a route that does not go through X. This can 
happen in various formulations of a placebo effect example, 
 
(M3) I should not itself be caused by any cause that affects Y via a route that does not 
go through X, and 
 
(M4) I leaves the values taken by any causes of Y except those that are on the direct 
path from I to X to Y (should this exist) unchanged. 
 
Woodward then gives a minimal criterion (M) for something being a cause. 
 
(M) X causes Y iff there are background circumstances B such that if some (single) 
intervention that changes the value of X (and no other variable) were to occur in B, 
then Y or the probability distribution of Y would change. 
Woodward (2010) 
 
This minimal formulation of what it is to be a cause is very broad. If anything like the 
neurodevelopmental schooling hypothesis, or the environmental complexity theory 
of IQ scores is correct then (M) includes: television, billboards, the internet, slide-
rules, pens and paper, membranes, genes, maternal diet, and so on. (M) rules out 
dolphins as causes of human eye colour, but (M) includes oxygen as the cause of 
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house fires, the road as a cause of the chicken crossing, and genes, as causes of 
reading. Such causes are not usually what we are referring to when we ask, ‘why did 
the house catch fire?’ or ‘how did Sally come to be able to read?’  Woodward is 
looking for some way to take this minimal conception of causation and refine it so 
that the concept of cause does the explanatory work that we want it to.  
 
Note that this minimal criterion rules out mere correlations. There is no intervention 
on a barometer that would have any effect on a storm. (M) says nothing about 
whether a cause tends to produce its effect or inhibit it, and so a factor that tended 
to diminish or negate some effect would count as a cause of that effect under (M). It 
is the breadth of this kind of approach that makes it useful. I will begin with this 
criterion for identifying multiple causal factors of some effect. This ought to satisfy 
systems theorists, as it will capture everything that is causally potent.  
 
Woodward’s next move is to produce three dimensions of causal powers. I will 
examine in some detail his three ‘causal dimensions’ and then suggest that we need a 
fourth if we are to capture (and differentiate) all causes in one model. A four-
dimensional ‘concept-space’ captures all causes we might be interested in when 
analyzing developmental causation. Finally, I explain how this tool can then identify 
the privileged causes that we want to build into our explanatory models.  
 
Kinds of Causal Role 
There are different kinds of causes. To supplement the minimal criterion (M) for 
something being a cause, we can introduce three causal dimensions, stability, 
proportionality and specificity. We can distinguish the particular role that some 
causes have with respect to some effects and contrast this with the role that other 
causes have.  
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Stability 
The key requirement for causal stability is that the cause in question produces 
consistent effects over a range of manipulations in background conditions. Stability 
comes in degrees and causes can therefore be more or less stable than other causes.  
 
For example, a gene that consists of CAG repeats in the Huntington region of 
chromosome four causes Huntington’s disease9, which is a degenerative neurological 
disorder characterized by cognitive decline and jerky limb movements (chorea), 
across a wide range of other combinations of genes, developmental environments 
and ecological conditions. In fact the huntingtin CAG repeat causes Huntington’s 
disease across a range of background conditions virtually as wide as will permit a 
cognizing human to develop (Paulsen et al. 2008). The huntingtin CAG repeat is an 
extremely stable cause of Huntington’s disease. It is stable across almost all 
backgrounds that are relevant to the domain of interest, that being the development 
of a cognizing human.  
 
On the other hand a mutant version of the KRAS gene causes certain sorts of 
leukaemia, but only given a host of other important background conditions, such as 
exposure to a carcinogen, the amount of p53 protein present, and so forth (Zhao et 
al. 2010). We might say that CAG repeats are highly stable causes of Huntington’s 
disease, whereas KRAS is a less stable cause of leukaemia. The important point is that 
although CAG repeats and KRAS are both causes of serious disease, they are different 
kinds of causes because they can be plotted at different locations along a continuum 
of stability. With, zero representing completely unstable causes and one representing 
utterly infallible causes (figure 8).  
 
                                                             
9
 For more information about Huntington’s disease and the genes involved see chapter five.  
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Figure 8: Causal Stability (Cause : Effect) 
 
Another important factor with respect to the stability of a cause is consideration of 
the proximality of the cause with its effect. It tends to be (though is not always) the 
case that the more proximal a cause is to its effects (given some chain of causation or 
a sequence of events) the more stable the cause is likely to be. So if we describe some 
system and hold the grain of description fixed, then compare two causes, the more 
proximate cause will tend to be the more stable cause. I’ll give an example to 
illustrate this point. In his discussion of genetic coding Godfrey-Smith (1999) notes 
the imprecision of the relationship between genes and phenotypes, when compared 
to the specificity of the relationship between triplet codons of mRNA and the amino 
acids added to a growing protein chain in translation. Godfrey-Smith claims that this 
localized precision is one reason to claim that mRNA codes for proteins, while 
resisting claims that genes code for phenotypes. Of course the causal chain from 
genes (via translation, splicing, transcription, protein folding, cellular biochemistry 
and other aspects of development) to phenotype is a long and tortuous one. However 
the step from mRNA to primary amino acid sequence is very proximal and tends to be 
much more stable as there are few possible interventions that ordinarily disrupt the 
causal chain at this point (while still permitting the cell to actually survive, again, our 
domain of interest). 
 
Proportionality 
The next characteristic of causal role is proportionality. Woodward explains that 
causal accounts (explanations) can be too broad or too narrow. For example, to say 
that learning English was part of the cause of a child becoming literate is too narrow 
an account, as it implies that learning another language would have had a different 
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effect. It was not English that caused literacy, but the learning of a language with a 
written form (among other contributing causes). Learning a language would be the 
cause that is proportional to the effect of becoming literate.  
 
Causal proportionality can also be attributed overly loosely on the effect side of a set 
of causes and effects. In fact looseness in the proportionality of causal talk is a 
common fault of many who make claims about the importance of particular genes. I 
will describe this phenomenon in general terms then give a concrete example. We 
may be told that X is the gene for some trait Y, when actually; X is a cause of some 
general or more fundamental trait Z, which Y depends upon. However, Y itself is 
subject to many other more particular causes. What I mean by ‘particular’ is that even 
given X, there is no guarantee that Y will develop. Y depends on causes A, B and C 
against a background of X. I believe that this problem is common when talking about 
the causes of cognitive phenotypes.  
 
For example, take Williams’ syndrome, a disorder of many cognitive functions 
including reading ability and facial recognition (Karmiloff-Smith 2009). The genetic 
anomaly is a deletion of about twenty-five genes on chromosome seven. But it isn’t 
accurate to say that the genetic differences cause impairment in reading. In a sense 
they do, but this is as a consequence of a more global impairment in cortical function. 
By attributing the effect ‘impairment in reading’ to the cause ‘genetic defect in 
Williams’ syndrome’, we are being overly broad in causal attribution. The genetic 
defect in Williams’ syndrome is proportional to the more distal effect, global 
impairments, not to specific proximal abilities such as reading. The same goes for 
genes like the FOXP2 ‘language gene’, which produces a regulatory protein that binds 
downstream to all sorts of target genes. FOXP2 does not have domain specific 
effects10. These confusions arise because of the hierarchical organization of biological 
systems. I believe that this proportionality problem is common when talking about 
the causes of cognitive phenotypes. Although many genes may appear to be the 
genes ‘for’ certain mental traits, they are merely causes of the background conditions 
enabling these traits, rather than causes of the traits themselves. The genes lack tight 
                                                             
10
 For more detail about FOXP2 see chapter five.  
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proportionality with the effects. Getting proportionality right in causal explanations 
allows us to build explanations that generalize.  
 
In an example given by Woodward himself a pigeon is trained to peck at red symbols. 
When presented with a scarlet symbol the bird pecks. But the bird did not peck 
because the symbol was scarlet, it pecked because scarlet is a kind of red. To say that 
scarlet caused the pecking is to exclude important causal information. By explaining 
the pecking as caused by the symbol being scarlet is to give an explanation that does 
not generalize well. By giving the explanation that the bird pecked because the scarlet 
symbol was a kind of red allows generalization. Similarly, in the above example, 
saying that the genes caused reading difficulties does not generalize to other 
situations of cognitive deficit as well as claiming that the genes caused general 
cognitive impairment.  
 
It helps to think of this as a case of a category doing the causing not a sub-category. 
So the category ‘red’ is the cause of the pecking, and any instances of it (perhaps sub-
categorical instances such as scarlet) will cause the effect. Scarlet is a sub-category of 
red. In an important sense red subsumes all that participates in a certain section of 
the visible spectrum. It is this range of visible light, not any component of it, or cause 
of it, that is important. The point may be made a little clearer by imagining that it was 
not red that the bird was trained to peck at, but a non-primary colour such as green. 
If two lights are shone, blue and yellow, in such a way as they produce a green trigger 
for the bird, then it is not the blue light nor, the yellow light, nor the lights in 
combination, that cause the bird to peck, it is the green. Though the blue light and 
the yellow light played a causal role in the pecking, it was not these that were 
proportional to the effect.  
 
In an analogous way, liking Mozart is not proportional to a gene for perfect pitch, or 
any other genes, or gene combinations. One likes Mozart because one has a 
functioning auditory system and this is combined with the hearing of Mozart in 
favourable circumstances, perhaps as a child. Here we have a proximal-distal 
distinction again. The proximal cause was hearing Mozart. The distal cause was having 
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a functioning auditory system, and genes for perfect pitch. The genes are causes of 
the neural networks that support audition. The auditory cortex supports the concepts 
of music and pitch. 
 
Causal proportionality can be mapped as a continuum, just like causal stability. 
Causes are more or less proportional to their effects. Figure 9 shows how we can plot 
causes against two continua, stability and proportionality. The genetic defect in 
Williams’ syndrome is a fairly stable but non-proportional cause of reading 
difficulties. 
 
Looking at examples of proportionality, we see a pattern emerging. It is one of layers, 
or hierarchies of causes and effects. There is a category and sub-category 
phenomenon, a proximal and distal phenomenon, and also a levels-of-explanation 
phenomenon.  
 
 
One of the main potential uses of proportionality distinctions, I think, is to tease apart 
levels of explanation. For example, high-level sociological (biological/psychological) 
features like unemployment rate are proportional to high level features such as crime 
rate. Low-level features like, Jones has no work, and Smith has no work are not 
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proportional to crime rate. This is partly a value judgment because it tends to result in 
us favouring causes that are at the ‘level of explanatory interest’. Proportionality, 
therefore, is to some degree a feature of our description of causes and effects. But 
when our project is one of explanation then we must account for both features in the 
world and also our interests in those features. If we want to intervene on a system 
and the cause that we intend to intervene on is not proportional to the effect of 
interest then we must expect broader or narrower alterations than just those of the 
effect of interest.  
 
In Huntington’s disease there is a situation where a faulty gene (Hg) causes a global 
cognitive impairment (Gci). The Gci consists of jerky movements (Jm), impaired 
reasoning (Ir), and memory loss (Ml), among other things. Hg also causes a faulty 
protein (Fp). Fp is caused by Hg, it is not caused by anything more broad (such as 
other genes, or a chromosome), or by anything narrower (such as a particular 
nucleotide base). At the level of biological organization relevant to the synthesis of 
proteins there is tight proportionality between Hg and Fp. The effect of Hg at this 
level of description is no broader or narrower than Fp, and the cause of Fp is no 
broader or narrower than Hg. Take the description to a different grain. Now we are 
looking at the causes of Gci. Let’s limit our cases of interest to only the population of 
individuals with the huntingtin gene in the first instance. In this population Hg causes 
Gci. At the level of description of Gci, Hg is a proportional cause because nothing 
broader or narrower than Hg is responsible. As before, it is not some wider collection 
of genes or a whole chromosome that is causally responsible, neither is it a single 
nucleotide base. All of Gci is explained by Hg. At both levels of description, the 
protein as effect, and Gci as effect, Hg is proportional to the effect. However, take the 
effect of jerky limb movements. Hg is the cause of Jm. Nothing broader or narrower 
than Hg causes Jm. So we have proportionality on the cause side. But, we don’t have 
proportionality on the effect side. This is because Hg causes impaired reasoning and 
memory loss as well. So if our effect of interest is Jm, then Hg is the cause. But if our 
cause of interest is Hg, then Jm is not the only effect.  
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Take now the wider population exhibiting cognitive impairment, not just the set of 
individuals with the huntingtin gene. If we specify this population as the effect of 
interest then we strike a limitation of causal analysis in general. In order to capture 
any relationship between global cognitive impairment in general, and its causes, we 
must necessarily describe the causes in very general terms. For example it is a fact 
that global cognitive decline is caused by some genetic or environmental factor or 
other. However, without being more specific about our effect of interest, it is hard to 
see how we could populate the concept-space. This whole approach requires that we 
determine a host of important factors ahead of time, such as defining the effect of 
interest. But once we have determined these factors, and delimited our domain of 
interest. Then this causal continua approach produces an answer about the relations 
of causes and effect. 
 
One last point about proportionality ties this concept to the idea of causal 
mechanisms (something I return to in chapter six). If we want to explain why a 
Huntington’s patient has jerky limb movements, the appropriate fine-grained account 
would explain the mechanism whereby global cognitive decline interferes with 
locomotion. If we wanted to explain why the patient had global cognitive decline we 
would want to know the mechanism by which the huntingtin gene affected neural 
function. If we want to know why a Williams’ syndrome patient can’t read, we want 
to understand that mechanism whereby global cognitive impairment interferes with 
experiences that would otherwise result in reading acquisition. Explaining the 
mechanism through which the genetic defect in Williams’ syndrome causes global 
impairment does not explain reading difficulties. Hence, there is an important 
relationship between proportionality of cause and effect and the locus of the 
mechanism of interest. Mechanisms of interest connect causes with proportional 
effects.  
 
The causal property of proportionality is sensitive to how we describe the effects. 
But, some precision in our description of the effect of interest is required. No 
approach will have unlimited generality.  
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Specificity 
The third dimension of causal kinds for Woodward is the specific cause. Specificity is 
compared to David Lewis’ (2000) notion of influence. Some cause C, has influence 
over an effect E, to the degree that changes in the cause (C1, C2, C3…) tend to 
produce changes in the effect (E1, E2, E3…). The idea is that a specific cause can lead 
to fine tuning of the effect (a dial rather than a switch). There is a somewhat precise 
one-to-one relationship between variants of the cause and variants of the effect. 
 
For example, imagine I walk into a shop and buy a lottery ‘scratchy’ ticket. The ticket 
has a range of possible states (win $10,000, win $1000, win $100, win $5, 
replacement ticket, lose) which cause my wallet to subsequently be fatter or slimmer. 
In this case the lotto ticket is a specific cause of the state of my wallet at some later 
time.  
 
On the other hand although the second chromosome in the twenty-third position of a 
human karyotype causes the sex of the person concerned (pathological cases 
excepted for illustrative purposes) there are only two alternatives X or Y. So whatever 
else the chromosomal cause of sex determination in humans is, it is not highly specific 
in the present sense. There is a sense in which something being more specific allows 
that cause certain degrees of freedom. The cause can be ‘turned up’ or ‘turned down’ 
in something of an analogue way if it is highly specific. Woodward gives the example 
of a frontal lobe injury being the cause of someone’s low IQ score. The injury is 
certainly causally responsible, but the effect of the injury can’t be fine-tuned up or 
down in a controllable way. This opens a further question. In order for something to 
be a specific cause, do the states C1, C2, C3… have to be controllable? I suspect that it 
is enough that several such states exist (glancing blow, full frontal impact, wounds 
that crack the skull and those that don’t) and that the effects of these causal states 
show a degree of one-to-one correspondence with a suite of outcomes. This is to be 
contrasted with causes such as the effect of the speed of light on an optical switch. 
The speed of light has only one possible state. As such it can never be a specific cause 
of any time delay in activating an optical switch.  
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With respect to specificity, a cause and an effect can be related in several ways. There 
can be many-to-many relations, many-to-one, one-to-many, and one-to-one. In a 
many-to-many relationship, there are many possible states of the cause and these 
map onto many possible states of the effect, such as when adjusting a thermostat. 
Many to one relations hold where many states of a cause map to just a single effect. 
Many possible charges listed on an arrest warrant for Jones will cause the single 
effect of Jones being arrested. With one-to-many cause-effect relationships the single 
state of the cause maps to many different states of the effect. For example, Smith’s 
bachelor degree could cause him to obtain a number of different possible jobs. 
Finally, with a merely one-to-one mapping there is just one possible state of the 
cause, and it maps to one possible state of the effect.  
 
A subset of many-to-many functions exists where there are only one-to-one relations 
between states of the cause and states of the effect. Each state of the cause 
corresponds to just one state of the effect. This situation of many possible states of 
the cause mapping to many possible states of the effect, in one-to-one fashion is 
known as an ‘onto’ function and must be distinguished from the merely one-to-one 
relation. In the merely one-to-one mapping there is merely one possible form of the 
cause and one possible effect. The cause is either present or it is not, and there is 
only one possible effect, which occurs if the cause is present and fails to occur if the 
cause is absent. This kind of relationship is a ‘switch’. The cause is either there or it is 
not. Just like a light switch is either on or it is not. But also the sex chromosomes in 
human beings are close to acting as a switch. If there is a Y chromosome present the 
phenotype is male, if not then it is female. The Y chromosome is also a proportional 
cause of maleness.  
 
I am counting switches as low-scoring on the specificity continuum. The Y 
chromosome is not a very specific cause of maleness, a light switch being ‘on’, is not a 
very specific cause of the light being on. These causes are however proportional (and 
may be stable), so they still have the potential to be privileged causes depending on 
what questions we are asking and what effects we are interested in. For comparison, 
the actual genes on the Y chromosome may be specific causes of maleness if there 
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are variations in genes that map to varying degrees of such things as hirsutism, or 
baldness, and so on. These genes however may not be proportional to these effects.  
 
Finally, sometimes effects happen and it is alleged that an omission was the cause. 
For example, the boy died of meningitis because he was not vaccinated. One way of 
dealing with omissions in this schema is to see an omission as one possible state of a 
cause. We could take the cause ‘vaccination’ and it has the possible states of ‘being 
vaccinated at the right time’, ‘being vaccinated a little late’, ‘not being vaccinated at 
all’. In this sense omission would be accounted for under specificity. However, in the 
case of the boy dying, it seems that he died not because of some omission of 
vaccination, but rather because he became infected with meningococcal bacteria. If it 
is possible to explain cause and effect relations without appeal to omissions then this 
is what I think we should do.  
 
The Causal Role Concept-Space 
We can plot any given developmental cause (or indeed any cause of any effect 
whatsoever) according to these three continua. The cause can be more or less stable, 
more or less proportional, and more of less specific with respect to some effect that 
we have nominated as the target of explanatory interest. Whenever we describe 
something along a number of dimensions we can plot the resulting concept as a 
spatial representation. For example we can describe the length of some object along 
one dimension and plot the result on a number line. We can do the same with 
something described by two dimensions as is frequently done when describing the 
relationship between two variables such as height and weight. It is possible to 
represent concepts with three dimensions as located in a box (see figure 10).  
 
Recently there have been several moves in the philosophical literature away from 
typological thinking (definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or 
essences). This can be seen, for example, in Godfrey-Smith (2009) and Hobson, Pace-
Schott & Stickgold (2000). Rather than summaries of what is necessary or sufficient 
for something X being a case of Y, we are given a set of descriptive dimensions and X 
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can be scored as more or less satisfying these dimensions. The idea is that the 
dimensions create an abstract space in which X can then be located. The position 
taken up by X in the state-space then indicates to what degree X is a case of Y. Often 
different regions of the space can be mapped onto different important concepts in 
some domain. For example the number line might have regions representing ‘short’ 
objects and ‘long’ ones. Though sometimes such concepts will be relative. Godfrey-
Smith uses this approach to criticize replicator and ‘recipe’ conditions for natural 
selection, and Hobson et al. describes a state-space for something being conscious or 
not.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: The Concept Space Generated by Woodward’s Analysis of Causal Roles 
 
Hobson et al.’s model of consciousness has three descriptive dimensions. These are 
the level of psychological activation, to what degree the input is external or internal, 
and a measure of neurotransmitter activity. We can then label different regions of a 
three dimensional box with concepts such as sleeping, dreaming, waking, 
unconsciousness, coma, and so on. It is clear that just as we move from waking to 
sleeping in our lives, a point in the state-space can migrate from one region to 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
140 
 
another over time as the measures on the continua change. Different regions of the 
state-space describe different sorts of consciousness, e.g. dreaming, waking, 
transitioning to sleep, etc.  
 
Godfrey-Smith’s approach to Darwinian populations and natural selection is more 
complex. At its heart is the idea that regions of multi-dimensional concept-space 
correspond to populations that are more or less Darwinian. There will be paradigm 
cases of Darwinian populations, and further removed in space from them, there will 
be marginal cases, and cases that are not Darwinian populations at all. Instead of the 
brutality and ambiguity of necessity and sufficiency, an approach usually fraught with 
outlandish counter-examples, we have a softer ‘more or less of a paradigm’ approach 
to something being a case of something else.  
 
The state-space models for consciousness, Godfrey-Smith’s ‘Darwinian populations’, 
and employing Woodward’s causal dimensions as we just have, are all examples of a 
way of thinking. This is a method that rejects clear distinctions between things in 
favour of continua. It rejects necessity and sufficiency in favour of degrees of 
something X being a case of Y. It permits vagueness and marginal cases to legitimately 
enter our explanatory discussions. Shortly we will employ the concept space for 
causal roles to identify privileged developmental causes of some trait.  
 
Models, Abstraction and Explanation 
 
In this section I will briefly introduce models and their role in science. Following this I 
will identify and solve a problem for the three-dimensional concept space as it stands. 
I will first distinguish between causal analysis, causal explanations and mechansims, 
and then discuss one account of what makes a good causal explanation. A causal 
analysis produces a list of causes of some effect, and ideally distinguishes among 
them. Woodward’s criterion (M) identifies causes of some effect, and the concept-
space distinguishes among them. To this point we have been doing causal analysis. An 
explanatory model is some representation, tool or structure, that assists our 
understanding of the world or bears some similarity to the way things are 
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(Odenbaugh 2006), and a mechanism details the entities and the their activities, 
which produce some phenomenon (Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000). The present 
project is one of causal analysis and explanation. I am not setting out to produce 
mechanisms. The general thrust of my argument is that we can undertake a causal 
analysis in order to then build an explanatory model, which can then focus our 
attention upon relevant mechanisms. However, we will see shortly that using just the 
three causal dimensions described by Woodward leaves both our causal analysis and 
explanatory model building project wanting. I will describe a way to solve this 
problem.  
 
Godfrey-Smith (2006b) distinguishes between two processes central to doing science. 
These are the creation of idealizations and abstractions. With idealization we treat 
things as having properties that they clearly do not have, such as treating surfaces as 
frictionless or populations as infinite, in order to study something. With abstraction 
we leave things out of explanations while still saying something literally true about 
the world. The project I am undertaking is one of abstraction. Abstraction can both 
reduce complexity and inject generality into explanations. On one hand the 
complexity of the developmental system motivates this approach. By leaving things 
out, we can better understand some complex process. But a search for generality in 
explanation also motivates this project. Too often explanation under the auspices of 
developmental systems theory is applicable only to a particular case that we are 
examining. However, by taking an interest in the specificity and stability of causes, for 
example, we might be able to generalize explanation in certain ways. With this in 
mind, we should probably be interested in the different causal dimensions in simpler 
systems as well. In a later chapter I will connect this hunt for generality and cognitive 
tractability in explanations with the complementary search for mechanisms through 
which causes have their effects. My analysis is one focusing on the dependence of 
variables, not of events causing events, however sometimes we are interested in such 
event causation and this is when we must appeal to mechanisms.  
 
Abstract models come in various sorts. Models can be analogies, such as the billiard 
ball model of Newtonian physics. They can be relational structures, which purport to 
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be isomorphic with the world, or similar in some respects to the world. Often these 
are diagrams or graphical representations of some kind. Models can also be 
mediators, in this case they function as a representation that allows someone to learn 
something about theory and phenomena in a way that is partly independent from 
both. The third kind of model should not be viewed as a claim about the structure 
and nature of reality, but rather as a tool in a scientific toolbox (Cartwright, Shomar, 
& Suarez, 1995). I am predominantly interested in analogies, isomorphisms and 
similarities. The method I am proposing should lead us to say something true about 
the systems we are interested in.  
 
Models can help us understand the structure of the world by representing, to a 
greater or lesser degree of similarity, the nature of things. Models can help us 
understand causal relations, and deducing causal relations can help us build models. 
Explaining exactly how the different entities in a model interact to produce some 
effect is the domain of mechanisms. I will discuss mechanisms in a later section. 
 
Giere (1988) has an account of how model-based science works. A model is an 
abstract, idealized object, which can be used to represent an empirical system. There 
is never actual isomorphism with the world, and hence the empirical system never in 
fact satisfies the conditions of the model. This is a necessary limitation on 
descriptions of the world, they never correspond exactly in every detail to the way 
things are. Greater or lesser degrees of similarity are the important relation. At the 
extreme, we have developmental systems theory, the models of which would include 
everything in the system in question. At the other extreme we have single factor 
models that purport to explain, but are very dissimilar to the state of the actual 
world. So how do we determine relevant similarity, because any two things are 
similar in some respect? I propose that we analyze the entities in question for causal 
privilege, and the more of the privileged causes we include in our model, and the 
more we abstract away from the unprivileged causes, the more relevantly similar our 
model will be to the system of interest.  
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A good explanation of some phenomena should clearly explain the phenomena. This 
means that the set of entities that the explanation posits as being important should 
include all the important entities. The explanation should not include too many things 
that are not important, or do not make a lot of difference to the outcome of interest. 
But if some entity is important or does make a lot of difference then it should be 
considered and included.  
 
Potochnik (2007) concludes that a good causal explanation of some effect E is one 
which: 
1. Represents the causes of E that figure into the causal relationship of interest 
in the particular context of inquiry at hand (a limiting criteria). 
2. Satisfies the criteria of explanatory adequacy (see below, an inclusive criteria). 
3. Is maximally general within these constraints.  
She further explains,  
 
‘The best explanation of an event must, it seems, cite some set of factors that 
actually does account for the occurrence of the event… if selection would have 
resulted in the members of the population having trait P1, but because of a lack of 
genetic variability they instead have trait P2, then information about the selection 
pressure cannot by itself fully explain the population having trait P2’ (Potochnik, 
2007, p. 684).  
 
She proposes the following criteria for explanatory adequacy: 
 
4. Pr(E|Cexpl) ≈ Pr(E|C) 
 
5. Pr(E|Cexpl )≈ Pr(E|Cexpl∧ Ck) for all Ck 
 
In natural language this says that for a good explanation, the probability of the effect 
E, given the factors proposed in the explanation should be approximately equal to the 
probability of the effect given all possible explanatory factors (this is criterion 4). And, 
that the probability of the effect given the causal explanation should be 
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approximately equal to the probability of the effect given the factors in the causal 
explanation and any other factor k (this is criterion 5).  
 
If something like this is the right approach to causal explanation then the upshot is 
that a fully satisfactory explanation should not exclude information that had it been 
included would drastically change the expected probability of the event to be 
explained. And we should include only those causes that account for the event and 
not a host of other minor contributing factors. The three-dimensional concept space 
is populated with everything satisfying (M), so satisfying Potochnik’s criteria (2), (4) 
and (5) should not be a problem. What we will need eventually is some method for 
restricting the analysis to only the causes of interest, with maximum explanatory and 
practical power, i.e. a way to satisfy (1) and (3).  
 
However, this approach still does not distinguish among the causes. In fact when 
asked for an explanation of why the chicken crossed the road Potochnik would be 
compelled to include the road as part of the explanation. The road certainly enables 
the chicken to cross, but we are not always interested in this sort of cause (this is not 
to say we are never interested in enablers when asking certain questions). Nor are we 
usually interested in gravity as a cause of bone density, nor background solar 
radiation as a cause of cancer (except in specific contexts, e.g. astronauts’ bones, or 
airline pilots’ cancers.) However, all this falls out with criteria (1) above, ‘the 
particular context of inquiry’. We can limit our causes to the ones of relevant interest 
later. We want to make sure we actually capture them all in the concept space first. 
We must also balance all this with cognitive tractability and the pragmatics of what 
we intend to do with the explanation. 
 
Important, or ‘privileged’ causes will be found in some regions of the three-
dimensional concept-space. Intuitively we see already that a cause that scores highly 
on stability, specificity and is proportional to its effect is going to be more interesting, 
important or privileged than a non-stable, non-proportional, non-specific cause (i.e. 
those that lie at 0,0,0 in the three-dimensional box).  
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A Problem for the Three-Dimensional Concept Space 
 
If we are going to analyze and distinguish causal roles in a way that will help to focus 
our attention on important causal relationships then we want our model to include 
the important causal entities. If we claim that important causes are those that score 
highly on Woodward’s causal dimensions, then we want intuitively important causes 
to score on at least one dimension. It is demonstrably the case that some important 
causes fail to score on any of Woodward’s causal dimensions. Either this means that 
we are mistaken in thinking that such causes are important, or the three-dimensional 
concept space needs modifying. This is a problem, and I will shortly set out a way to 
solve this problem. There are non-stable, non-proportional, non-specific causes that 
need to be included in explanatory models. We need to identify these somehow and 
distinguish such causes from non-stable, non-specific, non-proportional causes that 
should not be included in explanatory models.  
 
What I will now show is that there is a distinct, explanatorily important, kind of cause 
that is not captured by Woodward’s three dimensions. This is the kind of cause, or 
causal role, described as ‘an enabling cause’. Causes of this kind often cluster around 
0,0,0 in the concept space. There are other relatively minor causes that also cluster 
here and so we need a fourth dimension to pull the interesting enabling causes apart 
from these. Indeed, we need to pull enabling causes away from 0,0,0 simply in order 
that they have a chance of featuring in explanatory models. I will argue that we can 
define to what degree a cause is an enabling cause and map this on a continuum. This 
continuum becomes the fourth dimension of the causal analysis tool.  
 
Many causes satisfying (M) are located at 0,0,0 in the box. They are non-stable, non-
specific, and non-proportional with respect to the effect. They satisfy (M) because 
there is some conceivable intervention on the cause, which would alter the value of 
the effect. For example we can conceive of massively altering the mass of the moon, 
such that its gravitational field has some effect in altering the morphology of some 
developing organism on Earth. But this seems like an outlandish, unlikely, extreme, or 
irrelevant intervention given our usual contexts of inquiry. The moon’s gravity 
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deserves to stay at 0,0,0 and not figure in our causal models. However, there will be 
other causes at 0,0,0, which are necessary enablers of effects of interest. We want to 
reserve a space in the model for such causes, and to be able to distinguish them from 
what might be the truly uninteresting causes. This is the problem with Woodward’s 
analysis as it stands. One key blind spot it has is that there are causes located at 0,0,0 
(i.e. non-specific, non-stable, non-proportional causes) which not only are we 
sometimes interested in, but which also can be distinguished from each other and 
from uninteresting causes. 
 
Let’s think of two different causes of the chicken crossing the road. First the road 
itself, and second a switch that unlocks the chicken’s coop. The existence of some 
road is not proportional to chickens crossing it, neither is it specific, nor a stable cause 
of chickens crossing. However it is a necessary factor. It enables the chicken to cross. 
So roads satisfy (M). We can imagine an intervention (removing the road) and the 
effect, the chicken crossing, is altered. Roads score 0,0,0 in the concept space (or 
fairly near to 0,0,0) and yet they are necessary causes under (M). Think also of a 
switch rigged so that under some circumstances the switch is activated and this opens 
the chicken’s coop. The switch is not proportional, nor specific, nor a stable cause of 
the chicken crossing the road. But again it is a necessary enabler. The switch must be 
activated in order that the effect could occur. The switch scores 0,0,0 in the concept 
space as well. It is not stable, as conditions could be such that when the chicken is out 
there is no incentive for it to even approach the road. It is not specific, as there are 
not different states of the switch corresponding to different states of the crossing of 
the road. The switch is not proportional, because it enables many other things not 
just the crossing of the road. But, the switch is clearly important to explanation (as a 
distal cause) but is located at 0,0,0 in the concept space I have built so far.  
 
Consider also the ambient air temperature as a cause of the chicken crossing the 
road. Over a wide range of values the temperature has no effect on this outcome. 
However, perhaps if the air is seriously cold, maybe sub-zero, then chickens tend to 
stay in their coops even if these are unlocked. The air temperature, when it is very 
low has a tendency to inhibit the effect. This satisfies (M), because (M) says nothing 
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about whether causes tend to cause or prevent their effects. Ideal intervention and 
alteration of outcome are all that is required. So the air temperature is a non-
proportional, non-stable, but perhaps slightly specific cause of the effect. This moves 
the temperature further from the origin in the concept-space than the enabling 
switch. This appears to be counter-intuitive. It is much more important to explaining 
the chicken crossing the road that the coop be unlocked than the air be the right 
temperature.  
 
I suggest that we need to consider these kinds of causes when we come to build an 
explanatory model. Perhaps the road is not the sort of cause that we want to include 
in our explanation of why the chicken crossed the road. It is a part of the legitimately 
assumed background conditions for the effect occurring. This is part of our context of 
inquiry (Potochnik’s criterion 1). I’m happy for such causes to be considered and then 
left out of explanation at some later point. However, the switch should probably be 
considered and included. The point is that we don’t want to rule these causes out 
from explanatory models too prematurely. Just because some cause scores 0,0,0 on 
Woodward’s dimensions, doesn’t mean that it is irrelevant to explanation.  
 
Potochnik’s criteria include enablers, because removing enablers from explanation 
drops the probability to zero, or near zero. But her criteria do not single out the 
privileged causes. Her criteria include too much. Woodward’s criteria exclude 
enablers (or at least place them at 0,0,0). If we can describe the degree to which a 
cause is an enabling cause along a continuum, or at least in binary terms, then this is 
unsatisfactory.  
 
If enabling is occurring then there is a degree of bottlenecking in the relationship 
between some causes and some effect. Enablers will often be distal causes, which 
bring about some effect by being more directly causally responsible for some 
intermediate effect. And most, or all, causal trajectories to the effect must pass 
through this enabling cause. This is clearly the case in the chicken and the road. The 
switch is a distal cause of some effect, the chicken getting out, which is necessary for 
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the effect of interest to occur. Furthermore, without the switch being activated, the 
effect cannot occur. 
 
Ideally we would be able to capture and distinguish all causal kinds in one model. I 
propose that we can do this by adding a fourth causal dimension and extending the 
model to a four-dimensional space.  
Dependence: The 4th Dimension 
Lombard (1992) argues that there are some cases of counter-factual dependence that 
are not cases of causation. He gives the example of an event causing a match to 
become dry, which is not supposed to be a cause of a fire being lit. Similarly, there is 
debate over whether it is the lighting of the stove, or putting the kettle on it, which is 
the cause of the water boiling. It should be clear now that there is nothing stopping 
us from saying that the match becoming dry is one kind of cause, and the lighting of 
the gas another kind of cause (perhaps a more proportional cause of the kettle boiling 
than the drying of the match). Furthermore, some of these causes are more or less 
important than others. Some of these causes correspond to different conceptual 
spaces than others. It seems that rather than argue over what is or isn’t a cause, we 
should place everything that satisfies the minimal criteria (M) into the analysis and 
then inspect the concept space to identify kinds of causal role.  
 
Lombard further argues that there is, ‘a charge of circularity, unless a way can be 
found to analyze the concept of an enabler without employing the concept of a 
cause’ (p. 319). Actually we need not do this at all. By adding a ‘degree of enabling’ 
dimension to our model we can treat enablers as bona fide causes, whilst still 
distinguishing them according to their location in the concept space. Paradigm 
enablers seem to be (roughly) events, which had they not occurred, would 
significantly reduce the likelihood of the effect, often to zero, and which also tend not 
to significantly rate as one or more of the kinds of causes (proportional, specific, 
stable). This does not mean that causes that are specific, proportional and stable 
cannot be enablers (often they certainly will be!), but that some causes can be to a 
large degree pure enablers. This seems to be the case with the chicken coop switch. 
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Let’s look at a case where there is clearly no bottlenecking element. Reading 
Einstein’s ‘On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’ may cause you to understand 
the special theory of relativity. But it does not enable this concept, which can be 
acquired from many other sources. The effect does not depend on this cause. There is 
no bottlenecking, and so no true enabling. On the other hand, think of the 
relationship between cell membranes and IQ. There is a strong counter-factual 
dependence of IQ on membranes. Remove membranes and there is no IQ. 
Membranes are a clear enabling cause of IQ. An intermediate case is that of the 
relationship between smoking and lung cancer. Almost all lung cancer is caused by 
smoking (among other factors), but you can still get lung cancer in the absence of 
cigarettes if you are unlucky. Smoking is largely, but not entirely, an enabler of lung 
cancer. Woodward identifies enablers as a class of causes, but relegates them to 
something along the lines of ‘background conditions for x’. However, more can be 
made of this class and it can be turned into a fourth dimension, a continuum.  
 
But what should we call this fourth dimension. These are enabling causes and there is 
a degree of bottlenecking. We could call the dimension ‘degree of bottlenecking’, or 
perhaps ‘enablement’. But these are rather clumsy terms. So let’s settle for 
‘dependence’. We will create a four-dimensional concept space with continua of 
specificity, proportionality, stability, and dependence. Dependence is roughly: 
Pr(~Y|~X), the probability of the effect not occurring, given the fact that the enabling 
cause doesn’t occur. If you don’t smoke, the probability of not getting lung cancer is 
close to one.  
 
Woodward’s criteria exclude pure enablers. Such causes satisfy (M) but then only 
register at 0,0,0 on the three-dimensional concept space that lacks the dependence 
dimension. It seems that we want things that satisfy (M) not to cluster at the origin. 
The whole point is that we are trying to distinguish among them on the basis of 
importance if we can. It seems strange that the match drying out is an important part 
of the explanation for the house burning down but it fails to rate on any dimension of 
cause even though it clearly satisfies (M). It is easy to imagine an intervention on the 
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match that changes the effect (unlike the outlandish interventions required to alter 
the effect of the moon’s gravity). The whole point of this causal analysis exercise is to 
distinguish among causes, so if we can tease apart causes clustered at 0,0,0 then we 
should.  
 
In order to have four distinct and meaningful dimensions in our causal analysis it 
should be the case that the causal dimensions can vary independently of one 
another. The degree to which a cause is specific or stable, say, should have little 
bearing on whether it is an enabler or proportional. Specificity clearly separates from 
dependence. An effect can depend on some cause without different states of the 
cause being possible, such as with membranes and IQ. Similarly a cause can be 
specific without the effect depending on it. An example here is the thickness of my 
wallet is not dependent on the scratchy ticket, though the ticket is a specific cause of 
the thickness of my wallet. However, I want to spend a little more time being clear 
that proportionality and stability are not inextricably tied to dependence.  
 
Someone might argue that enablers are actually found in non-origin regions of the 
three-dimensional space, which is based just on Woodward’s three causal continua. 
In particular, enablers seem like fairly stable causes that perhaps lack proportionality 
and specificity. For example, oxygen is a fairly stable cause of houses burning, having 
its effects across a wide range of background conditions, hence oxygen rates highly 
on at least one of Woodward’s dimensions without having to posit the dependence of 
fires on oxygen. However, this relationship between stability and dependence does 
not always occur. For example, high IQ clearly depends on there being cell 
membranes present, but membranes are not stable causes of high IQ. Many other 
background factors such as genes, environments and education must be in place.  
 
One might think that there is some relationship between proportionality and 
enablement. There seems to be an important connection between a cause being 
enabling and it being non-proportional. Enabling causes seem to be upstream to a 
capacity that is co-opted for, and essential to, the effect. Hence enablers are often 
distal causes, which is one frequent feature of non-proportional causes. So, the 
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objection goes, enablers will tend to not be proportionate. Take the effect of a pile of 
wood catching fire. A week earlier an event occurred that caused the wood to dry 
out. The wood drying out is an enabling cause of the pile of wood catching fire. But it 
is not proportionate. Proportionate causes would be things like, a blowtorch being 
applied to the pile, or a match being tossed into the pile. The event ‘wood drying out’ 
is so distal to the event of interest (the woodpile fire) that it fails proportionality on 
the general rule (distality/proximality). Therefore, says the objection, the fourth 
dimension is not independent of proportionality. In fact, it holds an inverse 
relationship to it. On the other hand Woodward’s dimensions can vary independently 
of each other.  
 
But we can refute this claim by demonstrating enabling proportionality. Here are 
cases where both dependence and proportionality are satisfied. I hope that it is clear 
that hearing Mozart is a proportionate cause of liking Mozart. One does not like 
Mozart because one hears music, and one does not like Mozart because one hears 
the violin, one like Mozart because one hears Mozart. Hearing Mozart is proportional 
to liking Mozart and it is also enabling. So there are counter-examples to the claim 
that enablers must fail the proportionality criterion. Another cause that is both 
proportionate and enabling lies in the relationship between codons of DNA and the 
associated amino acid. This is a proportionate relationship between cause and effect 
if anything is. It is also an enabling relationship. The amino acid is not added to the 
growing peptide chain in the absence of the appropriate codon.  
 
I have shown that: 
1. Enabling causes are a distinctive, theoretically important class of causes. The 
chicken coop switch (and other similar cases) demonstrate this. Such causes 
are important components of the explanations for some events.  
2. Such causes often cluster at 0,0,0 in the concept-space when it is mapped out 
only including the specificity, stability and proportionality dimensions.  
3. However, other causes of little importance cluster here too, such as effects 
that the moon’s gravity has over events on Earth. 
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4. We need a fourth causal dimension in order to pull enabling causes away from 
0,0,0 where they would be omitted from causal explanations. We need some 
measurement by which causes that are purely enablers, and causes that score 
on the other dimensions as well as being enabling causes, can be measured.  
5. Dependence is such a dimension. Effects can depend to greater and lesser 
degrees on some causes. IQ depends heavily on membranes, whereas 
understanding the theory of relativity does not depend very much on reading 
Einstein’s original article.  
 
Using the Model 
My full causal analysis tool is a four-dimensional space. However, partial 
representations of it can be visualised. For example we may plot just the dimensions 
of stability, dependence and proportionality (there are 4 possible combinations which 
produce unique three-dimensional models) see figure 11 (A-D).  
 
Let me describe the nature of the three-dimensional box represented in figure 11(D). 
This is the causal analysis I have introduced with specificity, proportionality and 
dependence marked on it. There is an origin 0,0,0 in the bottom left hand corner. 
There are three apices where a cause can score fully on a single dimension. Passing 
the edge of your hand across the diagram from bottom left apex to top right apex 
these are the first three apices crossed after the origin. The next three apices crossed 
are the locations at which a cause could score highly on two dimensions at once. 
Finally the top right apex represents high degrees of each of the three causal 
dimensions represented in this three-dimensional version of the model. The richness 
of the causal kind with respect to an effect increases as we traverse the model from 
bottom left to top right. The most privileged causes will tend to be found towards the 
top-right of the model (or whatever the equivalent location is in the four-dimensional 
space).  
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Figure 11: The Four 3D Concept Spaces Showing Partial Representations of the Causal Analysis Tool.  
 
I emphasize two features of the model. First is the fact that the full model is four-
dimensional, but there will be equivalent geometric phenomena representing the 
sorts of spaces I am describing in three dimensions in the four-dimensional version, 
they are just not as easy to visualise as describe mathematically11. The second feature 
is that it is not obvious how much weight ought to be given to each of the 
dimensions. Axes could be logarithmic, or perhaps continua are merely binary. 
Different weightings could be applied to the different dimensions so that movements 
along degrees of, say, specificity might cause large jumps through the space, whereas 
movements on other dimensions might not. I am merely taking each dimension of 
causation as equivalent in worth at this point. There may well exist more and less 
useful formulations of the concept space. The space could be refined in future work. 
In introducing this tool I am trying to keep things relatively simple. I am trying to give 
                                                             
11
 For a video rendering of a 4D hypercube see http://vimeo.com/1076061 
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the outline of a method which illustrates and underscores the importance of cultural 
technological factors in explaining the development and evolution of the mind, not 
necessarily a fully refined version on the first pass. Privileged causes are those that 
tend to be located in the right upper portion of the space when the various three-
dimensional representations are visualized. 
 
Another insight I take from Hobson et al. and Godfrey-Smith. In these concept-space 
models there is not always an obvious transition where some case of causal role X 
becomes a case of causal role Y. In Godfrey-Smith it is not the case that there is a 
starting point for ‘real’ cases of Darwinian populations. Rather the gradient is truly 
smooth. Natural selection starts playing a more prominent role as we move toward 
the end of the paradigm. The paradigm of course is a state-space not a linear 
representation. But still the idea that there is no necessity and sufficiency but rather a 
spectrum of cases is the key. The same applies to the consciousness model. Just as we 
slip unnoticeably into and out of sleep and dreams the model allows for no distinct 
‘phase-boundary’ between conscious states. We should expect no distinct boundary 
between something being or not being a case of natural selection, and no distinct 
boundary between something being or not being a privileged cause. In fact as we 
change the question we are asking causes can move around in the space. The FOXP2 
gene is one sort of cause of the corresponding amino acid sequence, another sort of 
cause of language acquisition and yet another sort of cause of lung development.  
 
Taking a concept-space approach to kinds of causal role can help us see now what 
sort of impact changes to some causes are likely to have on the corresponding 
effects. Will ‘mutations’ of cause have radical, subtle, or invisible effects? If a cause is 
highly specific, then changes to it will likely result in specifically altered effects. If a 
cause is an enabler, then alterations to it will likely result in cessation of the effects. If 
a cause is stable, then we can change the background conditions without concern. 
 
Another feature of approachess like this is that we could in theory quantify the 
position of elements within the space. However, it seems like we are a long way from 
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actually being able to do this. For now ordinal ordering of causes is sufficient to 
demonstrate interesting findings.  
Summary of the Argument 
1. Either some elements of the developmental matrix are privileged or no elements of 
the developmental matrix are privileged (all elements could be privileged, but then 
this is equivalent to none being privileged, so we have a binary disjunction, there are 
no further options.) 
 
2. The Brute Parity Thesis argues that no elements are developmentally privileged. 
(Semantic information content could grant developmental privilege, but even genes 
don’t contain semantic information.) 
 
3. Differing causal roles could grant developmental privilege if it turned out that there 
are appropriately different kinds of causal roles and we can identify asymmetries 
among causes. 
 
4. Stability, Specificity, Proportionality, and Dependence are appropriately different 
dimensions of causal roles. 
 
5. To the degree that particular genes satisfy these dimensions of causality, they are 
developmentally privileged (with respect to the effect in question).  
 
6. But there is no reason to privilege just genes, or even all genes. To the degree that 
any element of the developmental matrix satisfies the criteria, it is developmentally 
privileged (this is a Modified Parity Thesis – more in line with Oyama’s ‘Parity of 
Reasoning’). 
 
7. Therefore, some, but certainly not all, elements of the developmental matrix may 
be more privileged than others given this gradient. These are the elements in upper 
right of three-dimensional versions of the state-space boxes.  
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This approach offers to structure developmental systems theory. It also allows visual 
inspection of causal kinds, and the possibility for quantification of causal privilege 
(whatever quantities might mean). Perhaps most interestingly we might now be able 
to find regions of concept-space that correspond to developmentally interesting 
concepts, like ‘codes’ or causes that are ‘innate’. This sort of exploration is the 
material of the next three chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – Using the Space: A Focus on Causes 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last chapter I introduced a four-dimensional concept space of causal roles 
derived from Woodward’s (2010) analysis of biological causation. In order to use this 
model to build a causal explanation for the purposes of understanding or 
intervention, we must be able to place causes. Determining where in the four-
dimensional ‘box’ that a particular cause lies is an empirical question, indeed whether 
it is in the box at all. There are many ways of elucidating the characteristics of a 
cause. We can use interventional experiments, structural equation modelling, 
computational modelling, or Bayesian net reasoning to determine whether proposed 
factors are indeed causes of the effects we are interested in. This will tell us whether 
(M) is satisfied. We can use such techniques as hypothetico-deductive reasoning and 
experimentation to refine the description, and place causes in the box.  
 
In this chapter I will detail some of the kinds of genetic and non-genetic causes of 
cognitive traits and where they might lie in this concept space. Once we populate the 
concept space with all the causes of some effect of interest, then it will be possible to 
construct a practical model of privileged and relevant causes useful in guiding 
intervention on some developmental system. This chapter will give examples of the 
kinds of causes that we actually find in development. I begin with three genetic 
causes of traits, the huntingtin, FOXP2, and dysbindin genes.  
 
Genes 
1. Huntingtin 
I have already mentioned the huntingtin gene as a cause of cognitive decline in 
Huntington’s disease. This disease is an autosomal dominant neurodegenerative 
disorder (Cha & Young 2000). If an individual inherits an affected huntingtin gene 
then they have virtually a one hundred per cent probability of developing the disease. 
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The mutant huntingtin gene satisfies (M), the minimal criterion of causation. 
Furthermore the mutant gene is characterized by a repeated three codon string 
CAGCAGCAG… The number of CAG repeats corresponds to the severity (or at least 
age of onset, with longer repeats causing earlier onset) of the disease. Turning ‘up or 
down’ the length of the CAG repeat alters the disease in analogue fashion. A second 
mutated gene can also affect the phenotype and rate of progression of the disease. 
This gives the gene a specific relationship to the disease.  
 
The huntingtin gene is also a stable cause, having its effects over a range of 
background conditions virtually as wide as those producing a functioning brain. 
Furthermore, the huntingtin gene accounts for virtually all the probability variance 
between cases where the disease does not manifest and cases where it does, escaped 
only by dying young of other causes before the disease manifests. Looking to 
Potochnik’s criteria for explanation, we see that the probability of the effect 
(characteristic cognitive decline) given the explanation that omits the huntingtin gene 
is virtually zero. So the huntingtin gene enables Huntington’s disease.  
 
We can describe the ‘effect’ globally as ‘Huntington’s Disease’, or locally, perhaps just 
cognitive decline (sans the jerky movements) or just jerky movements (sans cognitive 
decline), or even just the mutant protein. Two points to note here are first, once we 
fix the description of the effect we have fixed the causal analysis. And second, the 
proportionality that the gene holds may change as we re-describe the effect. 
However, no matter how we describe the effect, the gene is still a stable, specific, 
enabling, and to some degree proportional cause of the effect. Hence it is a rather 
paradigm case of privileged biological causation. The gene is the clear target of any 
interventionist attempt to subvert the course of the disease. I emphasize that genes 
are very scaffolded things themselves. A lot of causally relevant things go into 
enabling genes to be translated. For example, membranes, transfer-RNAs, 
transcription factors, and so on. Transitively these are all causes of Huntington’s 
disease. So huntingtin is certainly not the definitive cause of Huntington’s disease. 
However it is the only privileged cause. It is also the factor that explains the variation 
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between individuals in things such as the presence or absence of the disease and the 
age of onset.  
 
2. FOXP2 – The ‘Language Gene’ 
Locke & Bogin (2006) discuss human life history and language. They describe the KE 
family in which a significant grammatical and verbal dyspraxia disorder seems to be 
caused by a mutant FOXP2 gene. There seems to be some specificity between states 
of the FOXP2 gene and states of language use. Karmiloff-Smith (2009) emphasizes 
that the disorder is wide in its effects (it affects morphogenesis, neurite growth, axon 
guidance, etc), and that FOXP2 is therefore not proportional (in the present 
terminology) to language function. As further evidence of this Shu et al. (2007) 
describe the role of FOXP2 in the development of lung and oesophagus tissue. So it 
seems that if FOXP2 is evolved to contribute to language production then the effect is 
more generalized and perhaps co-opted from its effects on development of other 
body systems. Well-entrenched lung development is surely more primitive than 
language development and this suggests that there was exaptation in the lung to 
language direction rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, FOXP2 variation does 
produce variation in language production, it also seems that a normal FOXP2 is 
required for normal language development (although there is still empirical 
uncertainty over this enabling role because it is not clear what the effects of a 
deletion of FOXP2 would cause). Furthermore, FOXP2 will have its noticeable effects 
on language production across a fairly wide range of background conditions because 
language itself emerges in development across almost all contexts that produce 
cognizing humans, therefore FOXP2 is a fairly stable cause of language function. So 
FOXP2 is a semi-specific, stable, probably enabling, but non-proportional cause of 
language production. 
 
3. Dysbindin 
 
The dysbindin gene maps to dystrobrevin binding protein 1 (DTNBP1). This protein is 
expressed in many brain regions and is known to play some role in synaptic 
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transmission and neural growth. DTNBP1 is characterized as a susceptibility gene for 
schizophrenia because several mutations of the gene have been associated with the 
disease (Hashimoto et al. 2009). Various versions of DTNBP1 have also been 
associated with a range of cognitive abilities in both healthy individuals and 
schizophrenic patients (Zhang et al. 2010, Zinkstok et al. 2007). It is possible that 
schizophrenia susceptibility arises partly due to DTNBP1’s influence on cognitive 
performance. For the purposes of my argument I am assuming that these associations 
are causal, if they turn out not to be then a different example would suffice to 
illustrate the point. Again I emphasize that determining causation (whether some 
factor satisfies (M) or not) is an empirical issue.  
 
Certain single nucleotide polymorphisms (instances where one base pairing of DNA is 
altered) have been demonstrated to both negatively and positively impact on 
functions such as memory and IQ in otherwise healthy subjects. Burdick et al. (2006) 
found an association between g and a particular version of the DTNBP1 gene. g is a 
general intelligence factor. It was discovered by Spearman (1904), who noted a trend 
for a range of intelligence tests to correlate with each other. Spearman found that a 
common factor ‘g’ explained the positive correlations among the tests. g is widely 
accepted as a measure of general intelligence. Burdick et al.’s study found that 
DTNBP1 variations accounted for about three per cent of the overall variance in g. 
Other authors (Zinkstok et al. 2007) have found effects with several other single 
nucleotide polymorphisms (mutations) of this gene. If there is a mapping from several 
different states of the gene to several different IQ phenotypes then this would be a 
case of specificity of causation.  
 
Dysbindin accounts for approximately three per cent of the variation in IQ or g, but it 
is hard to draw conclusions about its role as an enabler without further information. 
We cannot conclusively claim it is not an enabler because we don’t know what the 
result of having a deleted dysbindin gene would be, neither should we jump from a 
minimal variation in the effect given variation in the cause, to a claim of no enabling. 
Dysbindin could still be a switch for IQ (and hence an enabler) even if it is not a dial 
(it’s only partially specific). Furthermore, dysbindin is clearly not proportional to IQ as 
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its effects are shown to involve neurotransmission at neural junctions and broad 
effects on neural growth. The effects of dysbindin change according to whether the 
individual is schizophrenic or not (Hashimoto et al. 2009), so dysbindin is not a stable 
cause of IQ or g. Overall, dysbindin is a partially specific, non-proportional, non-
stable, perhaps enabling, cause of IQ.   
 
Placing Causes in the Concept Space 
Figure 12 describes the relationship between the genes dysbindin, FOXP2 and 
huntingtin, and some selected effects. These causes have been plotted in a three-
dimensional version of the four-dimensional concept space. We can see immediately, 
by visual inspection, that huntingtin is a different kind of cause of Huntington’s 
disease than FOXP2 is of language acquisition, and from that which dysbindin is of 
intelligence.  
 
However, dysbindin is also a gene related to the amino acid sequence of the DTNBP1 
protein in a proportional, stable, specific, and enabling way. In fact all three of the 
genes just described are causes of their amino acid sequences in the same fashion 
(figure 13). I emphasize at this point that the examples I choose are merely to 
illustrate the potential of this tool, and I am happy to quibble with respect to 
empirical evidence, over where exactly on any particular continua any particular 
cause lies.  
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We can now see why the genome is so intuitively privileged in many causal 
explanations. In many cases, genes are located in the upper right of our concept-
space boxes. This is especially true with respect to the causal relationship between 
genes and amino acid sequences, but it is also true in some ‘higher’ cases. For 
example, the huntingtin gene sequence seems to remain proportional to global 
cognitive decline.  
 
However, this sort of analysis also explains why many genes are not privileged in 
development. For example, the dysbindin gene is privileged with respect to the amino 
acid sequence of DTNBP1, but is not in the upper right of the concept space models 
for traits such as low psychometric test scores (intelligence). This is partly because it 
is not proportional to this effect. If we ask why someone scored low on a given test, 
then the answer may be because they have a diffuse brain impairment, and maybe 
partly because of their particular education history, and perhaps because of a lack of 
engagement with representational media. The dysbindin gene is not proportional to 
the cognitive trait, just like the perfect pitch gene is not proportional to liking Mozart 
in Woodward’s example. With the huntingtin CAG repeats, however, the CAG repeats 
are proportional to the effects at all levels, right up to the cognitive decline. There is a 
very real sense in which the cognitive decline results from the gene. 
 
Specificity is a phenomenon noted particularly with respect to DNA. Small alterations 
in nucleic acids tend to produce a variety of small effects on the primary protein 
sequence. This tends not to be the case with other elements of the causal matrix of 
proteins that merely satisfy the minimal criteria (M). Small alterations to DNA 
polymerase or ribosome subunits, for example, tend to render them inoperative. 
They act more like switches, turning a process on when they are intact and present, 
but off if they are altered in any way. This causal specificity is one reason perhaps to 
privilege DNA in causal explanations in biology. Furthermore, in ordinary cases it is 
the DNA that tends to vary, not the proteins of transcription.  
 
But we privilege DNA as a cause of what? If we consider Godfrey-Smith’s arguments 
for the limited role for coding in biology (chapter four), and Woodward’s notions of 
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proportionality and stability, we see that the appropriateness of causal privilege talk 
with respect to DNA may have to be limited in important ways. 
 
This analysis explains why (some) genes are causally privileged with respect to (some) 
traits without positing information content of the genome. What this approach 
suggests we do is to forget about the semantic content of a gene and decide instead 
what kind of causal role it is playing. We see, therefore, that some genes are more 
causally privileged than other genes according to what kinds of effects we are 
interested in. In other words genes can be causally privileged with respect to some 
effects and not others. I note that I have not mentioned gene combinations or gene-
networks here. But the same analysis can be performed with clusters of causal 
elements as can be performed with individual elements. It may turn out that some 
clusters of genes ought to be granted causal privilege, and again this will be with 
respect to some effects we are interested in and not necessarily with respect to 
others. On the other hand I will proceed to demonstrate that a lot more things than 
genes ought to be granted causal privilege according to this understanding of 
developmental causation. 
 
What This Shows about the Role of DNA 
I emphasize again that the characterization of each causal factor (in this case the 
three genes I have just described) is open to empirical refinement, however, what 
does seem to be clear is that the role of DNA in development is pluralistic. There are 
different kinds of genetic causes. Some are more privileged than others. But there is 
no universal argument supporting the privileged role of genes in general in 
development (in these cases cognitive development).  
 
Finally, the role of particular genes as causal kinds may place them in the same space 
in the concept model as other non-genetic causes. For any given effect, and any given 
region of the concept space, it is possible that both genetic and non-genetic causes 
might be found there. In the next section I will argue that many other developmental 
causes play the same kind of causal role as genes in many circumstances.  
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DNA does not play a distinctive role in development. It plays many roles and even its 
important roles are equivalent to some other elements of the developmental matrix. 
Yet, it is not the case that every element of the developmental matrix (nor even every 
gene) should be seen as on a par.  
 
Parity of Reasoning 
 
In chapter four, I explained the parity theses of developmental systems theory and 
argued that we should employ the thesis of parity of reasoning when approaching 
causal elements. I have just applied the four-dimensional causal analysis to genetic 
causes of cognitive development and now I will apply the same reasoning to non-
genetic causes, including cultural technological causes of cognitive development.  
 
Number Words 
 
Remember that in chapter one I described the effect number words have on the 
development of number concepts and, therefore, on the development of exact 
arithmetic. Number words in a language enable exact arithmetic manipulation. 
Without number words, this simply does not develop (as Piraha and Munduruku 
speakers demonstrate). Number words have a degree of specificity, as there can be 
none, few or many such terms, and this seems to correlate with different arithmetic 
phenotypes. Piraha has a ‘one, two, many’ system, English a set of natural number 
terms, and A.C. Haddon noted base two counting in Torres Strait tribes in 1889, ‘one’, 
‘two’, ‘two one’, ‘two two’, ‘two two one’, ‘two two two’, ‘many’. 
 
Number words are proportional causes of number concepts. Number concepts are 
high-level cognitive representations that ride on more basic faculties (we saw this in 
chapter two). The basic faculties include a low-value exact discrimination system and 
a higher-quantity approximate system (Feigenson et al. 2004). Many factors conspire 
to cause these systems, including genes, but once in place, these systems themselves 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
166 
 
are enabling causes of the high-value number word concepts. Number words interact 
directly with these systems to scaffold the development of exactly proportional 
number concepts. Finally, number words are fairly stable causes in this context. We 
can change the background conditions of individuals around, and yet, so long as they 
are in a position to learn language, number words will cause number concepts. The 
existence of the words themselves highlights the fact that there are salient 
differences between quantities in the world.  
 
Number words are enabling, proportional, fairly stable and fairly specific causes of 
number concepts and high-value arithmetic manipulations. Number words occupy a 
location in the concept space for numerical concepts similar to the space occupied by 
huntingtin genes in the concept space of causes for Huntingtin’s disease (figure 14). 
They are a privileged cause by virtue of scoring highly on several of the causation 
dimensions. This demonstrates clearly that genes are not the only privileged causes in 
development. However, have we yet shown that technology deserves causal 
privilege? Some people may argue that words although causative are not really a 
cultural technology. I argue that as they are the target of innovation, invention, can 
exist independently of agents, and can be shared among different users, then they 
are technological. But now let’s look at a more paradigmatic technological cause. 
 
Storytelling Alice 
‘Storytelling Alice’ is a computer software suite, which is used to teach programming 
skills. Although people engage with computers on a daily basis, very few learn to 
create computer programs on their own (Kelleher et al. 2007). Students can use Alice 
and engage with the software, working through exercises, accepting prompts and 
clues, and progressively learn to program.  
 
There are two traditional difficulties in getting students to learn programming 
concepts like loops, parallelisms and conditional logic. These are, firstly, a lack of 
motivation, and secondly frustrating syntax errors. Alice overcomes these difficulties 
by being based around the concept of storytelling, and by making it impossible to 
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produce syntax errors. The storytelling dimension allows users to create animated 
sequences as the key real-time outcome of the learning sequence. A drag and drop 
system of commands overcomes the problem of syntax. Users do not need to type 
the programming commands.  
 
Storytelling Alice enhances student motivation. Users of storytelling Alice were more 
than three times as likely to sneak extra time to work on their programs. Also, a 
system of ‘stencil’ overlays appear on screen to guide users through the tutorial 
systems while masking functions and commands not relevant to the lesson. The use 
of stencils greatly decreases the reliance on human assistance and increases the 
speed that tutorials are completed (Kelleher & Pausch 2005). Students can see the 
results of their programming and have an active, socially embodied, mode of 
appreciating their mistakes because they witness the characters in their stories 
behaving as they expected; or not if they have made an error.  
 
As a cause of skill in computer programming Alice is very powerful. Skill includes 
problem solving ability, understanding logic, and various other cognitive tools. One 
study found that at-risk computer-studies students usually average a C and only 47% 
go on to take the second level computing course12. With Alice they average a B and 
88% go on to take the advanced course. Taking the advanced course will develop 
even more cognitive skills. So Alice is a technology that causes (probabilistically in a 
population of learners) these cognitive skills.  
 
Alice does not enable computer skills, since these can easily be attained in the 
absence of its use. It is a partly stable cause because it works for at risk students (i.e. 
across a variety, but not all, student backgrounds). But Alice is a specific cause, as it is 
able to be modified so as to teach different skills. It is also directly proportional to the 
cognitive outcome. Again, I am certainly not saying that Alice is the cause of 
computer skills and understanding, but it is a cause. And we can characterize exactly 
what kind of cause it is (figure 14).  
                                                             
12
 At risk students are those without a math background or prior programming experience.  
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Summary: Things to note 
 
1. We can take one cause and two different effects of that cause. The cause 
doesn’t necessarily end up in the same place in the concept space with 
repsect to each effect (e.g. the relationship between a gene and its amino acid 
sequence when compared to the relationship between the same gene and IQ 
scores). 
2. We can take some location in the concept space and find heterogenous 
causes located there, for example, genes and cultural technologies (huntingtin 
and number words). 
3. Causes of the same class (such as culture, or genes) are not homogenous kinds 
(two genes can be in very different locations in the box). Specifying our 
context of investigation is crucial.  
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4. We can place all causes of some effect in one concept space analysis. How to 
then select some causes rather than others to build into our explanatory 
model is the topic of the next chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have taken the four-dimensional tool for analysing causes, which I 
introduced in chapter four, and populated it with some representative examples of 
causes of human psychological traits. By examining examples of genes, and of cultural 
technologies, I hope that I have made it clear that causes are very heterogeneous 
kinds. Asymmetries among causes can help us better understand developmental 
systems. In the next chapter, I take one example of a human cognitive trait, good 
critical thinking, and undertake a causal analysis, building the concept space for its 
causes. In principled fashion, I then abstract some causes from the concept space and 
build a general explanatory model for this trait. 
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CHAPTER SIX – Explanatory Models: A Focus on Effects – What 
explains critical thinking skills? 
 
‘Causal analysis is concerned with identifying causes and effects of social phenomena 
[psychological phenomena] with the purpose of understanding, predicting and 
eventually intervening on society and individuals’ (Russo 2010, p. 68).  
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter four, I introduced an approach to distinguishing causal roles in 
developmental systems. In chapter five, I showed how some select genetic and non-
genetic causes fit into this model. I also pointed out that developmental systems 
theory is too holistic an approach to be either cognitively tractable or offer up useful 
tools that practicing scientists and particularly policy makers can actually put to use. 
As well as the project of explaining cognitive development we are also interested in 
identifying interventions. Russo (2010) rightly notes that we have two goals when we 
approach causation in complex systems. One is a cognitive goal, the target is 
explanation. The other is an action-oriented goal. This is the practical motivation of 
causal analysis. 
 
Sometimes we want to build simplified causal models in order that we might 
understand and explain the key determinants of a process or outcome. But we don’t 
want our models so simple that one cause (say a gene) is seen as the only 
determinant of some effect (say a trait) for this misses other important privileged 
aspects of the causal relations. In this chapter I will illustrate a method for moving 
from the four-dimensional analysis of causal roles to a tractable explanatory model 
and I will illustrate this primarily through a case study of the determinants of critical 
thinking skills. So our project will need two arms, one where sets of causes are 
captured, and distinguished, and the other where the relevant or important causes 
are built into explanations. Chapters four and five began the first project. This chapter 
introduces the second project.  
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In cognitive science many of the explanations we seek are layered upon other 
explanations. For example, explanations of concept acquisition tend to be layered on 
explanations of brain function, which tend to be layered on explanations of 
biochemistry and gene expression. These are the issues of proportionality and 
dependence, which I have already discussed. Depending on the question we are 
asking different layers of models will be more or less relevant. Relevance and 
importance is also relative to particular projects of explanation and intervention. I will 
illustrate this idea of layers or hierarchies in the example to follow.  
 
Furthermore, Oyama (2000) acknowledges that causes in explanatory models can’t be 
too multiple and boundaries can’t be too indistinct. We can’t extend our explanation 
to anything and everything in the universe. We need to choose from the very many 
factors that are causally relevant to the development of psychological traits which 
ones to build into our explanatory model. I now show how this can be accomplished. 
 
Critical Thinking Example 
 
By asking what are the causes of good critical thinking skills, or perhaps some more 
empirically measurable proxy of this, such as scoring well on the California Critical 
Thinking Skills Test, and employing (M), then we produce a four-dimensional concept 
space with all the causes accounted for. Once we’ve fixed a question, then we have 
fixed cause and effect. To make the four-dimensional causal analysis approach 
worthwhile, we now need some criteria for taking elements from the concept space 
and including or excluding them in causal explanatory models. We could merely take 
any element that we already think is causally privileged and then include, in addition, 
any other element from the same region of concept space. However, the concept 
space itself provides guidance as to which causes are more or less privileged and 
therefore which causes ought to be included in the model. We can include or exclude 
causes from an explanatory model on principled grounds. 
 
In order to build an explanatory model (with a view to optimal intervention) using the 
concept-space approach, we first need to list all the causes. As should be obvious 
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from the preceding chapters, there will be many in the four-dimensional box for any 
particular developmental outcome. As a toy illustration, let’s take just six of the 
causes of ‘critical thinking skills’ in turn and examine the kind of cause that each is. 
We can then populate a causal analysis box (figure 15) with these six causes. I will 
restrict myself to discussing the three dimensions illustrated in figure 11(D) for 
simplicity. These are, specificity, proportionality and dependence.  
 
Dysbindin Genes: In chapter four, I explained that different polymorphisms of 
dysbindin relate to lower or higher IQ scores. So if student IQ is a cause of high scores 
on critical thinking tests then dysbindin shows some specificity toward critical 
thought. Also, dysbindin may be in some way enabling of critical thought, but this is 
speculation as it is not clear what the effect of having a deleted dysbindin gene is. 
Dysbindin is clearly not proportional to particular critical thinking skills however, 
because its activity is general, at a low level in the biological hierarchy. 
 
Membranes: These are essential for critical thought, as without membranes there can 
be no cognitive function. Critical thought depends on membranes. However, they are 
not proportional or specific in their effects. In humans, as well as inheriting DNA from 
both mother and father, an embryo inherits its entire membrane system from the 
egg. There is a sense in which the membrane system is continuous with the 
membrane system of the common ancestor of all eukaryotes. This emphasizes one 
feature of membranes that makes them less significant in explaining the development 
of critical thinking skills. This is that they are not actual difference makers. 
Membranes do not actually vary in significant ways in nature (not in the sense that 
genomes or education syllabi vary in any case), and so explaining critical thinking skills 
assumes the existence of functioning membranes (this is our context of inquiry, just 
like assuming the road when asking why the chicken crossed). Membranes are not an 
explanatory factor relevant to most avenues of inquiry. Membranes as causes are 
found in a less privileged region of the concept-space model, as they score very 
poorly on specificity and proportionality. There is neither a many-to-many 
correspondence of interventions on membranes and various cognitive effects, nor are 
the effects of the membranes (such as protecting the cell from hazardous 
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extracellular materials, or facilitating the diffusion of water) proportional to cognitive 
phenotypes. Most interventions on membranes will cause non-functioning cells, or 
undetectable effects at the cognitive level.  
 
High-bandwidth cultural inheritance13: This also enables critical thought, as many of 
the underpinnings of critical thinking skills are techniques and approaches established 
in the past by others. These include accumulating symbols, methods and skills that no 
one person can figure out in their entirety. However, cultural inheritance is less 
enabling than membranes. A lack of membranes crashes the probability of critical 
thinking skills to zero. Membranes are a true bottleneck cause. Lack of social 
inheritance merely makes it very unlikely that some agent will have good critical 
thinking skills. However, high-bandwidth inheritance is neither specific nor 
proportional in its effects. This is to be contrasted with the actual skills transmitted, 
which may be both specific and proportional.  
 
Literacy: As I identified in chapter three, the origins, and now existence, of writing 
may have had a role to play in the emergence of critical thought such as syllogistic 
reasoning (Lock & Gers 2011). This seems to be supported by experiments, which 
show that they way students represent a problem maps to how well they solve it 
(Twardy 2004). Literacy is an enabling, non-proportional cause of critical thought. It is 
also somewhat specific because the effects depend on the system and method of 
representation used, for example, Arabic/Roman numerals, representing speech or 
using pictograms, formal logic, and so on. 
 
Student IQ: The specific, and somewhat proportional, effects of student IQ on the 
emergence of critical thinking skills place it in a privileged region in the analysis of 
causal roles for critical thinking skills. As this thesis has argued, student IQ itself has 
an interesting range of biological and non-biological causes, including some cultural 
technologies (Blair et al. 2005, Flynn 2007). These causes will, by transitivity, be 
                                                             
13
 See chapter seven for a full discussion of this feature of human environments 
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causes of good outcomes on critical thinking tests, but they will fail the 
proportionality test (as dysbindin does), and so are likely not to be privileged.  
 
Critical thinking courses: Differences in the way critical thinking is taught in the 
classroom (traditional versus tree-diagramming methods, decision theory, and so on) 
have effects on how competent students become. The use of computer software for 
tree-diagramming (van Gelder 2001, Twardy 2004), or even pen and paper exercises 
(Harrell 2008), have been shown to also mediate this effect. Twardy found that the 
use of the ‘Reason!Able’ software suite for argument mapping increased critical 
thought performance twice as much as a traditional critical thinking course, and eight 
times as much as standard university courses. A critical thinking course (taken as a 
whole) is a specific, proportional, but not enabling cause of good critical thinking 
skills. There are pathways to good critical thinking skills that do not run through the 
bottleneck of a critical thinking course. Not taking a course does not necessitate a low 
probability of acquiring critical thinking skills.  
 
Taking just these six causes for illustrative purposes14, we can now diagram a three-
dimensional section of the four-dimensional concept space for causes of good scores 
on the California Critical Thinking Test (figure 15). 
 
I suggest that there could be good genes, membranes and high-bandwidth 
inheritance in place and yet the student fails miserably at some test of critical 
thought. This is because (as this model demonstrates) good genes, membranes and 
high-bandwidth inheritance are not the privileged causes (toward the top right in this 
representation15) of critical thought. Literacy, IQ, and critical thinking education are 
                                                             
14 Other causes that will appear in the 4D analysis model might include: natural variation in grey 
matter, COMT genes, teacher intention, student motivation, all the paraphernalia of apprentice 
learning, neural prediction systems, pencils, Parental IQ, Informal learning experiences, the questions 
on the test... etc.  
15
 The reader is encouraged to slide the edge of their hand from the bottom left apex of the cube to 
the top right, as was demonstrated in chapter four, in order to get a feel for the fact that causes 
scoring highly on none or one of the causal dimensions tend to lie to the bottom left of the figure, and 
those satisfying two or more tend towards the top right. Again, I emphasize there is no cut-off for 
when a cause becomes privileged, but some causes are clearly much more or much less privileged than 
other causes.  
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such causes. Taking just the causes (from our illustrative selection of six) which seem 
to be privileged we can build an explanatory model of the development of good 
critical thinking skills (figure 16). Note that I have illustrated the causes IQ and literacy 
as beneath the effect and the cause critical thinking course as horizontally apposed. 
This is because there is a sense in which critical thinking skills emerge from the 
psychologically more basic features IQ and literacy, which in turn ride on features of 
brains and neural firing, whereas critical thinking courses shape critical thinking skills 
at a ‘higher’ level. This is reflected in the more distal, enabling function of IQ and 
literacy.  
 
We have just moved from an analysis of causal roles (the concept space approach) to 
an explanation (a box and arrow model). The box and arrow model is an abstraction. 
It says something literally true about the world while leaving a lot of less important 
detail out. The box and arrow diagram also generalizes to some degree.  
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I will now introduce and reply to two potential criticisms of this approach. First, 
someone might argue that I have left too much out of the explanation with the 
explanatory model in figure 16. Second, someone might argue that figure 16 is not a 
good explanation because it does not give any mechanisms through which the causes 
identified actually have their effects.  
 
1. The Model has not Left Too Much Out 
 
We have left a lot out, but hopefully the process of abstraction has focused our 
attention upon the causes of interest. Remember Potochnik’s criteria for a good 
causal explanation from chapter four. Part of a good causal explanation was 
completeness. No element Ck was to be left out, which had it been included would 
have significantly altered the probability that the effect would occur. The entire four-
dimensional concept space analysis satisfies Potochnik’s criteria for explanatory 
adequacy by including everything. But it might be objected that we have failed this 
test by abstracting to the explanatory box and arrow model. However, as I identified 
in chapter four, this requires we include the road in the explanation of why the 
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chicken crossed. So Potochnik’s account is too strong. There are things it is 
reasonable to omit from explanation, either on the basis that such causes are 
assumed in our context of inquiry, or because such causes are minor players in 
comparison to other more important causes.  
 
Remember also that models are good or useful by virtue of their similarity relation to 
the world. An ideal, though perhaps unattainable, model is one that exhibits 
isomorphism with the way things are. Other models are good because they exhibit 
relevant similarity with the way things are. This similarity (as Godfrey-Smith 
explained) can be idealized and abstract. By taking even one privileged cause we 
generate a model with some similarity to the world. However, by expanding our 
domain of inclusion from the 1,1,1,1 locus in the causal analysis toward the origin at 
0,0,0,0 we can increase or decrease the richness of the model as we see fit. We can 
build any number of explanatory models with this technique from those that contain 
only a single causal entity (the most privileged cause), to those that encompass the 
entire set of (M). The richness of the explanatory model we produce is a function of 
the richness of the model that we consider adequate for our purposes.  
 
In order to sensibly intervene to modify critical thinking as a trait, we need to 
intervene on the structure of education, on student IQ or on literacy. If we are 
education policy makers we are mainly interested in critical thinking courses rather 
than IQ, or perhaps if we are geneticists we are more interested in IQ (and its 
determinants) than in critical thinking courses. We can omit further causes on 
pragmatic grounds, as long as we make this explicit.  
 
An explanatory model shows covariate sufficiency when it includes all the variables 
needed in order to account for the phenomenon of interest. In our toy example I 
suggest that, to a good explanatory approximation, covariate sufficiency is attained 
by including student IQ, literacy and critical thinking courses. Long distal chains of 
causation require only that their most proximate causes be included. If dysbindin has 
its effect on critical thinking via IQ, then it is sufficient to just include IQ. We aren’t 
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usually interested in the big bang as a cause of psychological traits. However, our 
domain of interest will vary somewhat depending on the context of inquiry.  
 
It was the complexity and inclusiveness of developmental systems theory, which 
motivated this approach in the first place. We wanted to simplify the explanation 
because including all causal elements as equally privileged becomes intractable. I am 
suggesting that the elements that must not be left out are the set of privileged 
causes. It is these causes that will comprise a useful explanation.  
 
2. We Don’t Always Need Mechanisms 
 
Rather than worry about what is included or excluded in the explanatory model the 
second objection centres around the relationships among the things that are 
included. It is true, some might say, that we have produced a model of causal 
relationships, but this does not explain anything because it does not give us 
mechanisms by which causes have their effects. In effect we have ‘black-boxed’ the 
workings of the system. I will give two replies to this objection. First (i), I will show 
that it is possible to decompose the entities in our model to produce finer grained 
explanations. Second (ii), I will argue, along with Jackson and Pettit (1992) that it is 
permissible to screen off detail that is not relevant to the questions at hand.  
 
i) Decomposition to Mechanisms 
 
Mechanisms are composed of entities and activities. The entities are things in the 
world, and the activities are what these things do. Mechanisms aim for a complete 
description of some phenomenon, a set of entities and activities that fully explains 
the phenomenon without any gaps in the explanation.  
 
‘Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions’ (Machamer, 
Darden, & Craver 2000).  
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A mechanism should be able to explain the activities of ‘bottom-out’ entities with 
respect to some field of inquiry. For example a mechanism in particle physics ought to 
bottom out at sub-atomic particles. In social science a mechanism should bottom out 
with the behaviours of individuals, or perhaps their beliefs and desires. We could 
perhaps explain social science phenomena with respect to particle physics, but I will 
explain in the next section why we are at liberty not to take our mechanisms that far.  
 
Furthermore, we can distinguish between a mechanism schema and a mechanism 
sketch. A sketch is more abstract and bottom-out entities do not (yet) feature 
(Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000). A sketch can act as a guide to further research 
and further findings may indicate the sketch is lacking in some important way. It can 
then be modified. Complete descriptions of mechanisms are continuous without gaps 
from the start conditions to the termination conditions. The continuity often lies in 
the arrows in a mechanistic diagram and explication of the arrows is in terms of 
activities. For example, the mechanism of DNA replication may be represented as a 
box labelled ‘single DNA molecule’, an arrow labelled ‘replication’ and a second box 
labelled ‘duplicate molecules of DNA’. The ‘replication’ activity is explained in terms 
of actions. DNA unwinds, DNA polymerase protein moves along the strand slotting 
new nucleotides into place according to chemical specificities. Note that in the model 
I have provided there are no such action terms explaining the causal arrows.  
 
However, it is possible to decompose the entities in my explanatory model, such as 
‘critical thinking course’ into parts and activities. The course is composed of teachers, 
computer exercises and, implicitly, students. Teachers speak and encourage, students 
write and read, and computer programs display correct and incorrect responses. 
Students learn. Once the privileged entities are identified through the four-
dimensional causal analysis, then we can focus our attention on the causal arrows of 
interest and set about deducing mechanisms. Just like the mechanism of DNA 
replication may make no mention of membranes, or the ambient temperature, both 
of which might be causally implicated in replication, the sort of causal analysis I have 
provided allows us to focus on mechanisms without including all that extraneous 
material. This material distracts from the essential features of the process.  
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I am identifying causes not mechanisms. It is a model of causes not spatial or 
temporal relationships. Arrows are not necessarily activities. But building causal 
explanatory models this way focuses our attention on causal relationships where the 
mechanisms of interest reside.  
 
ii) Pluralism of Explanation 
 
When trying to explain phenomena in the social, psychological and biological sciences 
we can employ several methods. We can choose explanation at different grains or 
levels of analysis. For example, when asking why crime has risen in some community 
we could choose to employ the explanation that unemployment has risen. There is a 
causal connection between the unemployment rate on one hand and the effect, 
rising crime. However, some might argue that this is too coarse-grained an 
explanation of this problem. What has actually occurred is that individuals Jones, 
Smith and Wilson have lost their jobs and as a result stolen money in order to eat. 
This is a more precise explanation of the effect some might say. 
 
The second explanation is a reductionist explanation. It employs methodological 
individualism and studies the activities of individuals as explanations of higher-level 
phenomena. As a general rule reductionists prefer these micro-level accounts rather 
than macro-level accounts. However, the natural end point of such analysis is that 
every phenomenon ought to be best explained by reference to particle physics and 
this is surely wrong. The crime rate has risen because the unemployment rate has 
risen. Unemployment is importantly proportional to crime. The movements of 
physical particles certainly take part in these effects, in fact they constitute these 
effects, but they are not an explanation of the effects, or at least not the sort of 
explanation we are after in the inquiry at hand. In order to solve the crime problem 
we aren’t out to get Jones a job, and Smith a job, and Wilson a job, we are out to get 
some people a job and the effect we seek will obtain. In fact had things been different 
at a smaller grained level, for example it was Roberts rather than Smith who was out 
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of a job and so stole some money, then the macro-level effect still would have 
obtained.  
 
Some causes, such as unemployment rates, exhibit realization-insensitivity. This 
means that it doesn’t matter how or why the cause came to be, or how or why a high-
level property of some system is physically realized. Given that it is realized, the effect 
will be the same. In the critical thinking case the causal route by which IQ came to be, 
is not important. It doesn’t matter if dysbindin or COMT genes or informal 
experiences contribute to IQ and in what proportions. What matters is that there is a 
certain IQ available for the agent to employ in critical reasoning. IQ is the cause the 
matters, not its particular causal history. 
 
Note also, that (in this case) student IQ is a privileged cause of scoring well in critical 
thinking tests. But student IQ itself is an effect with myriad developmental causes (we 
have seen this in chapter one). If we decide to intervene on student IQ we might like 
to repeat the causal analysis process taking IQ as our effect of interest rather than 
critical thinking skills, and build a new causal model explaining the privileged causes 
of IQ. In this way hierarchies of explanation in psychology and development may be 
built as if one were combining Lego bricks. This seems to be much more cognitively 
tractable and offers a route to conceptual understanding that developmental systems 
theory fails to strike. This method also avoids simplistic explanation such as genetic or 
environmental determinist accounts.  
 
I am not arguing that reductionist, or micro-level, or mechanistic explanation is 
wrong. In fact quite the opposite is true. It is the case that causal fundamentalism is 
true. This means that the activities of fundamental causes result in macro-level 
effects. If you fix the micro-level then you fix the macro-level. I am arguing that both 
explanations are correct. Both explanations are useful in different circumstances. 
Both explanations say something literally true about the world. Pluralism about cause 
and effect is a legitimate and useful position (Jackson & Pettit 1992). We can reject 
fine-grain preference in favour of explanatory pluralism and therefore choose which 
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explanation is appropriate for our needs. This includes choosing between mechanistic 
explanation and other kinds of explanation.  
 
I want to further argue that we can choose tractable explanations over complete 
ones. I am not arguing that complete explanations are wrong. They certainly are not. 
In fact only a complete explanation will be entirely true of any phenomena. But often 
we are not seeking the complete truth of a matter, but a way of comprehending or a 
way of guiding our intervention on it. We can acknowledge the force of the 
developmental systems theory argument without being pushed toward preferring it. 
We do not throw away an explanation just because there is another. Developmental 
systems theory is not wrong; it is just not useful for many purposes. Mechanistic 
explanation is not wrong; it is just that causal analysis allows us to focus on some 
mechanisms rather than others. Causal models identify which mechanisms we are 
interested in. Once we understand the privileged causes of some effect we can set 
about deducing the causal mechanisms that link them.  
 
According to Jackson and Pettit’s pluralism we can legitimately screen off lower level 
detail which is not relevant. In the unemployment and crime case, we do not need to 
employ the actual mechanism whereby Jones steals bread from the shop, to explain 
the rise in crime. A higher-level explanation suffices. Including all the mechanisms 
may give us more realism in our models, but then this limits the generality because 
the exact same mechanism may not be in operation in relevantly similar cases. 
 
In chapter four I introduced the idea of abstraction. When we build an abstract model 
we leave things out. When we do this we sometimes make characteristic errors 
(Godfrey-Smith 2006b). The main characteristic error is that we end up positing some 
entity that actually doesn’t exist in the world. It is a statistic. It might be argued that 
IQ in my example is merely a statistic. It is not a ‘discrete causal player’ on its own (to 
use Godfrey-Smith’s terminology, 2006b, p. 7). The actual causal players are the 
entities that serve as the foundation for the statistic, such as neural firings, enzymes 
of various efficiency, mental representations, and so on. However, as long as we 
realize that the entity in question is decomposable to these ‘actual players’ then we 
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are not saying anything false about the world. IQ is in the same ontological category 
as ‘unemployment rate’ and can serve a similar explanatory purpose.  
 
No initial model will be the final word on causation of any effect we are interested in. 
We take the causal model and then use it for further empirical testing. When we are 
plotting causes into the four-dimensional model each cause can itself be taken as an 
effect and its own causes plotted in a further four-dimensional space. Each segment 
of our causal model can be modified through empirical testing. Refinement comes 
with iteration of this process.  
 
Other Examples 
Let’s compare, for completeness, critical thinking skills to Huntington’s disease. See 
the three-dimensional model for Huntington’s (figure 17) and it’s causal explanatory 
model (figure 18). As with critical thinking there are many causes: membranes, the 
temperature of the womb, and so on… But none of these is anywhere near the 
privileged zone of the analysis tool. The huntingtin gene is the only such cause. In the 
Huntington’s case we can take explanation directly from gene to trait because the 
gene is the cause all the way up, at every level, of every manifestation of the disease. 
Without the gene there would be no mutant protein, no cognitive decline and no 
jerky limb movements, and each of these effects is sensitive to specificity, enabling 
and stability with respect to the huntingtin gene. Proportionality holds on the causal 
side because whether we are talking about the mutated protein that results from the 
huntingtin gene, or the global cognitive decline of the individual, the cause is the 
huntingtin gene, no category broader, or narrower. Proportionality may fail on the 
effect side, if we ask what is the effect of the huntingtin gene then we could 
substitute many different effects, some broader some narrower. However, I’ve stated 
already that we must fix cause and effect in order to build our four-dimensional box, 
so we can’t roam at will up and down through a list of effects. If we were looking for a 
mechanistic explanation of Huntington’s disease then we would need to explore the 
mechanism by which the huntingtin gene interacts with other elements of the system 
and the mechanism by which products of these interactions interacted with other 
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elements of the system. Only then would we have a complete mechanistic account. 
However, we can give an explanatory account by identifying privileged causation.  
 
Other genetic diseases (or genetically influenced traits) behave differently. Compare 
phenylketonuria (figure 19), which leaves sufferers severely mentally handicapped. 
Phenylketonuria is caused by an absence or deficiency of the enzyme phenylalanine 
hydroxylase. Normally about three-quarters of dietary phenylalanine is converted 
into tyrosine. If this process cannot occur because of the enzyme deficiency, then 
phenylalanine accumulates in the body leading to cognitive deficit. In this case both 
the defective gene and phenylalanine in the diet are needed in the causal model. The 
gene and phenylalanine in the environment are both proportional to the effect (milk 
would not be), they are both specific (via different mutations and different amounts 
in diet respectively). They are both one hundred per cent enabling. They are both 
somewhat stable because most interventions on the system will leave the effect 
unchanged. They are not fully stable, though, because we simply change one and the 
other no longer causes the disease. However, three out of four causal dimensions 
probably qualifies both the gene and the phenylalanine as privileged causes and 
warrants their inclusion in a causal model (figures 20).  
 
Finally, I emphasize that the critical thinking skills case is just a toy example for 
illustrative purposes. I am trying to indicate the manner in which the four-
dimensional analysis of causal roles could be used to explain (in a cognitively 
tractable way) interesting facts about trait development. I am completely open to 
empirical refinement of the particulars of any one causal model.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Through chapters one, two and three I built a picture of a very complex set of 
interacting causes in psychological development. This included technological 
influences, constructive neural processes, and external resources. The picture was 
complex even though I was trying to focus only on technological influences on 
cognitive traits. Explaining the development of human psychological traits is a messy 
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business. In this chapter I have furthered my argument for bringing tractability to 
Developmental Systems Theory by using the concept-space method, which I built in 
chapters four and five, to identify privileged causes of traits and build explanatory 
models. 
 
I have illustrated the method using the example of the development of critical 
thinking skills. I have suggested that culture and some cultural technologies play key 
roles in explaining this aspect of human psychology. In the next chapter I will discuss 
two theoretical implications of the concept-space tool and then, in the final chapter, I 
turn from the present to the past, and indicate how understanding the privileged role 
that human technologies sometimes play in the development of psychological traits, 
helps us to understand two problems in prehistory and the evolution of human 
minds.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Theoretical Implications of the 4D Space 
 
I have spent chapters four through six explaining and demonstrating a tool for 
analyzing the causes of some trait so that we can build an explanatory model 
focussing only on privileged causes. This shows that human technological innovations 
are sometimes privilged causes of human psychological traits. In this chapter I pick up 
on two theoretical concepts in biology, innateness and codes, and suggest how they 
may relate to spatial regions mapped out in the four-dimensional tool. Do some 
regions of the concept space correspond to these biological concepts?  
 
Innateness 
 
In chapter two I examined the folk concept of innateness using the analysis that 
Mameli & Bateson have undertaken. This showed the folk concept to be wanting, and 
failing to connect to any particular useful and useable scientific concept. However, 
there may be a related concept of interest illustrated by the four-dimensional model. 
Once we determine the set of privileged causes for some particular trait, then we can 
ask the following questions. (1) Are the privileged causes stable? (2) Are they 
heritable (or better yet, are they inherited)? (3) Are they internal to the organism? To 
the degree that this is the case then the trait in question is of a particular kind, with a 
particular class of privileged causes. This seems to be the sort of trait we refer to 
when we make claims of innateness. However, if the privileged causes are not 
inherited, or not internal, or not stable16, then we cannot make the claim that such a 
trait is anything like innate. Remember innateness is some approximation of 
invariantness and having an evolutionary selective history, though it is not clear how 
exactly we cash this term out when we use it in the folk sense. It does not seem to 
map to a single scientifically useful concept.  
 
                                                             
16
 A cause can be privileged and not stable in virtue of scoring highly on the other three dimensions.  
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For example, take the case of critical thinking skills. The privileged causes in the toy 
example we looked at were IQ, literacy and critical thinking courses. These causes 
may be stable in their relation to the effect (producing critical thinking skills), they 
may be heritable (literate parents tend to produce literate children), but they are not 
all internal to the organism. Critical thinking courses in particular are an external 
institution. But when we decompose IQ into its own causal analysis, we find that the 
privileged causes include environmental factors as demonstrated via the Flynn Effect. 
Literacy is heavily dependent on invented symbols and cultural practices as well. So 
critical thought as a trait is not of the class delineated by having stable, internal, and 
heritable causes constituting its set of privileged causes. 
 
Huntington’s disease on the other hand has a small set of privileged causes. This 
includes just the huntingtin gene in the analysis in chapter six. The huntingtin gene is 
stable, it is internal to the organism and it is heritable. I’m not arguing that 
Huntington’s disease is ‘innate’. I stand by the analysis of Mameli and Bateson 
outlined in chapter two. Innateness is not a useful concept, largely because it is 
unclear what we mean by the term. For example, in this case the disease is neither 
species-typical, nor a standard Darwinian adaptation. Both of these were argued to 
be elements of some folk conceptions of innateness. However, I am suggesting that 
there is a very definable concept, that where most of a trait’s privileged causes are 
heritable, stable, and internal, that captures much of what we mean when we employ 
the term ‘innate’ in different contexts.  
 
It may be objected that according to this analysis something turns out to be ‘innate’ 
or not ‘innate’ according to where we draw a line in the four-dimensional causal 
analysis tool, and that this is somewhat subjective. However, I suspect that there will 
be a lot of cases where the appropriate location for such a line is quite obvious. This 
will occur when there is an unpopulated gap in the causal analysis between the 
location of a cluster of causes or a cause scoring highly on many dimensions and a 
further cluster or scattering of causes not scoring highly on many dimensions. This is 
illustrated somewhat in figure 15, but more particularly in figures 17 and 19. 
Phenylketonuria is not a good candidate for ‘innateness’ according to this approach 
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because one out of two members of the obvious cluster of privileged causes 
(phenylalanine in the diet) is not internal to the organism, and is less obviously 
heritable.  
 
The idea here is not that this is a fully worked out fix for the messy concept of 
innateness. But, that once we have analysed the causes of a trait, using the 
dimensional approach worked out in the last three chapters, we may then be in a 
position to more fully understand why a trait is generally considered innate or not 
innate in the folk sense. There may also be further kinds of traits defined by further 
clusters of privileged causal kinds, such as traits the privileged causes of which are 
external, heritable, and stable, for example. Such traits might also inform us about 
Human Nature.  
 
Developmental Codes and Representation 
 
Sometimes talk about the development of traits is cashed out in talk of codes, or 
coding. Some causes of some traits are supposedly intructive, representative, or there 
is some rule-based translation mechanism at work converting causes into effects. We 
saw in chapter four that there is a project imparting informational and coding work to 
the genome in development, and also scepticism surrounding this project. But alleged 
developmental codes are not restricted to the genome. Other arguments and 
examples exist. Turner (2007) attempts to define an epigenetic code. He claims that 
modifications to the histone proteins around which DNA is wrapped constitute a code 
and have effects on which genes are active.  
 
‘An attempt is made to define how histone modifications operate as part of a 
predictive and heritable epigenetic code that specifies patterns of gene expression 
through differentiation and development’ (p. 2, my emphasis).  
 
Furthermore, ‘the increasing variety and interactive properties of histone 
modifications has led to the use of the terms “histone code” and “epigenetic code”’ 
(p. 3).   
 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
192 
 
In a developing system a developmental code is a code for some outcome of 
development. Codes are rules for converting information from one form to another. 
Biologists often talk about a distinction between permissive and instructive causes 
(see e.g. Gilbert 2003). A permissive cause is a necessary background condition for 
some effect to occur, an instructive cause bears some kind of imperative, plan, or 
program-like characteristics. We see now that some of this distinction is made salient 
in the four-dimensional space. Permissive elements will score highly on dependence 
and perhaps low as proportional causes in the four-dimensional space. Instructive 
causes on the other hand are generally what we mean by ‘developmental codes’. 
Often it is argued that an imperative message or code in some developmental 
elements (such as DNA) is an important ‘instructive’ sub-category of cause.  
 
In this section I will examine two ordinary codes, Caesar’s Code and Morse Code, and 
deduce five criteria necessary for something being a code. We can then relate these 
criteria to the four-dimensional model and delineate a part of the concept space in 
which causes must be found in order to be considered as possible codes. Given that 
we are employing a parity of reasoning approach, we must approach all elements of 
the developmental matrix as if they could be developmental codes, and test each 
one. I will show that very few things, if any, can be seen as true developmental codes. 
And that even in cases where one can make an argument for a coding role for the 
causal factor, that explaining development in terms of coding adds nothing to the 
explanation offered by the four-dimensional model, and in some cases may confuse 
issues. Note that I am only focusing here on the processes of ontogeny, and that any 
talk of codes or explanation of inheritance across generations will not necessarily be 
captured by the present arguments.  
 
The code employed by Julius Caesar to communicate with his generals allowed the 
conversion of coded messages into plain text by employing a rule where letters of the 
alphabet are frame-shifted three places. C becomes F, D becomes G and so on. Morse 
code is a more complex method for encoding the alphabet. Short combinations of 
dashes and dots in Morse code correspond to letters of the alphabet. But codes are 
also imperatives bearing the instructions, ‘add letter α to the growing message’.  
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In Caesar’s code changing a letter changes the corresponding letter in the message. In 
Morse code adding or deleting a dot or dash changes the letter in the message. In this 
sense both codes are specific causes of their messages. Small alterations of the code 
have corresponding small effects. Multiple states of the code C1, C2, C3... correspond 
to multiple states of the effect E1, E2, E3... This is our specificity criteria from chapter 
four.  
 
These codes are also proportional. In Caesar’s code one letter corresponds to one 
letter in the message. In Morse code one small cluster of dots and dashes 
corresponds to one letter in the message. Neither code nor translation is broader or 
narrower than the other. Codes are ‘grained’ such that identifiable units of the 
message are mapped to identifiable units of the form or representation produced. 
Letter to letter in Cesar’s code, or small set of dots and dashes to letter in Morse 
code. Information is neither lost nor gained in the process of translating.  
 
The question of causing and the question of coding are two separate issues. Some 
entity can cause an effect without coding for it. Legs cause us to walk, but we don’t 
normally consider legs to code for walking. Genes are causes of psychological traits 
but this doesn’t entail that they code for them. Codes on the other hand do need to 
be causes. Red lights code for traffic stopping and they also cause traffic to stop. 
Caesar’s code causes intelligible messages to be extracted. Dolphins are obviously not 
a code for human eye colour because they play no role in causing human eye colour. 
The relationship between dolphins and human eye colour fails to satisfy (M), our 
minimal sense of a cause. Also, we should note that the vehicle (letters in Caesar’s 
code, dots and dashes in Morse code) represents the outcome, but it is the rule (shift 
of three places) that is the code. Codes are systems of signs and meanings, and they 
necessitate adaptors for converting signs into meanings. 
 
From this discussion it seems that we can begin to construct criteria for what it would 
take to be a developmental code. To be a developmental code it is not enough to be a 
‘gene’ or a cultural technology, or some other class. Instead five criteria are required: 
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1. The entity in question must be a developmental cause (satisfying (M)) for 
there are no non-causal developmental codes. This criterion is necessary to 
omit cases like the dolphin example I have just outlined. 
But satisfying (1) is far from sufficient to be a developmental code. Think of gravity. 
Gravity has causal effects in the development of probably every trait. But gravity 
alone does not seem to code for our traits.  
2. The entity must be specific to the developmental outcome. 
But causal specificity is insufficient for being a code. The ambient temperature has a 
causal, specific relationship to the molecular lattice of H2O. Hot ambient temperature 
(C1) causes steam (E1), moderate temperature (C2) causes water (E2), and cold 
temperature (C3) causes ice (E3). But again, I contest that we don’t ordinarily 
consider temperature to ‘code’ for molecular structure. 
3. The entity must be proportional to the developmental outcome.  
Tides cause high-water marks on beaches, larger tides cause higher high water marks, 
and there is tidy proportionality between the tide and the water-mark. High water 
marks are not caused by anything narrower or broader than the tides. But again, we 
don’t consider tides as codes of high water marks. They are merely proportional, 
specific causes. Indeed, genes seem likely to fail a proportionality test for coding with 
respect to most traits other than perhaps amino acid sequences. And amino acid 
sequences don’t seem to be developmental ‘outcomes’.  
 
The reason why we resist considering tides and similar examples codes is because 
they lack the quality of representation. Wheeler (2003) argues that coding talk is a 
species of representational explanation along the lines of instructions, blueprints, 
plans, specifications or a program. A code is a rule for converting information into 
another form or representation, not necessarily of the same type. So we need a 
fourth criterion: 
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4. The entity to be considered a code must represent the developmental 
outcome (i.e. be intentional). 
DNA has a causal, specific, proportional relationship with some traits. We have 
already seen that. But in chapter four I argued that DNA does not carry semantic 
information. If semantic information is required for representation, and hence for 
coding, then DNA cannot code for developmental outcomes. There is a genetic code 
in one sense, this is the mapping rule between codons and amino acids. But this is not 
a code for some developmental outcome. It is criteria for this stronger sense of 
developmental code that I am trying to elucidate here.  
 
What makes something a representation? Representations must represent 
something. Representations possess ‘aboutness’ or ‘directedness’ on something in 
the world. This is the quality of intentionality. Mental states are the paradigmatic 
cases of intentional things. Our mental states are ‘about’ things in the world. They 
have content. Furthermore something is only a representation if its function is to 
represent. Putnam (1981) gives the example of the ant causing a trail in the sand that 
just happens to look like a famous painting. But the trail in the sand does not 
represent the painting in and of itself. It only represents the painting when you or I or 
someone else comes along and uses the ant trail as a representation. This is one of 
the key reasons why DNA fails to represent the outcomes of development. It is simply 
not the function of DNA to do so. The function of DNA is to package itself for 
tranmission to the next generation and to be available as one of the ingredients in 
development. Objects in the world can acquire intentionality and therefore 
represent, thanks to semantic content derived from minds. So things that represent 
include mental states and artifacts, such as pictures, books, and language, which 
derive intentionality from minds.  
 
So, representations of student cognitive developmental outcomes in the minds of 
teachers could satisfy these criteria. Teachers’ mental states are causal, specific, 
proportional, representational things with respect to student learning. Teacher 
intention satisfies the criteria we have identified so far. 
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What about artifacts? First let me set this problem up with an illustrative example. 
When designing a house an architect represents his ideas with a plan or blueprint, the 
plan can be seen as a set of instructions for the construction of the house. The plan 
can then play a causal role in the construction of the house even if the architect is no 
longer present. The representations constituting the plan contain semantic 
information about the house because they are derived from the architect’s mental 
representations, which uncontroversially represent the house. There is a special 
relationship between the architect’s mental content and the proposed house. This is 
the intentional relationship. The plans are also characterized by this relationship. 
They possess intention derived from the architect’s mental content. According to the 
criteria listed above the architect’s plans code for the final structure of the house. 
This seems plausible. The architect’s mental states (A), code for the plans (B), and the 
plans code for the house (C). The plans function to represent the house, they also 
cause the house, and they are specific and proportional to the house.  
 
If agents are modifying cultural technologies with the intent of bringing about a 
particular cognitive device in their children, then there is a very strong sense in which 
they are representing the phenotypic outcome. The agents may also take steps to 
ensure that such an outcome occurs. Hence, redundancies and duplications creep 
into the strategy. We can attribute a representation here because the function of the 
agent’s intent is to represent the cognitive outcome of the child. This occurs all the 
time in education. We have an analogous situation to the architect case. In the case 
of programming skills there is the teacher intention (A), to produce programming 
skills in the child, there is Storytelling Alice (B), which facilitates the outcome, there 
are student learning outcomes (C). But Storytelling Alice is less obviously a 
representation of the outcomes, than is the architect’s plan. We need to ask, when 
something (A) is a code for some other thing (C) and there is an intermediary step (B), 
then does (B) also code for (C). We need to know if coding is transitive in the right 
way. There certainly exist counter-examples.  
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Suppose I wanted someone killed. I represent them being dead in my mind. This 
representation can be causal, it is proportional to their death, and it is specific to the 
mode of death, and so on. Even if we were to grant that my mental state codes for 
the death, then it is a stretch to claim that the bow and arrow, which I construct in 
order to facilitate the death, is a code. Something can function to bring about a coded 
outcome, without itself being a code. We may need to know in more detail whether 
Storytelling Alice represents cognitive outcomes in the right way.  
 
What is clear is that anything that clearly represents the outcome of development is a 
good candidate for a developmental code. Genes, as I argued in chapter four, fail to 
represent anything, except perhaps amino acid sequences. But this does not mean in 
and of itself that there are no developmental codes. Cultural structures or mental 
representations could still be candidates.  
 
However, there is a further problem. The criteria for coding as they stand are too 
broad. This is because nearly anything represented by a mind then becomes ‘coded 
for’. If I have a representation of making a sandwich in my mind, and this causes me 
to make a specific sandwich, proportional to my representation of it. Then my mental 
state has coded for the sandwich. If we want to preserve the everyday notion that 
Caesar’s code and Morse code are codes, and common mental states like 
representing a sandwich are not, then we need more in our criteria. The missing 
ingredient seems to be an interpretation rule.  
5. Codes adhere to a rule of interpretation, which dictates how the represented 
entity is to be extracted from the representation. 
This idea becomes clear if we think of a simple coding system. Take the system of red 
and green traffic lights. Red lights cause traffic to stop, and green lights cause it to 
flow. But a pile of rocks in the middle of the road also causes traffic to stop. The 
reason that red lights are a code rather than just a cause for traffic stopping is 
because there is a rule of interpretation, the code, which connects the sign, red light, 
with the outcome, stopped traffic. It is not that the photons of light falling on a 
driver’s retina physically cause traffic to stop; the stopping is due to the meaning of 
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the sign. The driver of the car is an adaptor, converting the meaning of the sign, not 
just its physical effects, into an outcome.  
 
The coding entity need not be stable, as many codes fail to code in the wrong 
context. For example a Chinese speaker who understands no Latin could not convert 
Caesar’s code. The entity need not be enabling, the developmental outcome may still 
occur even if it is not coded. However, if some cause is specific and proportional, and 
furthermore it is stable or enabling, then it is clear that it palys an important role in 
development as a privileged cause, whether it codes or not. It is entirely contingent 
whether any actual causes of developmental outcomes satisfy these coding criteria. 
 
Criteria (1)-(4) above are too broad an analysis of coding, and criteria (1)-(5) seem to 
leave us with few possibilities for developmental codes. Even mental states as causal 
entities don’t obviously appear to follow a rule of interpretation. Genes fail criterion 
(4). The causal specificity between DNA codons and the primary structure of proteins 
can be called a code irrespective of whether it carries a message or instruction (Shea 
2007). This does not imply that DNA has any semantic or intentional properties. But 
DNA in this sense certainly doesn’t code for developmental outcomes. And a 
developmental code is a code for some outcome of development. Mental 
representations fail criterion (5). Caesar’s Code, Morse Code, and other commonly 
employed communicative codes satisfy all five criteria. They are specific, 
proportional, representational, causes of their outcomes via a rule of interpretation. 
We can however assert that if anything is to qualify as a developmental code, it must 
appear in the shaded ‘coding’ region in the conceptual space model I have introduced 
as depicted in figure 21. Causes (notably genes) that fall outside this region simply are 
not codes for the effects of interest. Before even beginning to argue whether genes 
are representational or not, we immediately see that dysbindin cannot be a code for 
intelligence (figure 12) because it falls outside this region. The causal analysis helps us 
rule out many candidate causes as being codes for development.  
 
This analysis of codes is intended to support the use of the four-dimensional model 
for causal explanation. If there are no developmental codes or if being a code is so 
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broad that lots of counterintuitive things qualify, then perhaps we ought to just drop 
talk of developmental codes altogether. The folk notion that genes code for traits is 
empty and problematic. Full explanation of development can be obtained through 
the analyses provided by the conceptual space model. Nothing is gained by talking of 
codes. And in fact such talk may lead to omissions of important causal factors in 
explanation. Causal analysis does all the work we need. There may be a sub-class of 
causes which we refer to as causal representations, but this is as far as we need to go. 
Even if there were codes we often wouldn’t be as interested in these codes as we are 
in the actual privileged causes of the effect of interest. So the importance of codes 
and privileged causation comes apart.  
 
 
 
The criteria for being a developmental code are: (1) satisfy (M), (2) appear in the 
proportional and (3) specific region of the 4D space, (4) possess semantic information 
content about phenotypic outcome, and (5) satisfy an interpretation rule.  
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Testing the causes of critical thinking skills, we see that in the three-dimensional box 
(figure 15) student IQ and Critical Thinking Courses fall in the region of space 
necessary to be considered a code. However, student IQ does not possess the 
required representational content (nor is its function to represent the trait). Critical 
thinking courses on the other hand may be intentional, but there is not obviously a 
rule of interpretation linking the mental representation as ‘code’ and the outcome 
produced. Critical thinking courses are, however, heritable and, therefore, potentially 
of evolutionary significance. If there are selective pressures on critical thinking 
courses, then they will evolve over time leading to new critical thinking traits 
developing in subsequent generations. This sort of effect is the subject matter of the 
next and final chapter.  
 
Formal education systems contain a wealth of cultural information and innovations to 
enhance teaching and learning. With developing awareness of these processes, 
lineages (humans) will be able to plan their teaching and engineer the education 
systems themselves. This requires a degree of knowledge of what is desirable, what 
has worked in the past, and what is likely to work in the future. Just like an architect’s 
mental representation is part of the cause of a house, the mental representations and 
intentions of teachers, policy makers, and learners are part of the cause of certain 
traits. This has the potential to create a very powerful set of adaptive experiments. 
 
Up to this point I have shown that some technolgies can shape our plastic brains 
during development and also integrate with brains to enhance human capabilities in 
the world. Furthermore, some human technologies can be identified as privileged 
causes of psychological traits. In chapter eight I move from looking at development, 
to looking at evolution. How does understanding all these developmental processes 
help our understanding of the evolution of the human mind?  
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PART THREE: 
Evolution and the Sapient Paradox 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: The Sapient Paradox and the Neanderthal 
Extinction 
 
‘Those living at Pushkari *20,000 years ago+ are Homo sapiens, modern humans, 
anatomically and mentally the same as you and me’ (Mithen 2003, p.10, my italics) 
 
Introduction 
 
I have argued that cultural technologies are developmental causes of psychological 
traits. I have shown that the likely mechanism is an adaptation for neural plasticity 
and that psychological traits in some cases also functionally depend on technological 
aspects of culture. I then argued that cultural technologies can be privileged elements 
of the developmental matrix and should play prominent roles in the explanations of 
some psychological traits.  
 
But the role of human technological innovation is not restricted to its developmental 
effects. This is because development plays an important role in evolution. Novel 
environments can cause novel psychological traits to develop, as we have seen. But 
then novel psychological traits  cause the construction of new novel developmental 
environments (as we saw with the evolution of literacy). This ratcheting process can 
scaffold population-wide change in psychological traits over time. The arguments in 
chapter one suggest that the whole array of human psychology from affect, to 
intelligence, and from attention to memory, is manipulated by cultural variability. So 
these processes have important roles to play in the evolution of minds. The effect of 
computer games on emotion does not explain all of the changes in affect over recent 
decades, and the effect of minus signs and number lines doesn’t explain all the 
changes in IQ. But the whole cultural suite taken together is a powerful driver of 
human cognition. This will have been the case ever since culture emerged in our 
evolutionary past.  
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In this chapter I apply this analysis to two problems in prehistory. The two prehistoric 
questions are, firstly, why did it take anatomically modern humans so long to become 
behaviourally modern? This is sometimes known as the ‘sapient paradox’. And, 
secondly, given that Neanderthals were a lot like humans, why did they go extinct? In 
the process I am going to challenge Mithen’s claim with which I opened this chapter. 
Our mental life has changed dramatically over recent prehistory. 
 
I will argue that cultural-technological cognitive-developmental processes must have 
been occurring during these timeframes and that our plastic brains accommodated 
these influences by rewiring as well as integrating with cultural technologies in the 
world. Altered developmental environments provide scaffolding for novel concept 
acquisition, rewire the brain, and novel functional environments extend the 
functional apparatus of cognition. Minds have changed in many ways in both the 
take-off of sapiens’ behaviour and in the Neanderthals’ decay into extinction. I add at 
the outset that I am not attempting to give an actual sequence explanation of what 
actually happened in these two cases, rather I am outlining a framework which could 
be employed if someone were to seek the fine details. 
 
Approaching the Lineage Explanation 
 
There are two types of questions that cognitive prehistorians can ask. One is what 
were people like at other times? What were people like at time A? at time B? These 
type (1) questions are descriptive questions. The second sort of question is a process 
question. How did people of type A become people of type B. Note that in answering 
type (2) questions we generate a lineage explanation and give an account of 
mechanism.  
 
The evolution of the human mind is a long process that appears to advance in fits and 
starts (Donald 1991). This is not unexpected because this is the same pattern that we 
see in the biological evolution of organisms (Gould 2002). This is also the pattern we 
see in the macro scale changes in the earth’s geology. In each case micro events feed 
up to macro changes and there is change over time. An important feature of such 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
205 
 
change in these biological and geological cases is that change is ongoing. Organisms 
are evolving right here and now and the earth’s geology is in constant flux. Every time 
there is an earthquake, or a landslide, or volcanic eruption the earth’s geology 
changes. Charles Lyell appreciated this in 1830 when he published his: Principles of 
Geology, Being an Attempt to Explain the Former Changes in the Earth’s Surface by 
Reference to Causes Now in Operation. In this he observed that we can explain how 
the Earth came to take its present form, by appealing to ongoing small geological 
events that we can study here and now. This is exactly the same sort of insight that 
led Darwin to his Origin of Species. It happens that there are indeed current ongoing 
small changes in human cognition from generation to generation. Effects such as the 
Flynn Effect on IQ (see chapter one for a full discussion) must surely hold some clues 
to the processes underlying cognitive evolution. Key drivers of the Flynn Effect seem 
to be a complex social media environment, and a particular sort of formalised 
education system. Changes to the wealth of public representations, and to the 
structure of education syllabi seem to drive current evolution of IQ. These changes 
are ongoing and occurring right now.  
 
But we can look back further, remember the effects of the Cambridge tutorial system, 
then there are slide rules in the 19th Century (see Nickerson, 2005), mathematical 
notation systems in Mesopotamia, notched sticks at 30,000 years, number words, 
and the effects accumulate. We can expect such effects to be found since the origins 
of culture. The explanation for the rise of science, math and the sort of abstract 
thought that characterises high IQ scores turns out to be a series of small but 
important events that accumulate and alter pedagogic structures and developmental 
environments.  
 
The Flynn Effect is a population-wide psychological phenomenon driven by ongoing 
change in developmental environments. There have been other important 
population-wide psychological changes in the past. Lyell’s phrase, ‘Causes Now in 
Operation,’ suggests explanations for these phenomena. It is the change from one 
context to another that will provide our lineage explanation. I have suggested the 
elements of an explanation of the rise of scientific thought, and IQ effects. Similar 
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frameworks ought to apply to other significant cognitive emergences such as: 
language, literacy, aesthetic and representational art, self-reflexive awareness, and so 
on. Much of the explanation of these changes will be a changing pedagogic and media 
context for development.  
 
I am not trying to give a lineage explanation. I am trying to explain how one might be 
constructed. An understanding of these contemporary processes lessens the puzzle of 
the sapient paradox. First, let’s look more closely at the two problems I have 
introduced.  
 
Problem 1: The Sapient Paradox 
 
There are two interesting issues troubling those who seek to explain the evolution of 
‘modern’ humans. The first is the long time-lag (perhaps 150,000 years) between the 
appearance of anatomically modern humans and that of behaviourally modern 
humans (Renfrew’s ‘sapient paradox’, 2008, chapter 5). The second is the 
unexplained demise of the Neanderthals, who in many respects were very similar to 
the successful Homo sapiens.  
 
Genetic differences between contemporary human populations seem to be small and 
given that there was a radiation out of Africa approximately 60,000 years ago, which 
seeded all current global populations, then this suggests that the human genome has 
been relatively stable since then (Renfrew 2008). However, a study by Williamson et 
al. (2007) used statistical methods and found that up to ten percent of the human 
genome may have been affected by natural selection subsequent to the out of Africa 
radiation. Genes involved in skin pigmentation, lactose digestion, and the immune 
system, among others, have shown evolution. The gene for a single protein necessary 
for lactose digestion appears to have arisen in European farming populations over a 
period of just a few thousand years (Richerson & Boyd 2005). 
 
In addition to this, Laland (2008) reviews evidence that recent selective pressures 
have shaped some genes involved in brain development, such as genes for serotonin 
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transporters and proteins associated with synapses. However, it seems unlikely that 
gene networks coding for specific cognitive devices could have emerged (and 
emerged in such numbers) over this evolutionary moment. What is more likely is that 
this is ongoing selection for efficiency and optimization of the system, quantitative, 
rather than qualitative improvements. The gene for a lactase enzyme could arise 
rapidly and effectively because it takes only one enzyme, and hence one gene, to 
facilitate the digestion of lactose. Modifications to one enzyme are unlikely to have 
effects on specific cognitive devices. Rather global gains or losses of degrees are 
probable as I have suggested in chapter two.  
 
So the conclusion seems to be that even if there has been some genetic change over 
this timeframe, then it does not account for the cultural and behavioural diversity 
that we see. The genetic differences between human populations seem to be small in 
relation to the observed behavioural differences. Ongoing genetic changes in the 
sapiens lineage during the last 200,000 years are of relatively minor importance for 
behavioural change when compared to the gradual, gene-culture co-evolutionary 
process (see Laland 2008, Laland et al. 2010, Williamson et al. 2007, & Sterelny 2011 
for examples). Culture has driven most of recent human evolution. 
 
Why, if the genetic frame was relatively fixed by around 100,000-200,000 years ago 
did it take another 40,000 or more years for anything like human behavioural 
modernity to emerge no more than 60,000 years ago. Furthermore, why did it take 
another 50,000 years for really fancy behaviours like the invention of writing systems, 
long distance trade, and states to emerge in the Holocene (i.e. the last 10,000 years)? 
It is possible, I concede, that the sort of ongoing genetic changes I have just 
mentioned account for some of these delays, but given the arguments in this thesis to 
date, I suggest that there are several other legitimate answers to this question. It 
could be that: 
1. There were important social transitions that were required for the emergence 
of really modern human behaviour. 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
208 
 
2. There were ecological factors not yet in place in order for modern human 
behaviour to emerge. 
3. Truly modern human cognition requires the accumulation of certain cultural 
technologies in order for it to emerge developmentally. 
 
I am not ruling out some role for genetic evolution subsequent to Homo sapiens 
attaining anatomical modernity. Such ‘invisible’ (to the paleontological record) 
evolution may be relevant. But the role for genes becomes less and less likely as we 
approach changes in cognition and behaviour in the Holocene, such as symbolic 
proliferation and the origins of writing and mathematics. Furthermore, looking at 
contingent brute events does some part of the explanatory work. For example, social 
stratification and strong central government emerged as a result of a switch from dry 
to wet rice production in Madagascar (Linton, 1933). The small amount of very wet 
land at the bottom of a valley became especially valuable and property rights and a 
stratified family structure emerged (Trigger 1968). This in part explains the rise of 
cities and as we have seen in chapter one IQ in city contexts tends to be higher than 
that in rural contexts, there are rural/urban psychological differences. But this is far 
from the whole story. The explanation of human behavioural take-off is likely to be 
rich and complex. 
 
One deflationary way to account for this problem is merely to suggest that the 
materials and methods needed time to accumulate. A lot of behaviour depends on 
accumulated technological mastery. For example something like reliably preparing 
cooked meat depends on a sequence of steps in the mastery of fire, each of which is 
difficult or impossible to invent before the ones preceding it. Building aqueducts 
requires that a host of more primitive technologies such as mathematics and 
brickwork be mastered first, and in sequence. The smelting of copper (first performed 
about 8000 BC in Turkey) required fired-clay technology first, in order that a ceramic 
crucible could be buried beneath a hearth and oxygen fed to the fire through blow 
tubes. Of course the dynamics of recombining precursor technologies to produce new 
innovations are interesting in their own right and we see the exponential take-off of a 
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suite of innovation once enough technological know-how is in place. According to this 
account, we first got smart, then bit by bit invented fancy technology.  
 
On the other hand, much of what is fancy about contemporary humans is not 
obviously based in accumulating material culture. For example cognitive skills like 
syllogistic reasoning, or mathematical capability, don’t seem to depend on such a 
long lag of accumulated material culture. Why do these not appear, and indeed in 
written forms, much earlier than they do, given that sticks for making marks on rocks 
were certainly available to the first anatomical moderns? Indeed, the first cognitive 
artefact that we know of created for mathematical purposes were 29 notches on a 
baboon fibula just 37,000 years ago (Mercier 2006). Similarly, Marshack (1972) 
estimates that French bone artifacts acted as lunar calendars as early as 30,000 years 
ago. So tallying, the correspondence of marks with units of quantity, seems to be 
approximately this old. 
 
The key to explaining the sapient paradox lies in accounting for the cognitive skills 
that were required to drive behavioural modernity, and in realizing that these 
cognitive skills did not appear at the same time as anatomically modern humans. The 
first anatomically modern humans would have had an anatomically modern brain but 
the brain is not cognitively sophisticated on its own. Cognitive devices need to be 
constructed via developmental processes and integrated with supporting media. If 
developmental environments weren’t building the right kind of cognition, then fancy 
modern behaviour would not exist, no matter how modern the genetic and 
anatomical resources of the species. 
 
Renfrew (2008) describes a transition in human cognitive evolution, which comes 
around 40-60,000 years ago. Around this time there begins an increasing mismatch 
between the pace of genetic change (which continues at a slow steady rate) and the 
pace of behavioural change (which accelerates dramatically). We start seeing lots of 
behavioural change with very little genetic change (see figure 22). If the behaviour is 
a reflection of cognitive change, then there has to have been a ‘tectonic’ (or 
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constructive) phase of human cognitive evolution17. Cognitive nativists (such as 
proponents of Evolutionary Psychology, see chapter two) seem to be discussing 
human cognition that had evolved before this tectonic phase, whereas context-
dependent constructivist developmental explanations, become much more relevant 
after this time as the technological context begins to rapidly accumulate.  
 
 
 
Moving forward even further in time, we must emphasize the difference between 
humans today and those (pre-agricultural and pre-literate) of even 15,000 yrs ago. It 
seems that distinctively human cognition may have emerged very recently in the 
piece. This is the thesis of human recency. I argue that the deep structure of our 
cognition (e.g. language capability, a plastic neural cortex, a set of attentional biases, 
all the paraphernalia of general purpose learning) was in place a very long time ago, 
yet we had to wait until certain contextual conditions obtained before humans like us 
actually emerged through development. The upshot of this is that development has 
                                                             
17
 It is interesting to note the geological connotations of ‘tectonic’ in Renfrew’s account, given what I 
have just said regarding Lyell’s 19
th
 century book.  
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sustained evolution for human cognition over the last handfuls of millennia. The flip 
side of this is that many novel cognitive devices could in theory disappear ‘overnight’ 
should contexts change again.  
 
Overall, this means that if we are trying to find out about human minds, then nativist 
approaches may have blind spots as we begin to approach questions pertaining to 
more recent cognition. This is a temporal constraint on method. The methods of 
Evolutionary Psychology will not work as the timeframe of interest approaches the 
Holocene boundary and into more recent times. It is clear that the emergence of 
cognitive representations for reading and driving cannot have an evolutionary genetic 
explanation. I should note here, however, that the creation of these activities may 
alter selection on genes for neural development and change experience-dependent 
gene activation patterns. It is conceivable that efficiencies in reaction speed or 
alcohol tolerance may accrue after many generations of car driving. On the other 
hand more ancient cognitive drives like mate selection and landscape preferences 
may well have a genetic foundation. I can be agnostic on such claims for now. The 
more recent a phenomenon, the more likely it is to have a constructivist explanation. 
Given this, it seems that strict nativism is ill-equipped to answer questions about the 
cognitive evolution of ritual, art, material symbols, agriculture, value, the sacred, 
long-distance trade and human rights. The more recent our domain of interest the 
more that constructivism is going to be an important explanatory tool. I am not 
endorsing a pulse or burst model of human behavioural take-off here, rather I am 
illustrating that the relevant explanations are going to be ones of degrees.  
 
A second constraint on the methodology of cognitive prehistory is the embeddedness 
constraint. Organisms exist in niches and niches (seen as relationships between 
organisms and their environments) shape both selective regimes and also 
development. Radical changes in niches, as clearly occurred in human populations 
over the last 40,000 years with the advent of art, numerical representation, literacy 
and distinctively modern culture, are likely to cause radical changes in development 
of the individual minds embedded in these niches. Radical changes in development 
can lead to radical changes in future niches thanks to the constructive efforts of 
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individuals. We must understand development in order to understand evolutionarily 
recent processes. The less genetic change that is occurring, relative to the weight of 
niche change, then the more that temporal change in developmental environments 
will explain process questions. Furthermore, we could reasonably argue that most of 
human cognitive evolution, or at least a significant chunk of it has occurred in this 
recent timeframe. Again, explaining why and how this happened explains the sapient 
paradox. I will give the framework for such an account shortly.  
 
Problem 2: The Neanderthal Extinction 
 
The next problem of prehistory is this, Neanderthals were probably a lot like us and 
yet they went extinct. There are many reasons to believe that Neanderthals 
possessed a cognitive capacity roughly equal to that of early humans. This includes a 
large cerebral cortex, a larynx indicative of language capability, and tool-making 
behaviour necessitating essentially modern cognition. The Neanderthal brain at birth 
was similar to that of modern humans, and their brains grew to over 1600cc (larger 
than ours), yet Neanderthals remained dumb nephews in comparison to the 
behavioural take-off of Homo sapiens, having apparently never mastered symbolic 
technologies despite contact with symbolic and artistically capable Homo sapiens 
(Finlayson 2004). Furthermore, Neanderthals’ last common ancestor with Homo 
sapiens was approximately 500-700,000 years ago, so Neanderthal’s cognition should 
be considerably more human-like than that of chimps (with whom we share a last 
common ancestor an order of magnitude older again). And there is reason to believe 
that encultured (but never wild-type) chimps are able to pick up symbol use (see 
chapter one) and may have a ‘language ready brain’ (Taglialatela et al. 2008, 2009).  
 
It is entirely possible that all the pre-requisite capacities for modern language (or 
indeed any cognitive trait) be evolved and available to an organism and yet there is 
no guarantee that an individual or a population of such organisms exhibit the trait. 
The right integration and developmental construction of these devices may simply 
not occur for contextual reasons. This seems to be demonstrated by the Moghul 
Emperor Akbar’s deprivation experiments. This is largely because of the cognitive re-
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tooling processes that I have outlined in chapter two (see also Lock & Peters 1996). So 
the essential capacities, the neural suite, of Neanderthals could be similar to that of 
humans, while their cognitive abilities are very different because their final 
configuration has been constructed differently in development.  
 
If we are assuming biological comparability, then the explanation for the Neanderthal 
extinction must be contextual. It is not that they lacked cognitive potential, or were 
too stupid to adapt to a changing environment. A popular account is that ecological 
context changed dramatically forcing the Neanderthals to extinction (Finlayson 2009). 
But there are also many reasons for supposing that Neanderthals, at least in their last 
millennia, lacked the appropriate developmental context for developing human-like 
minds. What Neanderthals were probably missing was the appropriate scaffolding in 
their environment to turn their human-like developmental resources into the same 
sort of minds that Homo sapiens possessed. Just like wild-type chimps lack the 
scaffolding to develop symbolic communication like their encultured contemporaries. 
The argument of this thesis is that technological culture was an important part of this 
cognitive developmental environment, though learning forms and inheritance 
mechanisms are crucial, too, as we shall see.  
 
My overall claim is that variation in the technological context of humans and 
Neanderthals explains, to some approximation, the different evolutionary trajectories 
that these two species took. The argument will be that both species constructed a 
technological niche, which had downstream effects on the development of 
subsequent generations. I will also argue that cultural technology sometimes evolves 
by Darwinian natural selection, and that adaptive cultural learnings become 
assimilated into formal educational practices over time. These three processes, when 
they work well together explain protracted behavioural take-off without appeal to 
genetic change, and when they fail these processes (or their lack) explain disastrous 
population collapse.  
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Niche Construction, Hoyle and Evolving Technological Systems 
 
Three theoretical approaches underscore the importance of human technological 
innovations for human evolution. The first is downstream niche construction, which I 
introduced in chapter three, and which I will elaborate on here. The second is analysis 
of the evolvability conditions. In this case the features that technological culture must 
exhibit in order to evolve by Darwinian means. I will take up Sterelny’s account of 
evolvability using his ‘Hoyle’ criteria. This will allow us to test cultural technological 
innovation for evolvabililty. Finally we have theories that describe the adaptive 
response of the genome over generations as organisms learn adaptive behaviours 
ontogenetically. I will discuss a cultural analogue of this process, cultural 
Baldwinization, and explain how it can occur and cause important cultural 
technological innovation to become part of the package of cultural inheritance 
reliably passed from one generation to the next. I take each of these concepts in turn 
and then move on to resolve the two puzzles of prehistory that I have just introduced.  
 
Downstream Niche Construction 
 
As well as supporting cognitive function by extending minds (see chapter three), 
niche construction activities can have downstream consequences and hence there 
can be an ecological inheritance. For example, humans typically live with their 
parents and benefit from their ecological engineering (Sterelny 2003). This may 
include shelter, educational resources or a productive agricultural environment. This 
ecological engineering is often cumulative. We saw in chapter three that organisms 
(beavers, meerkats, humans) actively construct their environments and that this has 
consequences for development and function. However, niche construction also has 
implications for evolution. A lot of niche construction is transmission of information 
acquired by the parent (Stotz 2010) (perhaps from the previous generation). But a lot 
of niche construction is information created by the parent. Each generation can add 
to and improve the ecological inheritance. This often includes adding to the 
accumulating knowledge-base of the social group. The Cambridge University tutorial 
example I gave in chapter three is a nice instance of this sort of process. Much of 
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human niche construction is this sort of ‘epistemic engineering’, which alters the 
informational character of the environment. This can transform problem spaces for 
learning (by transforming the developmental environment) or for functioning (by 
providing external supports for cognition) in ways that aid thinking and reasoning 
(Clark 2008, Sterelny 2003).  
 
As I’ve already mentioned with the emergence of the lactase gene in farming 
populations, and potentially with the car-driving example, niche construction 
activities can alter selective environments so that different selective pressures on 
genes arise. Even if the brain develops in constructive fashion and cognitive devices 
are not genetically pre-specified, then adjustments to genes can still result in growth, 
development, and functional, efficiencies. Developmental niche construction will 
always entail the possibility of selective niche construction too18.  
 
However niches require resources and effort to sustain them, particularly if 
technology needs to be continually reproduced or maintained. Stotz writes that such 
‘exogenetic legacies demand continuous behavioural effort to maintain their value’, 
(Stotz 2010, p. 491). In light of this we see that developmental niches and the 
affordances that they provide are not inherited as surely as genes. This is especially 
true with technological culture that requires human input for its maintenance. If the 
conditions that sustain the technology or niche begin to erode, then the 
developmental effects of the niche will erode too. My children will only inherit my 
house as shelter so long as I work to maintain its upkeep. If I am otherwise occupied, 
say in herding cattle on dry barren land, and struggling to provide food, then this 
potential ecological inheritance is lost. We will see shortly that this feature of 
ecological inheritance has particular relevance for explaining the Neanderthal 
extinction.  
 
We can distinguish between education and mere development. Some niche 
construction is intended by members of the previous generation to bring about 
                                                             
18 This entailment is strong. There are not two or more versions of niche construction (selective and 
developmental) as some authors (e.g. Stotz 2010) have suggested. Such distinctions give the 
appearance of controversy where none exists (or none ought to exist). 
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certain bodies of knowledge. This is called education. Many examples of intentional, 
formal, education abound, one need only look to the software programs I have 
already outlined, which help to bring about critical thinking, programming skills, or 
literacy. Other niche construction just happens to have certain developmental effects 
on offspring (or indeed the generation which created it) these are unintended 
developmental effects. An example of this might be the way that complex media 
contributes to rising IQ scores, or changes to self-representation are brought about 
by the use of virtual worlds.  
 
So niche construction activities can sometimes have important adaptive 
developmental effects when they are sustained. But how are they sustained? I will 
give two examples now, one where developmental environments are sustained 
because cultural technology evolves adaptations. The second is where constructed 
niches are sustained because information that was once learned by trial and error by 
individuals becomes assimilated into the formal epistemic inheritance of the next 
generation through education.  
 
Hoyle and Evolvability 
 
If there was some innovation, X, that altered the functional or developmental context 
of human brains, then we could see psychological trait change in a population. If X 
causes psychology that lowers fitness, then we would expect X to vanish from the 
population all else being equal. For example, cults tend to arise spontaneously, 
indoctrinate their members with bizarre beliefs and desires and then vanish rapidly 
because the psychology they create tends to be maladaptive. We could even see a 
sequence of different innovations, X, Y, Z... over time as new spontaneous 
innovations arise and vanish. However, if X enhances fitness, then we would expect X 
to proliferate, all else being equal. For example a writing system allows users to make 
lists and hence remember much more than they otherwise could. Such innovations 
tend to persist. Furthermore, if X is evolvable, and the effect of X is not at a fitness 
optimum, then we would expect X to evolve over time toward a fitness optimum, if 
there is one. 
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Niche construction activities aside, environmental conditions are not shaped by 
selection, so we don’t ordinarily talk about an environment for phenotype X with 
respect to natural selection19.  Environments are not seen to be evolvable in the same 
way that genes are. But why are genes evolvable? Sterelny (2001) offers some 
suggestions. If Hoyle and Co. (evolution engineers) were employed to construct an 
evolvable system what features would it need? Firstly, an inheritance mechanism is of 
prime importance. What is inherited may be called the replicators, and the system 
needs to have an anti-outlaw mechanism to prevent maverick replicators going it 
alone. Next, there must be stability from generation to generation. Inheritance must 
be of high fidelity, with redundancies built in to the system and a stable context for 
the inheritance mechanism to operate in. Finally, the system must generate variety. 
But, there has to be a smooth map from the nature of the replicator to the 
organization it causes. The variety must be modular in nature, and be especially open 
to duplication. This rough characterization of the Hoyle criteria will do for now. I will 
assume that the Hoyle criteria are what is required for evolvability. Genes, it is 
argued, possess almost a ‘Full Hoyle’ (note that representation or information are not 
part of the Hoyle criteria), and therefore genes can sustain an evolvable system. It is 
on the basis of these criteria that genes have an important relationship to 
evolutionary processes. 
 
In the case of genes there is argued to be an appropriate Hoyle relation between 
genetic replicators and phenotypic organization. Is there a Hoyle relation between 
cultural technologies and psychological traits? It has become apparent that changes 
in human technologies can change the developmental context for cognition. We can 
see different cognition in different contexts. But can cultural technological change 
evolve new cognition?  
 
                                                             
19
 Kitcher accepts that there are ‘environments for’ as well as ‘genes for’ traits. But when challenged to 
say that environments ‘code’ for traits he dismisses talk of genetic coding as a rhetorical flourish that 
plays no part in explanation (Godfrey-Smith 1999). Hopefully my arguments in chapter four against the 
notion of genetic information make sense of this claim.  
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It is perfectly clear that much culture is not Hoyley. Lots of culture is not reliably 
inherited, it is the innovation of individual agents and it passes with them (of course 
this does not mean it can’t influence cognitive development, just that it won’t cause 
cumulative evolution of psychological traits). Other culture is inherited, but is so 
transformed as to be almost unrecognizable, such fashions, trends, and general 
contingencies pervade cultures. Other culture is inherited, and reproduced reliably. 
Writing systems are a good example of this.  
 
I am arguing that some cultural technologies, in particular some educational and 
symbolic systems flow in Hoyley fashion through cultural lineages. Some educational 
technologies (in particular) scaffold the socialization, development, and learning of 
students, and so play an important role in generating those who then make further 
educational technologies and pass them on to others. Educational technologies often 
enhance the biological fitness of agents. Think of master-apprentice relationships in 
stone tool knapping. Students often learn from more than one source and so we see 
duplication of the educational source. This means that one teacher can experiment 
with innovation without risking too much. This is particularly apparent in the 
Cambridge tutorial system’s evolution. The tutors were free to innovate and yet the 
students would continue to learn physics from the university itself. The inclusion of 
different symbol systems, different disciplines, different teaching regimes, artifacts, 
other technologies, and so on, makes education a highly modular and mutable 
system. There is great stability of some education institutions over time. There is 
material overlap that can scaffold reproduction of the cultural technology. There are 
redundancies in the systems, and the steady shift in human IQ over the twentieth 
century suggests a smooth map between education technologies (or the learning 
environment) and cognitive effects. Indeed, educational technologies as a replicator 
set seem to be a prime candidate for Hoyleyness if anything is. Cultural inheritance is 
not effected through a homogenous channel, and some channels are more Hoyley 
than others.  
 
If we think about the effect that cultural technologies have on the developing mind, 
such as the effect that playing a violent game like ‘Grand Theft Auto’, or other role-
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playing war scenarios, has on aggression, then we shed light on an important 
relationship between cultural technologies and cognition. I am suggesting that if the 
Hoyle criteria (or something similar) are the right way to characterize what it means 
to be an evolvable system, then cultural technologies may be important in the 
evolution, and adaptation, not just the development of the mind. Furthermore, if 
culture is an inheritance system that allows us to speak of culture ‘for’ some cognitive 
phenotype, then culture is not just materially important in extending the sapient 
mind, and is not just developmentally important as a changing milieu, but is 
evolutionarily important in explaining complex cognitive adaptation. I now want to 
give one concrete example of this process in action. I turn to the evolution of writing 
systems. 
 
Case Study: The Evolution of Writing Systems 
 
Many authors argue that human culture, at least in many instances, evolves by 
Darwinian natural selection (Cavelli-Sforza & Feldman 1981; Boyd & Richerson 1985; 
Richerson & Boyd 2005; Dennett 1995; Mesoudi et al. 2006; Shennan 2009). Those 
who study writing systems have argued whether or not writing is a case in point. 
Some fiercely reject the idea (e.g. Barton & Hamilton 1996, Houston 2004). Others 
have been more sympathetic (e.g. Trigger 2004; Changizi and Shimojo 2005; Skelton 
2008). At times debate has been ill conceived because of confusion over what the 
notion of a writing system ‘evolving’ actually entails. There are at least three distinct 
theses intended when it is suggested that writing systems evolved. First, it may 
merely be meant that culture changes over time. This sort of evolution is surely 
trivially true (this still leaves culture as an important developmental cause as I have 
argued to this point). Second, it might be meant that some goal-oriented or 
progressive process is at work. Third, and as it is conceived in this chapter, cultural 
evolution is at least in some instances a Darwinian process. That is, culture evolves 
when there is descent of cultural traits, with modification, modulated by a process of 
selection.  
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Writing systems seem to have a good chance of sastisfying the Hoyle conditions. 
Inheritance can be demonstrated using phylogenetic systematics (Skelton 2008, see 
figure 23). Linear B was a writing system used to keep economic records on clay 
tablets on the Greek mainland and on Crete between 1450 and 1200 BCE. Skelton 
notes that palaeographic techniques, in which differences in sign form are used to 
judge how closely two writing traditions are related, have been employed in 
discussions of the evolution of linear B. However Skelton then adapts phylogenetic 
systematics to evaluate this paleographic evidence. Taking the nuances of scribal 
hands as data, and applying the algorithms of phylogenetic systematics he infers the 
relations between scribal hands. Overall Skelton finds that when the data are 
analysed with criterion for finding the optimally parsimonious phylogenetic tree, the 
tree produced is largely consistent with the historical context of Linear B. This 
includes lending support to the existing theory that two scribal hands found at Pylos 
pre-date other materials from that site. 
 
The scribal hands in Skelton’s analysis show variety. The fidelity of inheritance is high, 
writing systems are reproduced with great accuracy and are stable across time. In 
some cases more than ten per cent of cunieform texts are lexical texts, or instructions 
for future scribes to learn and use the system accurately (Cooper 2004). Great 
attention is paid to reproducing the systems correctly, as is evidenced by the 
attention to detail teachers pay to students’ handwriting in junior classes. Ensuring 
that a script survives necessitates teachers and apprentices (Houston 2004). This 
requires a high bandwidth of social inheritance, but writing also massively enhances 
bandwidth, so we see a ratchet effect. Writing down writing systems enhances 
stability. Past markings can act as templates for future markings. Writing systems are 
modular, elements can change or be assembled piecemeal. Written numerical 
notations are independent of written logograms, and these in turn are independent 
of the graphical representation of speech, or diagrams, or punctuation marks. Finally, 
there is a smooth map between many different forms of writing systems and the 
abilities that users of the systems can possess (as I have argued when discussing the 
functional extension of information processing loops in chapter three). So there 
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seems to be a case for at least one cultural technology (writing) satisfying at least one 
set of criteria for evolvability (Hoyleyness). 
 
 
Figure 23: Phylogeny of Linear B (Skelton 2008) 
 
Cultural ‘Genetic’ Assimilation 
 
Humans construct developmental niches. These can in turn be selective on genes. 
Human technology, which forms a part of the developmental niche, can evolve in 
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Hoyley fashion. But, humans also learn to figure things out themselves, and learn 
adaptive behaviours by trial and error. If populations happen upon good tricks via this 
method then two things are likely to happen. There could be genetic selection for 
features of brains that enhance the tendency to acquire the good trick. And the good 
trick is likely to be assimilated over time into the cultural inheritance of that 
population, so that individuals won’t need to waste energy learning it for themselves.  
 
There may be some technology, which is learnable on one’s own (say, the innovation 
of notching a stick to track the full moon), which enhances psychological trait fitness, 
such as memory. In an innovating population we would expect some members of the 
population to learn this technology. If the technological innovation really does 
enhance psychological trait fitness, then we would expect, over time, the technology 
to become a part of cultural inheritance.  
 
Isaac Newton experimented with cultural technology and composed a set of technical 
signs, symbols and rules for mathematically describing the world. Subsequent to 
Newton, this set of signs and rules became a standard component of the school 
curriculum and has been taught to a great many students. It has in a sense become 
part of the cultural DNA of our developmental environments. This instance is a 
cultural analogue of the general evolutionary process known as genetic assimilation, 
of which the Baldwin effect is a well known example.  
 
Genetic assimilation occurs when a population is initially occupying one environment, 
although there is an unexpressed genetic capacity for plasticity. When the 
environment changes the pre-existing capacity for plasticity allows the population to 
adapt through novel phenotypic expression without any genetic change. The new 
phenotype may then become genetically fixed or assimilated (Pigliucci et al. 2006). I 
will give two specific instances of this general effect. First the Baldwin effect, and 
then Avital and Jablonka’s (2000) ‘assimilate and stretch’ model.  
 
The Baldwin effect (see West-Eberhard 2003, Sterelny 2004) occurs when a 
population encounters a novel adaptive problem and initially overcomes it thanks to 
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adaptive phenotypic plasticity, often in the form of learning to solve the adaptive 
problem during ontogeny. Efficient development of the successful trait is then 
selected for and over time development of the trait with less experience or 
environmental input emerges because of genetic evolution favouring ease of 
acquisition of the trait. At the limit the trait develops in the absence of experience. 
This process could play a role in shifting privileged causation from external to internal 
factors hence increasing the degree to which a cognitive trait has internal, stable, 
heritable, privileged causes (see chapter seven).  
 
Avital and Jablonka (2000), and Jablonka and Lamb (2005a), characterize a process 
they label ‘assimilate and stretch’. In these cases both the trait and the environment 
are transformed, perhaps continuously. The environment may change first, and as 
above, the trait changes through pre-existing plasticity mechanisms. But then a 
related trait, for example a correlated behaviour, can be conditionally expressed with 
much higher probability. In some cases the genetic assimilation of a behaviour, which 
would have been laborious to learn by individual trial and error, leaves resources 
available for learning still further adaptive phenotypes. These in turn can also be 
assimilated genetically.  
 
If cultures are evolvable, they are also open to Baldwinian and ‘assimilate and stretch’ 
processes. If a trait is successful and it can be more efficiently taught than learned, 
then there will be selection for more efficient teaching of the trait. At the limit the 
trait is learned from teachers (perhaps in complex formal fashion complete with 
structured exercises) without unstructured experimentation by the agent alone. For 
example, in the 1970s and 1980s computer skills were largely learned by innovative 
individual trial and error. Some mix of inputs, largely drawing on informal learning 
with only a minor contribution from formal learning accounted for the development 
of computer skills. Over time computer skills have proved to be adaptive in our 
current environment and over time the mix of inputs, which generate computer skills 
has shifted to include more and more formal teaching to the point where almost all 
primary school children get instruction in computer use. This could be seen as cultural 
as opposed to genetic Baldwinism.  
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Remember the IQ rises discussed in chapter one. Over the 20th century people have 
generally become less cognitively linked to the concrete and more flexible and able to 
manipulate abstract ideas. Importantly technologies like teaching, textbooks, syllabi, 
and software applications are all cultural objects that are inherited and open to 
natural selection. Over time such technologies that cause useful cognitive skills to 
develop ought to be selected for and refined. It doesn’t matter whether or not 
increased fluid cognitive ability enhances human biological fitness, if it is something 
we value as a society then the mechanisms that produce it will persist and spread.20 
The ongoing Flynn Effect could be seen as cultural as opposed to genetic ‘assimilate 
and stretch.’  
 
Let’s look at writing systems again. Once some practice such as written accounting is 
invented and employed by human agents, and is subsequently proven to be of value, 
then the learning of the practice often finds its way into the domain of formal 
education. We see examples of this in ancient times. Neugebauer (1935) describes 
the VAT 8528 tablet, on which is posed the following question: 
If I lent one mina of silver at the rate of 12 shekels (1/60 of a mina) per year, and I 
received in repayment one talent (60 minas) and 4 minas, how long did the money 
accumulate? 
 
This is clearly a pedagogic tool with the intention of helping students learn the skill 
that has been proven to be of value. The processes that led to this type of lesson 
existing are probably similar to those that drove the revolution in mathematical 
physics at Cambridge, and the effects of this sort of activity are probably analagous to 
the effects on IQ of the neurodevelopmental schooling approach to the Flynn Effect.  
 
Genetic assimilation, whether Baldwinian or ‘assimilate and stretch’, or some other 
mechanism, modifies the genome. In this thesis I will use the terms ‘cultome’ and 
‘teachome’ to designate cultural processes that are both evolvable and that cause the 
development of cognitive traits. An example of the cultome would be the existence of 
                                                             
20
 If the resulting trait is fitness decreasing and spreads because it is valued, then cultural group 
selection is likely to select against groups with such values.  
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number words and examples of the teachome would be particular syllabi in 
educational systems. Schools become a set of learning outcome facilitators providing 
a set of learning objects in order that students acquire important cognitive skills. 
Formal education seems like a reliable inheritance system. It also seems formally 
modular, and therefore evolvable.  
 
Teachers modify their behaviour to ensure that the required trait is learned. What 
was previously learned by an individual’s adaptive plasticity is moved to the 
teachome. There is an ‘assimilation of past agents’ trial and error’ process in the 
construction of education systems, which allows a lineage to ‘look’ to the future. This 
allows a more rapid, though less stable (more fragile), cognitive evolution than is 
possible by genetic assimilation. Learning may indeed find solutions that evolution 
never would. These innovations can then be further entrenched either genetically via 
the classical Baldwin effect, or in cultural technologies via teachome effects21. 
 
I have spent the first half of this chapter introducing the Sapient Paradox and the 
Neanderthal extinction. I have also outlined three ways in which technological culture 
can be of relevance not just to developmental outcomes, but also to evolutionary 
trajectories. These three ways are: cumulative downstream niche construction 
processes, the evolvabiltiy of technological and pedagogic culture, and a cultural 
analogue of the ‘assimilate and stretch’, or Baldwin process of genetic 
accommodation. With all this in mind, let’s move on to explain the two problems of 
pre-history.  
 
Explanation 1: The Sapient Paradox 
 
I will now demonstrate how niche construction, the evolvability of pedagogic and 
symbolic culture, and cultural assimilation processes explain both the sapient paradox 
and the Neanderthal extinction. The sapient paradox is resolved by understanding the 
                                                             
21
 Elements of culture upon which these sorts of processes act will become cultural analogues of Shea’s 
‘genes-P’, which we encountered in chapter four. The culture will persist because of its relationship 
with the trait being selected for. Hence, the elements of culture acquire teleofunctions and feature in 
phylogenetic explanations.  
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effect of an increasingly complex technological and symbolic environment, and 
accumulating changes to pedagogic methods and content.  
 
Sproull and Kiesler (1992a, 1992b) describe two levels of effects of technologies. First 
level effects are those that are planned and often efficiencies gained go hand in hand 
with offsetting consequences. Second level effects result in unpredictable and 
uncontrolled technology use and are associated with changes in social practice and 
social contexts. New technology can therefore lead to a new way of thinking by 
fundamentally changing how people work and interact with others. Something as 
simple as using ochre for camouflage may have effected this, as it was then co-opted 
as a signal of group identity. New technologies may have important unexpected 
cognitive effects. Furthermore, cultural technologies have their developmental 
effects not only, indeed not even mainly, in the generation that constructs them. 
Cultural technologies can affect the cognitive development of the next (and 
subsequent) generations. This is cumulative downstream niche construction. None of 
these resulting cognitive skills appeared at the same time as anatomical moderns. 
They were necessarily subsequent to the emergence of Homo sapiens.  
 
If we think that the first sapiens were not cognitively like moderns, then what 
happened? One approach is to see the invention and use of physical symbols as a key 
change. Some have argued that this is some sort of mark of fully sophisticated 
modern cognition. However, it may be a cause of such cognition. There exist at least 
two different kinds of symbolism, ‘physical symbols’ are not a homogenous category. 
There are symbols that have a physical function, such as dyeing one’s body with 
ochre, this both camouflages and marks an individual as a member of a group. And 
then there are purely abstract symbols such as glyphs:  
 
‘understood one way, the ability of a mind to use and understand symbols really is a 
signature of cognitive sophistication. But those are not the symbols used in group 
self-identity, and hence are not the symbols whose presence becomes obvious in the 
Upper Paleolithic and Late Stone Age.’ (Sterelny 2011, p. 63).  
 
As a ‘signature of cognitive sophistication’, writing emerged only after the social 
problem space in which it was required existed. Similarly, the appearance of ochre, 
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beads and other public ‘symbols’, are an effect of demographic and social change. 
People only need to badge their identity once their social worlds become dense 
enough. Nevertheless once effected, these features of the developmental 
environment would almost certainly start driving new forms of cognition as we saw 
with number words for example.  
 
An example of the prehistoric symbolic storage of important information is the 
Montgaudier baton (10,000 b.p.). This is an engraved antler segment from inland in 
southwest France (figure 24).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: The Montgaudier Baton 
 
The baton depicts particular spring plants, notably a flower which can be identified. In 
addition, in this view, a bull and cow seal are depicted, along with a male salmon with 
the characteristic hooked bottom jaw it develops having begun its spawning run 
upstream from the Atlantic. The salmon's run coincides with seals congregating on 
beaches for breeding, both these events occurring in spring. The baton can thus be 
'read' as containing the message, 'when these plants appear it is time to journey 
down river to the sea for good hunting' (Lock & Gers 2011). It is important to note 
that you cannot simply draw this without considerable practice in acquiring the skills 
for drawing in the first place. Think how long children must spend engaging with 
crayon and chalk technologies in order to draw rudimentary drawings let alone 
realistic representations. Note how the pictures on the baton contribute to enhancing 
fidelity of cross-generational adaptive information flow, and also act as 
developmental resources for children learning how to use symbolism. So some 
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innovation, which was learned by an individual, is now assimilated into a formal 
structure and can be taught to subsequent agents. These descendents can then 
stretch the knowledge, and it can be further assimilated into the teachome.  
 
The sapient paradox is the Flynn Effect writ large. In our contemporary world IQ 
increases may originally have caused increased complexity of popular media, or the 
increases may be driven by it, but either way the ratchet will begin. I propose that an 
analogous cognitive, not merely cultural, ratchet got underway with the emergence 
of moderns 100,000 years ago. New technology emerged due to accumulation (such 
as ways, and then new and better ways, to make weapons) and larger databases of 
know-how and facts about the physical and biological world could be preserved such 
as migration patterns (e.g. the baton above, perhaps cave art as well). But also, as 
well as quantitative accumulation of cognitive capital, there would have been 
significant cognitive change. A new suite of possibilities would have opened for Homo 
sapiens. This is almost certainly the case when we remember the new cognitive 
abilities gained by those lucky enough to develop in a context of number words, or 
rich social media, or external memory storage devices. And taking into account the 
features of evolvable systems that I have described above, the Hoyleyness of some 
forms of culture, the possibility of assimilation of important causes of cognitive 
development into the cultome and teachome, then this explains recent cognitive 
evolution and adaptation as well. These models are important and relevant even for 
us today because they point to our capacity for change (Gamble, 2007, p. 34). 
 
Symbolism does not mark the sudden emergence of cognitive modernity, but it drives 
cognitive modernity. ‘There is no other technological advance whose effects on 
human history rival those of this one’ (Nickerson, 2005, p. 25). Nickerson catalogues a 
host of cognitive amplification devices such as slide rules and memory aids, all of 
which amplify our capabilities. Sometimes these scaffold cognition, sometimes they 
form proper parts of cognitive systems. There are good reasons to believe that there 
was not a burst of cultural and behavioural take off, rather, the gradual, accelerating 
and distributed appearance of the signs of behavioural modernity in the 
archaeological record suggests a more diffuse and patchy build up. New privileged 
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causes of cognitive traits (such as ochre, art, tallys, symbols and teaching methods) 
emerged piecemeal and with increasing frequency and impact after we became 
anatomically modern.  
 
Trial and error, which has always been important, can result in lucky accidents that 
become regular events in generation N+1. A classic example of this is potato washing 
in the macaque monkey (Avital & Jablonka 2000). Just like genetic mutations, cultural 
mutations can drive evolution. This coupled with high fidelity, high bandwidth 
inheritance explains human uniqueness and also cultural diversity. Anatomically 
modern Homo sapiens did not emerge pre-equipped with the results of trial and error 
learning and experimentation. They needed to actually undertake the process. And 
over time changing and accumulating technological and symbolic innovations 
changed the developmental context for their children. Once this began to happen 
new cognition was born.  
 
Traditional views of cognitive evolution were that complex culture was the product of 
a new mind. And that a new mind was the product of a new genome. But the delay 
between achieving modern brain size and the arrival of truly complex culture casts 
doubt on this as sole explanation. Similarly, the glimpses of symbolic thought and 
linguistic ability in primates suggests that cultural thought may not be uniquely 
human anyway (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986). Recent authors (Mithen, 2000; 
Renfrew, 2008) have noted that through material engagement of various sorts 
(especially with symbols) humans have enhanced their cognitive capacities by 
forming new extended systems, which constitute cognition (see chapter three). 
Material culture is not just the product of a new brain, but it is part of a new mind. 
One causal channel that hasn’t been much emphasized in the literature, however, is 
that material culture and cultural technologies are also the cause of a new brain.  
 
As I have explained in chapters one and two, cultural technologies are not only 
produced by brains, and not only extend brains, but they also alter brains through 
developmental processes. Renfrew (2008), Mithen (2000), Donald (1991), Sterelny 
(2011), and others tend to only emphasize two, or two and a half of these processes. 
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The creation of culture is emphasized, as is the integration of culture and minds 
(Donald’s external memory field). But less is said about the changing developmental 
context and the altered cognitive development of the next generation. This is 
certainly consistent with some of these models, but more seems to be said about 
accumulating epistemic features of culture. As well as being useful in their own right 
such cultural technologies as games, role-plays, notching to record quantities, story-
telling, marking days or seasons, formal teaching, accounting, body adornment for 
institutional reasons, richer language, painting, and so on are all likely to have effects 
on the cognitive development of those children exposed to them (consider all the 
effects of cultural technologies on cognitive development we encountered in chapter 
one, and the mechanism underlying them discussed in chapter two). In fact the 
importance of child development for the evolution of cognition probably can’t be 
emphasized enough (see Bjorkland 2007). 
 
Donald’s model of the origins of our modern mind is one of punctuated radical 
change. There are three transitions. First is the emergence of mimesis (the ability to 
voluntarily retrieve a stored motor memory). This allows any voluntary action to be 
stopped, replayed, edited, and performed without the presence of contextual cues. 
The second change in Donald’s progression is language. The third transition, and the 
one I am most focused on in this section, is the ‘externalization of memory’.  This 
evolutionary move is a technological innovation, and hence entirely cultural, whereas 
the previous two transitions were biological. There is well documented evidence of 
visuo-symbolic culture appearing throughout the Upper Paleolithic. Donald argues 
that the effects of this externalization of memory would be four-fold. It is in these 
details that we start to see a hint of the effects of cultural technologies on brain 
development. 
1. There were now radical new properties in collective storage and retrieval 
systems. 
2. There had to be a major redeployment of cerebral resources towards 
establishing ‘literacy’ ‘modules’ in the brain. This has to come at a cost, 
remember the light patterns shone into chicks’ eggs in chapter two. 
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3. The physiological basis for this reorganization lies in neuronal epigenesis and 
plasticity (explained in chapter two). 
4. The role of biological working memory is forever changed.  
 
Hopefully chapter one illustrated that radical changes could have accumulated in 
many domains not just memory and literacy. Affect, concepts of number, attention, 
all sorts of cognitive devices would start to change with radical technological change. 
Donald’s net can be cast wide. 
 
We are context-dependent individuals, and thanks to cumulative niche construction 
and ‘assimilate and stretch’ phenomena, we are therefore a moving target of 
cognitive investigation. This is largely because it is our ‘basic human nature to annex, 
exploit, and incorporate non-biological stuff deep into our mental profiles’ (Clark 
2003, p. 198). Such non-biological causes of our cognitive profiles include ochre, cave 
art, symbols, and more recently tutorial notes, mathematical syllabi, social network 
site layouts, and digital avatars. The Sapient Paradox continues even today. There are 
many other potential examples, it has been argued that SMS messaging is driving a 
linguistic renaissance. The explosion in font diversity leads us to interpret words as 
feelings not just having semantic content. And the emergence of emoticons  is 
bringing a different sort of symbol, sometimes animated, to our lexicon. These are all 
individually small changes, but small ongoing changes are the foundation of Lyell’s 
geological explanations. Once cultural technologies are in place those which are 
highly Hoyley can evolve adaptations. Further efficiencies can be gained in the 
learning process through Baldwinian and assimilation effects. Cognitive 
improvements can accumulate without genetic change.  
 
My cultural technological account is not the final word. There are a host of different 
factors all contributing to explaining the sapient take-off. New learning dynamics and 
social transitions enable the accumulation of cultural technologies. Sterelny (2011) 
proposes that the transition to behavioural modernity was a multifactorial process 
that basically had the effect of increasing fidelity and bandwidth of cross-generational 
information transfer. His model argues for the importance of longer periods in a 
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juvenile learning state, the expansion of material culture, changes to the social 
environment that permitted information pooling and teaching, and further evolution 
of adaptations for cultural learning. These disparate processes combine to form a 
feed-forward loop, which once it begins to establish, further elaborates. A key piece 
in the puzzle for Sterelny is the rise of apprentice learning from a milieu of what was 
previously mere trial and error learning. I am not denying that such mechanisms have 
an important role to play. But it is a role that frequently uses technology as leverage 
in cognitive development.  
 
Those skeptical of this kind of story may object that Neanderthals pose a problem for 
the theory. Neanderthals probably possessed roughly the same cognitive resources as 
Homo sapiens and were probably endowed with similar degrees of neural plasticity. 
Why did they die out while humans were using their high bandwidth, high fidelity 
cultural inheritance and apprentice learning to prosper? 
 
Explanation 2: The Neanderthal Extinction 
 
The last Neanderthal went extinct approximately 28,000 years ago (Finlayson et al. 
2006). There are many hypotheses pertaining to the extinction of the Neanderthals. 
They can be broadly grouped into competition, hostility, assimilation, and climatic 
causes. The lack of clear data suggests that assimilation with sapiens is unlikely. 
However it is not clear whether Neanderthals simply failed to adapt to the dramatic 
climatic pressures of the last glacial maximum, or were outcompeted by early 
moderns, perhaps lacking some cognitive or behavioural advantage. In favour of the 
climatic approach is the argument that even combining sapiens and Neanderthal 
population numbers the species were below the carrying capacity of the environment 
(Finlayson 2004). Climatic explanations are also the most parsimonious (Stewart 
2006). So let’s assume this basic structure is the right way to approach the 
Neanderthal extinction. The idea here is that whether or not there was some 
cognitive deficiency Neanderthals possessed when compared to sapiens, that other 
factors can entirely explain the disappearance of Neanderthals. Climatic or ecological 
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models seem to apply especially if Neanderthals and sapiens were allopatric, living in 
non-overlapping geographical areas. 
 
I want to further assume that Neanderthals possessed similar anatomical, neural and 
genetic resources to Homo sapiens. My aim is to show that there can be a cognitive 
explanation for the Neanderthals’ demise, even if they are demonstrated to have had 
similar potential to humans, and even if climate plays a significant role. Indeed, 
Finlayson (2004), Zilhao (2010), and Sterelny (2011) play down any possible cognitive 
differences between Neanderthals and sapiens.  
 
Sterelny (2011) doesn’t want to posit cognitive differences with sapiens as explaining 
the Neanderthal extinction. He thinks that rather than a cognitive/competitive 
explanation (e.g. Mithen 2005, O’Connell 2006) there is an ecological/social 
explanation: 
 
‘I think it quite likely that *Neanderthals+ were pushed over the brink by negative 
feedback loops between demography and environment. These loops eroded the 
preconditions of high volume social learning.’ (Sterelny 2011, p. 75) 
 
This explanation is both parsimonious and avoids the problem of invisible evidence 
that cognitive explanations suffer from. In a nutshell the climate changed, forcing 
Neanderthals to marginal geographical locations. The choice to retreat seemed better 
because to adapt to a way of life other than ambush hunting with no sexual division 
of labour would mean crossing a fitness valley that was too risky an option. Existing in 
new refuges (which still had the carrying capacity to support them) meant the 
Neanderthals were very vulnerable, this is because smaller group numbers struggled 
to retain skill bases, specialization, and the redundancy required to transmit culture 
successfully. The social and information network was disrupted. Fidelity and 
bandwidth decreased due to ecological pressure and social disruption, and the great 
adaptation of the Neanderthals (i.e. their ability to transmit culture so effectively) 
became their biggest problem. They were dependent on culture and technology 
which was no longer able to be transmitted effectively. Even chance encounters with 
contemporaries and the possibility of horizontal transmission couldn’t help because 
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the required skills need years of practice and close living to obtain. The ratchet took a 
dive and eventually fizzled out. In the language of this chapter the Hoyle qualities of 
Neanderthal culture decayed, and fragile know-how that had been culturally 
Baldwinized fell apart, no need to posit cognitive differences between Neanderthal 
and sapiens.  
 
However, I have spent much of this thesis arguing that even when the same basic 
resources are available, agents’ cognition can vary markedly due to contextual 
factors. It is on this basis that it is unlikely that the cognition of recent (say 10,000 
years ago) Homo sapiens was the same as that of those alive 100,000 years ago. It 
also seems unlikely that the general cognition of Neanderthals just prior to their 
extinction even remotely resembled that which they possessed a few millennia 
earlier. This is because Neanderthal social structure and technology, and hence their 
general context of development was in disarray by that point. If significant cognitive 
differences did not exist between sapiens and Neanderthals at the beginning of the 
extinction sequence, then they almost certainly did at the end of it. My further claim 
is that as soon as Neanderthal cognition began to become impoverished due to an 
impoverished social and technological environment then this would have driven a 
negative feedback loop that further eroded cognitive capability. I will now give 
further details along these lines.  
 
One question is this, if Neanderthals did have contact with sapiens (as some accounts 
suggest) and they were an equally as intelligent species, why did Neanderthals not 
realise full symbolic potential? Neanderthals were probably pre-adapted for 
symbolism. Indeed they possessed rudimentary symbolic practices. Zilhao et al. 
(2010) claim to have found Neanderthal shell jewellery, and they probably used ochre 
as well, although this may just have been as camouflage. Given the right 
developmental conditions fully abstract symbolic thought could probably have arisen. 
Neanderthals it seems lagged somewhat behind Homo sapiens in the invention of 
several key technologies. These include representational symbolism (there are no 
known Neanderthal cave paintings for example), and probably lacked significant 
division of labour.  
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Once the concept of abstract representation really took hold in humans then there 
was a burst of cultural invention. We see the same phenomena with writing systems 
and mathematical systems. There have been a lot of refinements of the cultural 
anchors for our mathematical cognition. Chinese, Indian and European systems of 
math had their different limitations, but the European system has kept evolving at a 
rapid pace once it was realized that there was control of levels of abstraction (e.g. i 
for the square root of negative numbers). This sort of thing may explain why 
Neanderthals may have failed to evolve symbols. Once the process is underway it is 
an exponential ratchet, but it takes deep insight to get it off the ground. And even if 
they had lots of contact with Homo sapiens, Neanderthals who didn’t understand yet 
what symbols or representations were would not be able to grasp their significance.  
 
Had Neanderthal developed symbolic thought a few millennia earlier this may well 
have been a catalyst to a host of inventions that could have eased the ecological 
pressure. This could have happened through externalizing memory (perhaps cave 
art), facilitating calendars (the Montgaudier baton), trade, supporting teaching, and 
so on. However in order to pick up symbolism (and all which that entails such as cave 
art, number concepts, and so on) from sapiens, then the right Neanderthals (children) 
needed to come into extended (months/years) contact with the right sapiens. It takes 
a long time to learn to draw or use notches for numbers. And it must occur at the 
right stage of development (as Akbar’s deprived children demonstrate). Furthermore, 
if sapiens were indifferent to the existence of Neanderthals then simple observational 
learning on the part of Neanderthals would probably not do. For it is difficult to even 
understand the target of learning if you are not aware of what a symbol is. Indeed, it 
may simply be that the two species only met quite rarely, as there is little firm 
evidence of regular interaction (Sterelny 2011). There are many contingencies that 
may explain why humans currently exist everywhere on the planet and Neanderthals 
are extinct. 
 
Had it not been for rapid cognitive evolution in part caused by the invention of 
symbolism and rich language, sapiens may have gone extinct too. The Hoyley nature 
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of their newfound explicit teaching-apprentice setup and the process of cultural 
Baldwinization meant that they could track environmental changes in adaptive ways. 
Homo sapiens, I argue, were cognitively just leading the Neanderthals when the 
climatic problems hit. This was not due to any inherent difference in genes, neurons, 
anatomy or other such developmental resources, but due to the slight lag in 
Neanderthal technology and symbolic mastery. This was enough to make all the 
difference in their ability to adapt. The start of the downward spiral suffered by 
Neanderthals (which in all likelihood was triggered ecologically) degraded the Hoyley 
nature of their cultural system, and the pace of change meant that genetic evolution 
could not produce minds adapted to the new circumstances.  
 
Neanderthals by 50,000 years ago were a ‘species under stress’ (Sterelny, 2011, p. 
75). Ecological changes, including massive glaciation, had driven the population into a 
scattering of small refuges. Once confined to small populations due to ecological 
changes, the Neanderthals’ social, encultured life-way became a hindrance to 
survival. Hunting became dangerous and less effective, shorter life-spans led to a 
shorter adolescence as young ones are needed to hunt, intergroup interactions cease, 
skills lost are not replenished, and so on. But this is not all. As well as these effects, 
developmental environments are changing. As group size (and effective group size 
due to isolation), and technological know-how, diminish we would see the opposite 
of all the effects described in chapter one. Popular culture, such as fireside stories, 
may become thin and omit important detail. It may be that the popular culture of 
Neanderthal was more like ‘Dragnet’ than ‘The Sopranos’. Their games more like 
throwing stones than taking on fictional identities. It is unclear what the nature of the 
language of Neanderthals was, but as they experienced demographic decline and 
isolation what language they had would regress. A smaller population leads to 
impoverished retention or innovation of vocabulary. If rich language can drive 
cognitive flexibility perhaps Neanderthal lacked rich language. There may have been a 
lack of cultural redundancy and duplication of important knowledge bases. Hence 
there would be less chance of Cambridge tutorial-style experiments, no educational 
scaffolding, lower IQs, and perhaps affect changes through lack of play. It is easy to 
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see how all this could have caused extinction in difficult circumstances for a species 
that depended heavily on cultural inheritance and the cognition that culture caused.  
 
Despite the fact that at one point Neanderthals had sophisticated culture such as 
burial, brain extraction, ochre, cooking, leopard hide clothes, caring for the sick, 
beads, and so on,  Neanderthals went extinct, because, as argues Sterelny, they 
regressed in their technological and social complexity. This has been well 
documented in the case of indigenous Tasmanians who lost the ability to make bone 
tools and ceased fishing (Diamond 1993). This is likely to have also occurred when 
moderns first reached Australia, largely due to the dramatic demographic and social 
structure consequences of the founder effect (where the characteristics of the 
founding members of a population limit what can descend from them). A specific 
example of demographic shifts causing technological regress can be seen in Denmark 
where lithic arrowhead complexity was lost and point shape changed due to a 
population drop around 5-6000 BCE (Edinborough 2009).  
 
One of the key points surely is that learning things takes a long time. Children devote 
hours and hours and hours in playing to learn these things. With all their ecological 
stress, and the demand for ‘all hands on deck’ so to speak, Neanderthals probably 
didn’t have the required opportunities to play, and especially to play with 
technologies required to scaffold rich cognitive development. The technologies that 
children play with determine in part their cognitive abilities. Furthermore, social 
processes determine the child’s play materials (Gauvain 2001). The technological 
context will determine this too. As technological culture decays due to ecological and 
then demographic reasons, affordances of child’s play diminish. Socially offered 
options diminish and we see cognitive regress. This drives further regress in the 
developmental options for the next generation, and suddenly we have reverse 
cumulative niche construction.  
 
Similar potential, but a simple cognitive evolutionary lag when compared to sapiens 
may explain why Neanderthals didn’t adapt and experience a transformation into 
behavioural modernity in time to combat climatic change.  
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Basically the explanation of the Neanderthal extinction looks like the nuclear 
apocalypse scenario we imagined in the introduction. Alongside Sterelny’s 
technological regress arguments, we have to suppose that Neanderthals also suffered 
cognitive regress, in the exact opposite way to what I have argued for the sapiens’ 
take-off. Neanderthals had the potential to be as intelligent as us, the simply lucked-
out on the right developmental contexts. Being slightly behind the mark when climate 
change hit, their trajectory was very different. Even when culture is Hoyley it is a 
slow, step-wise and cumulative process to evolve complex adaptation. However, the 
reverse process can be rapid and dramatic. 
 
So the argument is not that pre-existing cognitive differences and competition 
between sapiens and Neanderthals caused extinction. But that cognitive differences 
resulting from an inability to adapt, possibly caused by a slight lag in behavioural, 
technological and therefore cognitive evolution, occurred after the insult. This meant 
no coming back for the Neanderthals.  
 
This is the framework I suggest employing in order to explain the actual mechanisms 
through which climate change and subsequent demographic disruption drove the 
extinction sequence. There were several contributing causes and as part of the 
explanation we must look for the relationship between technological culture and 
cognitive development. With this in mind it would be interesting to search and see if 
key technologies disappear from the archaeological record and when? This is how 
one would set about seeking the fine details of an actual lineage explanation in this 
case. 
 
So the Neanderthal objection to the sapient paradox story fails. We can explain the 
Neanderthal extinction with similar machinery to that that which explains sapiens’ 
success. Small differences in technological repertoire and small lags in cognitive 
evolution might have been all that was needed to make or break a species in a certain 
ecological context.  
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I am interested in this thesis in technology and cognition. So even if Sterelny’s 
‘ecological explanation’ for the Neanderthal extinction is correct in broad strokes, we 
can still ask did technology (or its lack) help the ratchet on the way down, and were 
there cognitive effects of this? We can add grain to the explanation by understanding 
the cognitive impoverishment that might come from losing or no longer acquiring key 
technological advances. Advances that would act as privileged causes of cognitive 
development. 
 
The sapient paradox is explained by a cultural-technological-developmental ratchet. 
The Neanderthal extinction is explained by precisely the reverse effect. Several 
negative events ratchet off each other and drive a technological and cultural regress. 
To illustrate, think again of the Cambridge tutorial example I gave in chapter three. 
Imagine if the tutorials were abolished, writing of notes in class ceased to be 
encouraged, and paper and pencils were no longer provided. Students would begin to 
perform poorly in mathematical physics, this would result in a dearth of skilled 
lecturing staff and further regress of physics education. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
In the movie ‘The Matrix’ Neo spends time learning to fight. The process by which he 
learns is that an interface rod is plugged into his brain through a socket already 
installed in his skull. The relevant information required to, say, use Kung Fu, is 
uploaded to his brain in a format that means he can employ the technique 
immediately. The point is that if there is the right information in the environment, 
presented to the agent in the right way, and there exist adaptations for uptake of the 
information, then teaching and learning and the development of novel cognitive 
devices can be seamless. However, if the information is degraded, perhaps because 
the relevant culture has lost its Hoyleyness, or if the teachome or cultome are 
incomplete, or the appropriate pedagogical structures are absent, or the learning 
window is disrupted, or crucial content fails to get recorded or memorized, then the 
system generating adaptive developmental environments may break down. Stable, 
high-fidelity, high-volume flow depends on individual cognitive adaptation, learning 
As We Build Our World We Build Our Minds 
240 
 
environments, and demographic support (to buffer resources and supply innovation) 
(Sterelny, 2011). It seems that Neanderthals may have lacked two of these. They 
were demographically disrupted, and the learning environments were degrading. 
Mental representations were probably not being preserved across generations and so 
instructional intention becomes lost. Technologies would be going extinct, and with 
them developmental environments. Cognition would have been decaying and then 
there would have been no return.  
 
The important conclusion to draw from this chapter is not necessarily a fine-grained 
explanation of these two puzzles. I’ve emphasized that I am not attempting to give an 
actual sequence of events that explains these problems. I’m merely trying to explain 
what would constitute such an explanation. Would Ayla, the fictional Cro-Magnon, 
raised by Neanderthals, have succeeded in using her sapiens smarts to profit? The 
answer is probably not, especially if her developmental environment was 
impoverished. Would a Neanderthal, raised by Cro-Magnons, be capable of 
representational art and fundamental mathematical correspondences? I think the 
answer is probably. Essentialist thinking must give way to causative, contextualised, 
developmental processes, and this applies even today. Finally, it will not have 
escaped the reader’s attention that the Neanderthal extinction itself is an effect with 
myriad complex causes of its development...  
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Final Summary and Conclusions 
 
In chapter one, I demonstrated that cultural technologies play a causal role in 
psychological trait development. In chapter two, I explained the constructivist neural 
mechanisms underpinning these phenomena. In chapter three, I argued that external 
media further support cognition and afford us novel and powerful capabilities. In part 
two, I examined causal roles in developmental systems and argued that these cultural 
technologies sometimes play an important privileged role in development. This 
reasoning helped us to explain away the puzzling nature of the sapient paradox and 
the Neanderthal extinction, in part by reference to changing cultural and 
technological environments.  
 
My overall point is this: As we build our worlds, we build our minds. Culture has a 
significant role to play in the development of psychological traits. Largely this is 
through formal education. But cultural technology, too, has a significant role to play 
in these processes. Cultural technology causes developmental changes in the brain, 
cultural technology supports psychological functions, and cultural technology partially 
constitutes some loops of cognitive processing.  
 
In an often underestimated book, Merlin Donald (1991) describes three phases in the 
evolution of human cognition. I believe that in most respects Donald has got the story 
exactly right. Our lineage went through important transitions generating mimesis, 
language and symbol use. However a lot has happened within the period denoted by 
his ‘third phase’ (indeed, a lot has happened since Donald wrote in 1991!) and these 
changes need to be fleshed out. The import of doing this is that Donald’s third phase 
is a period of rapid human cognitive evolutionary change. Prehistory is a long time 
and the third phase is comparatively brief. This suggests that the changes Donald has 
described are very much only a part of an ongoing process of human cognitive 
evolution.  
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The result is that there are important elements of human cognitive evolutionary 
theory that are relevant for us today, here and now. I have argued that 
developmental environments shape human minds to some degree. We have all heard 
of the ‘poor upbringings’ that many social misfits have had. We know that ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ environments will effect child cognitive development. However, if we look at 
environmental change over time, we see that some developmental contexts can 
ratchet further change in developmental context and, therefore, in cognition. By 
tracing the context of child development and how that context changes over time and 
place, and by studying the effects that this has had on human minds and culture, 
throughout history and prehistory, we can say something important about human 
potential and human nature. We can identify what causes human minds to change, 
and what contextual modifications can do to human thought. What will be the effect 
on human thought of the emergence of pervasive virtual environments? What would 
human cognition be like in the aftermath of nuclear war? Were Neanderthals human? 
If we take distinctively human cognition to be that which is enabled by external 
symbolic media then perhaps ‘humans’ are very, very recent indeed. These are the 
sorts of questions that this thesis should give us the conceptual tools to answer. 
 
Ever since biologically modern humans emerged there has been a dramatic wealth of 
technological and task-focused knowledge and artifacts produced. This changes the 
developmental environment dramatically, and the result is ongoing, rapid, cumulative 
changes to the brain and cognition. The really important changes actually came after 
the Neanderthals. It was only in the last 10,000 years, really only in the last 5,000 that 
we see the emergence of writing. With the possible exception of language, this is 
without a doubt the most important transformative technology that humans have 
invented. Today we experience total immersion in a virtual world of written texts. 
Written symbols constitute a massive portion of our physical environments. But the 
ability to write, and the existence of a developmental niche utterly teeming with 
written symbols are only one factor in an intricate developmental web. We have seen 
arguments for the role of genes, social structure, pedagogic practices, attentional 
biases, symbolic technologies, children’s games, and a host of other factors 
intertwining to hone the development of just a single cognitive trait. Given that this 
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process of cognitive evolution (in part driven by novel technologies) is not only 
ongoing, but actually accelerating, and given the wealth of technologies that we are 
currently creating which seem to have an impact on cognitive development, we are 
going to need some way to tease apart this dire swamp of causes. The time when 
genetic determinism was taken seriously is long gone. The developmental system is 
intricate and interrelated. If we have any hope of intervening sensibly on it by setting 
education policy, or remedial contexts, or in designing technological aids to cognition, 
then we must be able to understand, in tractable fashion, developmental causation. 
Genes certainly ‘reach’ and produce amino acid sequences, cultural technologies 
‘reach’ and effect cognitive concepts, somewhere in the middle the two mix and 
mingle. Hopefully the tool I have introduced in chapters four through six goes some 
way toward suggesting how we might untangle this mess and apportion causal 
responsibility in order to both explain and generalize over these complex systems. 
 
Furthermore, we should expect to see variability in human behaviour and cognition 
across place and time. Sterelny is probably right to claim that ‘behavioural modernity’ 
is a flawed concept and that high-bandwidth and fidelity and an apprentice learning 
structure are the important innovations. Shea (2011) echoes this sentiment, ‘as an 
analytical construct behavioural modernity is deeply flawed at all epistemological 
levels’ (p. 1). Behavioural and cognitive variability is exactly what we would expect 
given the role that neuroconstructive processes have been playing ever since we had 
a ‘modern’ brain. ‘Progression’ from being essentially primitive to being essentially 
modern is not the way to look at things. So much is context-dependent, and so much 
could vanish overnight if contexts were to change. There is no forward momentum in 
evolution (Godfrey-Smith 2009). Such is the precarious and fragile nature of human 
psychological traits. 
 
But things can go the other way too. I have argued for population-wide changes in 
what we are capable of achieving. The advent of number words is one example of 
this. So, too, is the general shift in IQ in the twentieth century. We are extremely 
adept now at offloading static information to our environments, as lists, as notes, as 
texts, in accounting, in law, in every domain of human endeavour. But technology 
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now permits us to offload dynamic processes too. We can program computers to 
think for us, and to keep processing while we turn our attention to other tasks. What 
will become of human capabilities if basic programming skills, and new ways of 
representing problems, become a population norm? Human psychology is a moving 
target of investigation.  
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